Opinion
Nos. 40783 and 40784.
November 8, 1948.
1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS: Municipal Corporations: Sale of 3.2% Beer: Power of City of Fourth Class to Regulate. Since the sale of 3.2% beer has been legalized by statute, a city of the fourth class is powerless to prohibit such sale by ordinance, but it may reasonably regulate such sale.
2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS: Municipal Corporations: Sale of 3.2% Beer: Liquor Control Act Not Exclusive: Additional Sunday Restrictions by Cities Authorized. The Liquor Control Act is not exclusive but cities may further restrict liquor sales by prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer on Sunday.
3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS: Municipal Corporations: Constitutional Law: Sale of 3.2% Beer Prohibited on Sunday: Ordinance Not Unreasonable. The ordinance of North Kansas City prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer on Sunday does not appear on its face to be unreasonable and appellants have failed to establish their burden of proof. The ordinance is regulatory and not prohibitory, and is a reasonable exercise of the power of the city.
4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS: Municipal Corporations: City Liquor Licenses: Ordinance Not in Conflict. The ordinance prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer on Sunday is not a violation of the rights granted by the city under liquor licenses issued to appellants, as a city cannot grant away its police power.
Appeal from Clay Circuit Court. — Hon. James S. Rooney, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Wherritt Sevier, by Robert F. Sevier, Lyman Field and Clay C. Rogers for appellants.
(1) The trial court erred in refusing to grant the injunctions and in dismissing appellants' petitions because the comprehensive Missouri Liquor Control Act of 1933 superseded and repealed the application of the Sunday Blue Law to the sale of 3.2% beer. The Sunday Blue Law of 1825 as it affects the 3.2% beer involved was repealed by implication because of the later enactment of a comprehensive liquor act. Chap. 32, Art. I, R.S. 1939, Liquor Control Act; Chap. 32, Art. II, R.S. 1939, Non-intoxicating Beer; State ex rel. Hewett v. Womach, 196 S.W.2d 809; John Bardenheier Wine Liquor Co. v. St. Louis, 135 S.W.2d 345; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 556, pp. 559-560; Sec. 459, R.S. 1939. (2) The Sunday Blue Law of 1825 is in conflict with and repugnant to the Liquor Control Act of 1933. This conflict works an implied repeal of the Sunday Blue Law. Secs. 4891, 4892, 4901, 4995, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. Hewett v. Womach, supra; John Bardenheier Wine Liquor Co. v. St. Louis, supra; State ex rel. Mo. Pac. v. Public Service Comm. of Missouri, 275 Mo. 60, 204 S.W. 395; State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 13 S.W.2d 1061; State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; State v. Mitts, 315 Mo. 1320, 289 S.W. 935; State v. Kessells, 120 Mo. App. 233, 96 S.W. 494. (3) The trial court erred in refusing to grant the injunctions and in dismissing appellants' petitions because the City of North Kansas City has no power to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer, since it must look to the Missouri Liquor Control Act or what power it has and that act only gives it power to regulate the sale of non-intoxicating beer. State ex rel. Hewett v. Womach, 196 S.W.2d 809. (4) Except in the instances of local option by popular vote, sales to minors, near schools, and to drunkards, the city is given no express power of prohibition. Secs. 4935-4942, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. Sheffell v. McCammon, 111 Mo. App. 623, 86 S.W. 510; Secs. 4849, 7169, R.S. 1939. (5) The city has no implied power of prohibition because not only do the express powers of prohibition above enumerated inferentially exclude any further power of prohibition, but also because when a city is specifically given power to merely regulate or license the liquor traffic, the power to prohibit the traffic is impliedly withheld from the city. Sec. 4954, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. Sheffell v. McCammon, supra; State ex rel. Hewett v. Womach, supra; 48 C.J.S., sec. 50, p. 187; 30 Am. Jur., sec. 316, p. 367; sec. 57, p. 289; City of Joplin v. Jacobs, 119 Mo. App. 134, 94 S.W. 210; Sec. 7442, R.S. 1939; St. Louis v. Tielkemeyer, 226 Mo. 130, 125 S.W. 1123; People v. McGraw, 190 Mich. 233, 150 N.W. 836; St. Louis v. Bernard, 294 Mo. 54, 155 S.W. 394; Sec. 7168, R.S. 1939; 37 Words and Phrases, p. 68. (6) The Missouri Legislature comprehensively entered the field of the liquor traffic when it passed the Liquor Control Act of 1933. The state having thus entered the field, and in doing so having set up its own standards of prohibition, a city in these circumstances may not enact any ordinance conflicting with or enlarging or diminishing prohibition standards set up by state law. Point (1), supra, and authorities cited thereunder; Point (5), supra, and authorities cited thereunder; State ex rel. Hewett v. Womach, supra; State ex rel. Sheffell v. McCammon, supra; 38 Am. Jur., sec. 316, p. 367. (7) The trial court erred in refusing to grant the injunctions and in dismissing appellants' petitions because a city cannot abridge the rights of a holder of a previously issued tavern license in regard to the sale of intoxicating liquors. City of Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo. 515; State ex rel. Shaw v. Baker, 32 Mo. App. 98. (8) The trial court erred in refusing to grant the injunctions and in dismissing appellants' petitions because the ordinances are unconstitutional. Art, I, Sec. 2, Constitution of Missouri, 1945; Art. I, Sec. 10. Constitution of Missouri, 1945; State ex rel. Shaw v. Baker, supra; O'Brien v. Ash, 169 Mo. 283, 69 S.W. 8; Poole Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S.W.2d 23; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d 628; Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., 313 Mo. 145, 281 S.W. 47; State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83; Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119.
Ward A. Dorsey for respondents.
(1) The trial court did not err in refusing to grant the injunctions and in dismissing appellants' petitions because the ordinances enacted by the City of North Kansas City regulating the sale of 3.2% beer by forbidding such sale on Sunday were within the general police power of the City of North Kansas City, and within the power granted to said city by the Missouri Liquor Control Act to regulate and control the sale of non-intoxicating beer and within the power expressly granted to regulate and license certain businesses. Secs. 4954, 7168, 7196, R.S. 1939. (2) The City of North Kansas City has a broad, general police power to enact any and all ordinances for the protection and in furtherance of the peace, comfort, safety, health, morality and general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality. The express power to regulate and license many businesses and occupations has been given to cities of the fourth class by the Missouri Legislature. Poole Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 125 S.W.2d 23, 343 Mo. 1143; City of Springfield v. Smith, 19 405 S.W.2d 1; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 25 S.W. 202, 41 Am. St. Rep. 678; Zinn v. Steelville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 S.W.2d 398; Lancaster v. Reed, 207 S.W. 868. (3) The Missouri Liquor Control Act is comprehensive but not all inclusive. It is a standard set as to limits beyond which no licensee may go. It does not attempt to differentiate between rural areas and cities but expressly grants to cities the right to regulate and control the sale of non-intoxicating beer within their city limits and such cities have the power to exact additional requirements as to such sales. Regulation by forbidding sale on Sunday is within power. State ex rel. Hewlett v. Womach, 196 S.W.2d 809; Vest v. Kansas City, 194 S.W.2d 38; City v. Ameln, 235 Mo. 669, 139 S.W. 429; Zinn v. City of Steelville, supra; Village of St. Anthony v. Brandon, 10 Idaho 205, 77 P. 322; Corporation of Minden v. Sieverstein and Dittmer, 36 La. Ann. 912. (4) It is not necessary that an ordinance properly referable to the police power state in its title or in the body of said ordinance that it is based upon the police power. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d 628; State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 245, 78 S.W. 569. (5) The Sunday Blue Law is not in conflict with nor repugnant to the Missouri Liquor Control Act of 1933. State v. Malone, 238 Mo. App. 939, 192 S.W.2d 68; State v. Haliburton, 194 S.W.2d 206; State v. Humphrey, 194 S.W.2d 545. (6) All efforts must be made to construe the Missouri Liquor Control Act so as to be consistent with Sec. 4742, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939. State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 13 S.W.2d 1061. (7) The ordinances in question are valid and constitutional as a proper exercise of the powers granted cities of the fourth class by the Liquor Control Act and the police power statute. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, supra; Zinn v. City of Steelville, supra. (8) The ordinances, enforcement of which is sought to be restrained by appellants' petitions, are presumed to be reasonable. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the law making power of a city has properly considered the public interest and the necessity of extending its police power in enacting ordinances referable to the police power of the city, and the burden is upon one attacking such an ordinance to clearly show its unreasonableness. State ex rel. St. Louis Transfer Co. v. Clifford, 228 Mo. 194, 128 S.W. 775, 21 Ann. Cas. 1218; City of St. Louis v. Cool, 228 Mo. 209, 128 S.W. 759; Hislop v. City of Joplin, 250 Mo. 588, 157 S.W. 625; Ex parte Tarling, 241 S.W. 929;; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, supra. (9) The propriety or advisability of passing an ordinance, or the motive of the aldermen so passing the ordinance, is a matter for the law making body or power and cannot be inquired into by the courts. State ex rel. Russell v. Gardner, 218 Mo. App. 217, 265 S.W. 996; State ex rel. Strait v. Brooks, 220 Mo. App. 708, 293 S.W. 471; City of Monett v. Campbell, 204 S.W. 32. (10) A license is not a contract and confers no vested rights in the licenses. All licenses granted by a city are subject to a later exercise of police power by the city during the term of said license. State v. Parker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, 139 S.W. 453; 237 Mo. 103; Gherna v. State, 146 P. 494, 16 Ariz. 344, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 94; Ex parte Deats, 166 P. 913, 22 N.M. 536; Heslep v. State Highway Dept. of S. Car., 171 S.E. 913, 171 S.C. 186.
By stipulation these appeals in two cases are consolidated and submitted on an agreed statement under Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs below appeal from judgments of the circuit court refusing to enjoin the enforcement of ordinances of the respondent, a city of the fourth class. Appellants are operators of taverns licensed to sell beer containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol by volume and not more than 3.2% by weight. The ordinances make it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, to sell such beer in the city on Sunday.
We have jurisdiction because a constitutional question has been properly raised and preserved. In addition to the attack on constitutional grounds, appellants also attack the ordinances on statutory grounds. [Unless otherwise specified statutes referred to will be sections of Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, and corresponding sections of Mo. R.S.A.]
Stated in different language from that in their brief, appellants' contentions amount to this: the ordinances are invalid because in conflict with the Missouri Liquor Control Act of 1933; that Act repeals by implication Section 4742; the ordinances violate Sections 2 and 10 of Article I of the Missouri Constitution in that they deprive appellants of their property and rights without due process of law.
Section 4742, commonly known as the Sunday Blue Law, has been on our statute books since 1825. It provides:
"Every person who shall expose to sale any goods, wares or merchandise, or shall keep open [712] any ale or porter house, grocery or tippling shop, or shall sell or retail any fermented or distilled liquor on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not exceeding fifty dollars" ($50.00).
Appellants say that Section 4742, so far as it applies to the sale of 3.2% beer, has been repealed by implication by the Liquor Control Act. It is unnecessary to decide that point for we believe the ordinances are not dependent for validity upon that section. [But see State v. Malone, 238 Mo. App. 939, 192 S.W.2d 68 .]
We agree with appellants that as the sale of 3.2% beer has been legalized by statute, a city of the fourth class is powerless to prohibit such sale by ordinance, but we do not agree that such a city is powerless to reasonably regulate such sale.
Section 7168 provides that cities of the fourth class "shall have power to enact and ordain any and all ordinances not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of this state, and such as they shall deem expedient for the good government of the city, the preservation of peace and good order, the benefit of trade and commerce and the health of the inhabitants thereof, and such other ordinances, rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to carry such powers into effect, and to alter, modify or repeal the same."
Section 4954, a part of the Liquor Control Act, says that the proper authorities of incorporated cities may "make and enforce ordinances for the regulation and control of the sale of nonintoxicating beer within their limits, not inconsistent with the provisions of this article, and provide penalties for the violation thereof."
Appellants argue that the Liquor Control Act has preempted the field of liquor legislation, both as to intoxicating and nonintoxicating liquor, to such an extent as to leave little power of regulation in the cities. They further say, that as that Act [secs. 4891-2] provides that intoxicating liquor cannot be sold during certain hours on week days and not at all on Sundays, and provides [section 4995] that nonintoxicating beer may not be sold between 1:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. but does not prohibit such sale during other hours nor on Sundays, a city by ordinance cannot further restrict such sales.
The Liquor Control Act is comprehensive, but not all-inclusive, and we so decided in a case cited by appellants. State ex rel. v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809. The Act itself [section 4954, supra] expressly grants some power to cities "for the regulation and control of the sale of nonintoxicating beer." Section 7168, supra, recognizes that, under an undefined police power, cities may make reasonable regulations for the good government and welfare of their citizens. Whether due to religious sentiment or to the well recognized fact that one day's rest in seven is beneficial to mankind, it is universally held that the police power authorizes different regulations and restrictions as to the conduct of business on the Sabbath from that permissible on other days. [See discussion and citations in City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 S.W.2d 1, l.c. 4-5, and in State v. Malone, 238 Mo. App. 939, 192 S.W.2d 68.] That is illustrated by the Liquor Control Act which licenses the sale of intoxicating liquor on week days, but prohibits it entirely on Sundays.
The fact that the city is powerless to completely prohibit the sale of nonintoxicating beer does not necessarily mean that it may not partially prohibit such sale by confining the same to week days. It may as well be argued that because the city has no power to confiscate one's property by taxation it has no power to tax at all. Many legal regulations may amount to a partial prohibition or restriction of business.
The validity of the ordinances depend upon whether they are reasonable and whether they are in harmony with our statutes and our constitution.
The ordinances, upon their faces, do not appear to be unreasonable. Therefore the burden was upon appellants to establish the fact of unreasonableness if such be the fact. This they have failed to do by either proof or argument. [Bellerive [713] Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d 628; Hislop v. City of Joplin, 250 Mo. 588, 157 S.W. 625.]
Under previous decisions of this court and of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the ordinances do not conflict with our statutes. The case of City of Flat River v. Mackley, (Mo. App.) 212 S.W.2d 462, is squarely in point. There a city ordinance substantially like those here, prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer on Sunday, was held valid. In Vest v. Kansas City, 355 Mo. 1, 194 S.W.2d 38, Division One of this court upheld a city ordinance requiring barbers to be examined at least once every six months by the City Director of Health. The state law requires them to be examined at least once a year, and oftener if required by the State Board of Barber Examiners, by a physician designated by the State Board of Health. We said: "The fact that a state has enacted regulations governing an occupation does not of itself prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the two, both the statute and ordinance will stand." In Zinn v. City of Steelville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 S.W.2d 398, this court, En Banc, upheld a city ordinance forbidding music or dancing in any place where intoxicating liquor or nonintoxicating beer is sold. What we there said anent the power of cities to regulate such occupations is applicable to the facts in the instant case. Again this court, En Banc, in State ex rel. v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809, upheld a city ordinance limiting the number of places at which intoxicating liquor may be sold, notwithstanding the Liquor Control Act provides no such limitation. We held the ordinance to be regulatory and not prohibitory.
We hold that the ordinances in the instant case constitute a reasonable exercise of the power of the respondent city, and do not conflict with our statutes or constitution.
We notice one other point made by appellants, to wit, that the ordinances violate the rights granted to appellants by their licenses.
A city cannot grant away its police power. The licenses are not contracts. They are permits, subject to reasonable future regulation or modification. [State v. Parker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, 139 S.W. 453.]
We have examined the cases cited by appellants and find nothing in them which conflicts with the conclusions we have reached. Accordingly the judgments of the circuit court are affirmed. All concur.