Opinion
No. 1736 C.D. 2014
06-05-2015
Rasheed Nifas, Appellant v. John E. Wetzel
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Rasheed Nifas (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County sustaining the preliminary objections of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections John E. Wetzel (Secretary) to Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Upon review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the Petition.
Appellant is and has at all times relevant to this litigation been an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections (Department). In his Petition, Appellant alleges that on June 15, 2007 while a resident at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI Fayette) he was put under investigation for a violation of Department rules and placed in administrative custody status. (Petition ¶6, Ex. 1.) Appellant alleges that the investigation was conducted under false pretenses and was in retaliation for the filing of grievances. (Id. ¶6, Ex 2.) Appellant alleges that he was again placed in administrative custody on July 13, 2007 for an investigation related to a conversation with a Department employee, although Appellant had no such encounter with that employee. (Id. ¶7, Ex. 3.)
Administrative custody is "[a] status of confinement for non-disciplinary reasons that provides closer supervision, control, and protection than is provided for in general population." (Petition Ex. 9, DC-ADM 802 (issued May 14, 2008), Glossary of Terms.)
On February 7, 2008, while still in administrative custody, Appellant alleges that he was informed by the Program Review Committee (PRC) that a request for a transfer from SCI Fayette was denied and that he was being placed on the Restricted Release List (RRL). (Id. ¶8, Ex. 4.) On March 26, 2008, a Staff Assistant in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department responded to an inquiry from Appellant, informing him by letter that he met the criteria for the RRL under Department policy DC-ADM 802 because he had received 34 misconducts, many of which were for assaultive and disruptive behavior, and he had 13 active separations on file and he had been transferred from four institutions. (Id. ¶9, Exs. 6, 7.) Appellant alleges that the Department had falsely reported the nature of these misconduct reports and that his placement on the RRL was improper. (Id. ¶9.)
The Restricted Release List is "[a] list of inmates who are restricted from release from [administrative custody] status without the prior approval of the Secretary/designee. An inmate may be placed on this list when he/she poses a threat to the secure operation of the facility and where a transfer to another facility or jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern." (Petition Ex. 9, DC-ADM 802 (issued May 14, 2008), Glossary of Terms.)
After further attempts to inquire into his status on the RRL, the PRC provided Appellant with an October 4, 2008 memorandum by the Major of Unit Management of SCI Fayette to the Superintendent of that facility, indicating that the PRC had explained to Appellant that he was on the RRL and that there was no requirement to provide him with a due process hearing prior to his placement on that list. (Id. ¶10, Ex. 8.) On April 4, 2012, Appellant was issued a report indicating that he cannot be released from administrative custody in the restricted housing unit absent the written authorization of the Secretary. (Id. ¶12, Ex. 10.) Appellant alleges that he exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to him prior to filing the Petition and that, in its responses to Appellant's appeals, the Department had never asserted any penological interest for his indefinite administrative custody, which had continued for over five years as of the date Appellant filed his Petition on August 14, 2012. (Id. ¶¶12-16.)
Appellant asserts two counts in his Petition. First, Appellant claims that he was deprived of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because he was deprived of a hearing to challenge the Department's rationale for placing him on the RRL prior to being placed on the list and any meaningful opportunity to challenge his status on the RRL after being placed on that list. Second, Appellant claims that his placement on the RRL constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because being placed on the RRL was "grossly disproportionate" to his claimed misconducts and Appellant's confinement in administrative custody "exposed [Appellant] to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious physical, mental, and emotional harm to [his] future health." (Id. ¶20.)
Following preliminary objections filed by the Secretary, the trial court dismissed the Petition. Relying on Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1975), the trial court concluded that segregated confinement in administrative custody did not "present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest," id. at 486, that would support a due process claim. (Trial Court Op. at 5-6.) The trial court further found that the Petition did not meet the standard of alleging a cruel and unusual punishment claim because Appellant had not alleged that he had suffered an actual and serious deprivation of human needs. (Id. at 6-7.)
On appeal, we initially address Appellant's claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment through his confinement in restricted housing as a result of his status on the RRL. A writ of habeas corpus "is an extraordinary remedy that is available after other remedies have been exhausted or are ineffectual or nonexistent...[and] is not a substitute for appellate review." Department of Corrections v. Reese, 774 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Fortune v. Dragovich, 192 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2002). The writ of habeas corpus "lies to correct void or illegal sentences or an illegal detention, or where the record shows a trial or sentence or plea so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a denial of due process or other constitutional rights, or where for other reasons the interests of justice imperatively required it." Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 180 A.2d 923, 924 (Pa. 1962); see also Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 24 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1942); Chadwick v. Caulfield, 834 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Appellant originally appealed the trial court's order sustaining the preliminary objections to the Superior Court. Upon review of the appeal, the Superior Court transferred the appeal to this Court on the basis that the question presented by the appeal fell within our exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the court of common pleas in cases relating to the secondary review of certain appeals from Commonwealth agencies. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 763(a)(1); Nifas v. Wetzel, (Pa. Super., No. 405 W.D.A. 2014, Order filed July 1, 2014) (per curiam).
Our standard of review of a trial court decision sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing an action is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Sassu v. Borough of West Conshohocken, 929 A.2d 258, 260 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). When determining whether preliminary objections were properly sustained, we must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts and any reasonable inferences therefrom. Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 158 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer may be sustained "only in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would certainly be a fruitless exercise." Id.
While the writ has traditionally been limited to determining the legality of detention, in Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1971), our Supreme Court extended the scope of the writ to allow it to be employed to secure relief from conditions constituting cruel and unusual punishment, even though the detention itself is legal. Id. at 112-13; see also Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 640-41 & n.22 (Pa. 2010). However, the Court in Bryant cautioned that the writ "should not be entertained on the slightest pretext or merely to correct prison conditions which can be remedied through an appeal to prison authorities or to an administrative agency." Bryant, 280 A.2d at 113; see also Fortune, 792 A.2d at 1259. Moreover, "it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penal institutions." Bryant, 280 A.2d at 113; see also Fortune, 792 A.2d at 1259.
To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on prison conditions, an inmate must demonstrate an objective component of whether the conditions were a "sufficiently serious" deprivation of human needs and a subjective component of whether prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the conditions of confinement. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1991). While "[j]ust what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense is a matter which defies concrete definition," Bryant, 280 A.2d at 116, the Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981)) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The inquiry into deliberate indifference requires proof that (i) a prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Tindell v. Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1039 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Here, the allegations in the Petition clearly fall short of this standard. Appellant has not alleged that he was deprived of any of the minimal necessities of human life, such as food, warmth or medical care, while in administrative custody at SCI Fayette, but rather only makes generalized allegations of "serious physical, mental, and emotional harm." (Petition ¶20(b).) As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, while an inmate may show that conditions of confinement act "in combination" to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, "[n]othing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05; see also Tindell 87 A.3d at 1042. Appellant has also not alleged that he has suffered any actual harm as a result of these conditions, but instead only cites an unspecified "risk" of harm to his "future health." (Petition ¶20(b).) Appellant's Eighth Amendment claim appears to rest on nothing more than the fact that he has been placed in indefinite solitary confinement as a result of his status on the RRL; courts have made clear, however, that the use of solitary confinement or restricted housing units alone does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Tindell, 87 A.3d at 1042; Rivera v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 837 A.2d 525, 534 (Pa. Super. 2003). Finally, the Petition does not contain allegations sufficient to satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim as Appellant has only summarily alleged that prison officials acted "[d]eliberately and consciously" in keeping him in administrative custody. (Petition ¶20(b).) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant has not made out an Eighth Amendment claim.
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), held that an inmate may state an Eighth Amendment cause of action based on prison conditions that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the inmate's future health, in that case the inmate identified a specific environmental factor, secondhand tobacco smoke, that had begun to cause him health problems. Id. at 28. Here, Appellant has not identified any aspect of the conditions in segregated housing at SCI Fayette that constitute a serious deprivation of human needs or any potential effect that such a factor would have on his health.
We next address Appellant's claim that his due process rights were violated because he was not afforded a hearing in which he could challenge the basis for the determination to place him on the RRL. It is well-established that matters of prison management, such as the determination of where a prisoner should be housed within a correctional facility, are uniquely within the province of executive and legislative branches. See, e.g., Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Martin v. Jeffes, 501 A.2d 308, 310 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are triggered by a deprivation of a cognizable liberty interest. Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Even where a liberty interest is found, due process is a flexible concept that only requires such procedural protection as the particular situation warrants. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 1996).
Department regulations concerning inmate housing provide that while "[a]n inmate does not have a right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility," administrative custody may not be punitive in nature and that the Department must maintain written procedures "and require due process in accordance...with established principles of law" for inmates in restricted housing units. 37 Pa. Code § 93.11. The Department's written procedure concerning administrative custody and the RRL is set forth in DC-ADM 802. Under DC-ADM 802, an inmate generally may be kept in administrative custody for up to 30 days for investigative purposes, at which point the Department must charge the inmate with a misconduct and a hearing must be held within 7 working days. DC-ADM 802 § 2.A.4. DC-ADM 802 provides that when an inmate is kept in administrative custody for more than 30 days and a misconduct charge is unwarranted, the PRC may keep the inmate in administrative custody beyond 30 days if it holds a hearing to determine whether continued administrative custody is appropriate. Id. DC-ADM 802 also requires monthly review of the status of any inmate who is in administrative custody, weekly meetings with a counselor and mental health assessments at least every 90 days. Id. § 2.D.2-3, 7.
Available at http://www.cor.pa.gov/Administration/General%20Information/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx#.VR7plP50xOX (last visited May 1, 2015).
Pursuant to DC-ADM 802, the facility manager or his designee may request that an inmate be placed on the RRL "when he/she poses a threat to the secure operation of the facility and where a transfer to another facility or jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern." Id. § 1.C.1. Criteria for placing an inmate on the RRL include a history of assaults against inmates or staff, escape attempts, sexual abuse history and a threat to the orderly operation of a facility. Id. § 1.C.2. DC-ADM 802 provides that the facility manager or his designee will provide a written rationale for the placement of the inmate on the RRL and the Secretary or his designee makes the final determination on the placement. Id. § 1.C.3-4. While ultimate authority for removal from the RRL lies with the Secretary or his designee, facility staff must make an annual recommendation whether an inmate should remain on the RRL and the PRC may recommend that an inmate on the RRL be released to general population or a specialized unit at any time. Id. §§ 2.D.8, 4.B.1-2.
The version of DC-ADM 802 in effect at the time Appellant was placed on the RRL is substantially the same in relevant respects although there was no requirement in the prior version that facility staff annually recommend whether or not an inmate should remain on the RRL. (See Petition Ex. 9, DC-ADM 802 (issued May 14, 2008).)
The scope of an inmate's right to assert a due process challenge to placement in segregated confinement in a correctional facility was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sandin. In Sandin, DeMont Conner, an inmate in a Hawaii correctional facility, was accused of a misconduct and following a hearing was confined to disciplinary segregation for 30 days. Id. at 474-76. Conner appealed and the misconduct determination was eventually overturned for lack of evidence. Id. at 476. Conner thereafter brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) for a deprivation of his procedural due process rights for not allowing him to call witnesses in his defense at his disciplinary hearing. Id. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Conner had a state-created liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation as a result of a Hawaii regulation that required a finding of guilt in a disciplinary hearing to be supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 476-77.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, and in the process rejected the methodology employed in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), and decisions following Hewitt that had focused on whether state prison regulations contained mandatory language that might be read to create a state-created liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83 & n.5. The Sandin Court concluded that the Hewitt approach had created two undesirable effects: first, the Hewitt line of cases created disincentives for states to codify prison administrative procedures and instead provide prison staff with unfettered discretion, and, second, Hewitt had "led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83.
The Court in Sandin reasoned that the proper approach to determine the nature of an inmate's due process rights centered not on whether language in a state prison regulation was mandatory but rather on "the nature of the deprivation," 515 U.S. 481, stating:
[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted). Applying this standard, the Court concluded that Conner's segregated confinement for a period of 30 days based on an unfounded misconduct charge did not present the type of atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life that would create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 486.
In Bowen v. Ryan, 248 Fed. Appx. 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the prisoner due process standard enunciated in Sandin to a Section 1983 claim brought by a Pennsylvania inmate who had been placed on the RRL and confined in administrative custody for a period of 20 years. The Third Circuit concluded that the inmate's placement on the RRL did not by itself invoke a protected liberty interest, but that his 20-year confinement in administrative custody was the type of atypical and significant hardship sufficient to trigger due process protections. Bowen, 248 Fed. Appx. at 304. Nevertheless, the court in Bowen held that the Department's procedures satisfied minimum due process standards as he was afforded an initial opportunity to be heard after confinement and periodic review of his status, rejecting the inmate's argument that the PRC's periodic review of inmate on the RRL was powerless because the PRC had the authority to make recommendations regarding the inmate's release. Id. at 304-05. Similarly, this Court in Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), dismissed a mandamus action brought by inmates held in administrative custody in restricted housing units for periods between two and thirteen years that sought to compel a hearing to challenge their indefinite confinement, holding that the periodic review provided for in DC-ADM 802 for inmates serving extended periods in administrative custody satisfied the minimum constitutional standards of due process. Id. at 1252-53; see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143-147 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a Pennsylvania inmate held in administrative custody for eight years faced an atypical and significant hardship that required due process protections, but that periodic reviews prescribed by DC-ADM 802 satisfied due process).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant has not alleged a violation of his due process rights that would support the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. First, Appellant did not suffer an atypical and significant deprivation by initially being placed on the RRL without first being able to challenge the placement at a hearing. Bowen, 248 Fed. Appx. at 304. Prison officials must be afforded great deference to determine the housing requirements of inmates in state facilities and the principles of due process impose few restrictions on this authority. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83; Clark, 918 A.2d at 161; Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Appellant does not allege that the conditions he experienced in administrative custody as a result of being placed on the RRL was any more restrictive than that faced in the ordinary course by inmates in segregated confinement at SCI Fayette. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
To the extent Appellant alleges that his placement on the RRL was based on falsified reports of misconduct to correctional officials, Sandin makes clear that disciplinary confinement based upon unfounded charges does not automatically trigger due process rights. See also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that seven months of disciplinary confinement based upon falsified evidence does not by itself create a liberty interest). However, there is no indication in the Petition that the falsified reports ever resulted in a finding of misconduct that lead to his confinement in disciplinary custody or administrative custody. Furthermore, correspondence from the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department to Appellant, which Appellant has attached to his Petition, makes it readily apparent that the decision to place him on the RRL was based not on any one misconduct report but rather the lengthy disciplinary record that he had amassed while in custody, including over 34 misconducts, 13 separations and 4 separations from facilities. (Petition Ex. 6.) Even if Appellant were to challenge all of the items on his disciplinary record, "prison officials must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain security free from judicial interference" and therefore internal determinations by correctional facilities are beyond the purview of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998); see also Brown v. Department of Corrections, 913 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (per curiam).
While Appellant's initial placement on the RRL did not give rise to a liberty interest, Appellant's indefinite stay of more than five years in a restricted housing unit may constitute the type of atypical and significant hardship that triggers procedural due process protections. See Bowen, 248 Fed. Appx. at 304; Torres, 997 A.2d at 1253. Nevertheless, we conclude that Department policies regarding administrative custody satisfy minimal constitutional standards of due process. Bowen, 248 Fed. Appx. at 304. DC-ADM 802 provides that an inmate in administrative custody shall be reviewed monthly by the PRC. DC-ADM § 2.D.3. While the PRC lacks the authority to order an inmate removed from the RRL, it does possess the ability to recommend to the facility manager that an inmate can be safely released to the general population or a specialized housing unit. Id. § 4.B.2. DC-ADM 802 further provides that the counselor, housing unit manager and other facility staff shall annually review the inmate's status and make a recommendation as to whether any inmate on the RRL should remain on the list that will be forwarded to the Secretary or his designee for his review, who has ultimate authority for removing an individual from the list. Id. §§ 2.D.8, 4.B.1. Appellant does not allege that he was denied this periodic review.
Appellant finds support for his due process claim in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that placement in an Ohio "supermax" facility was an atypical and significant hardship that creates a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also that Ohio had provided sufficient procedural protection to comply with its constitutional obligations. In finding that assignment to a supermax facility implicates constitutional due process protections, the Supreme Court in Wilkinson relied on such factors as the harsh conditions in supermax where inmates are deprived of almost all environmental or sensory stimuli and human contact and the fact that assignment to a supermax automatically disqualifies an inmate from parole eligibility. Id. at 223-24. These factors are not present here. See Clark, 918 A.2d at 162-64 (distinguishing Wilkinson and holding that inmates confined in Capital Case Unit after their death sentences were overturned did not allege that the conditions in that unit were more restrictive than other types of segregated housing at Department facilities or any other factors that would demonstrate an atypical and significant hardship). --------
Because Appellant has not sufficiently alleged that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of June, 2015, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge