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holding that the plaintiff's allegations that one or both of her co-workers, inter alia, told her that her clothes were sexy and her hair was beautiful, blew kisses at her and other employees, sent an inappropriate e-mail, and joked about sharing a hotel room with her did not establish a hostile work environment
Summary of this case from Ilinca v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of NassauOpinion
No. 10-61-cv.
May 2, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.).
Carmen Nieves, Staten Island, NY, pro se.
Katherine C. Glynn (Michael B. Golden, on the brief), Robinson Cole LLP, New York, NY, (Counsel for Appellees District Council 37, et al.); Elaine Smith, Lewis, Clifton Nikolaidis, P.C., New York, NY, (Counsel for Appellee Federation of Field Representatives/Municipal Employees Legal Services Plan), for Appellees.
Present: ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Carmen Nieves, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's judgment granting the defendants' summary judgment motions in her employment discrimination action. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). "In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Davis v. State of N.Y., 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court's judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. Nieves has not sufficiently explained how documents that allegedly were erased by Defendant-Appellant District Council 37 ("DC 37") were relevant to the district court's conclusion that she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that, where a party seeks an adverse inference regarding the content of destroyed evidence, "[t]he burden falls on the prejudiced party to produce some evidence suggesting that a document or documents relevant to substantiating [her] claim would have been included among the destroyed files") (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to Nieves's argument that a conflict of interest existed between DC 37 and her union, the district court correctly concluded that the sharing of certain office-related resources was not sufficient to establish such a conflict. In any event, even if a conflict of interest in fact existed, Nieves has not made the requisite showing that such a conflict results in conduct on the part of the union that is "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith" and "seriously undermine the arbitral process." Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted).
We have considered Nieves's other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.