Opinion
No. 106,478.
2012-06-8
Charles and Shawn NICHOLSON, Appellees, v. Bruce HARTNETT, d/b/a Hartnett Enterprises, Appellant.
Appeal from Ford District Court; Daniel L. Love, Judge. Ronald Bruce Hartnett, appellant pro se. Michelle D. Mahieu, of Michelle Reinert Mahieu P.A., of Dodge City, for appellee.
Appeal from Ford District Court; Daniel L. Love, Judge.
Ronald Bruce Hartnett, appellant pro se. Michelle D. Mahieu, of Michelle Reinert Mahieu P.A., of Dodge City, for appellee.
Before GREENE, C.J., LEBEN and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LEBEN, J.
Contractor Bruce Hartnett and homeowners Charles and Shawn Nicholson ended up in a disagreement over whether the contract between them for a home-improvement project set out a maximum contract price. The district court sided with the Nicholsons, and Harnett has appealed, contending that the use of the term “maximum budget estimate” in the contract precluded interpreting it as having a fixed maximum price. But we find that the use of several terms in the contract—including “maximum budget sum”—would have left an objective reader with the understanding that the contract set out a maximum price for the project that wouldn't be exceeded unless the Nicholsons asked for extra work or made other changes to the project's scope.
The district court found that the Nicholsons should pay only $4,800 more than the maximum contract price based on the changes they requested, though Hartnett had requested over $16,000. Hartnett also appeals that conclusion, but we find the district court's ruling supported by the evidence.
The parties also disputed whether Hartnett had properly filed a mechanic's lien, under which he could seek to enforce payment of any amounts still owed to him. The district court found his claim hadn't been filed within statutory deadlines. We disagree, but even though his mechanic's lien was timely filed, it lacked another statutorily required element—a reasonably itemized statement of the amounts charged. Thus, the district court's conclusion that the lien wasn't enforceable was correct, even though the basis for its ruling was not.
We find no error in the district court's ruling, and we affirm its judgment.
Factual Background
In 2008, Charles and Shawn Nicholson and contractor Bruce Hartnett (doing business under the name of Hartnett Enterprises) discussed a potential construction project involving remodeling and adding onto the Nicholsons' house in rural Ford County. At trial, Charles Nicholson testified that he asked Hartnett for a proposal that included all the work to be completed and the costs of that work. Nicholson testified that he wanted a proposal for the actual cost of the project, saying specifically that he didn't want a “cost-plus” proposal because he'd been involved in that type of project before and didn't have control of the cost. Nicholson testified that he told Hartnett that he wouldn't agree to a cost-plus contract.
In June 2008, Hartnett drafted and submitted to the Nicholsons a written proposal that described the work to be completed and the costs associated with the project. In that proposal, Hartnett said that the “maximum budget sum” for the project was $140,850:
“We propose to furnish all of the Labor, Equipment, Material and Sales Taxes, as indicated further below, per our discussions and drawings at your 20'x40' Addition with Patio & Composite Deck, per the plan, for the MAXIMUM BUDGET SUM OF One Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars—($140,850.00).”
Near the end of the document, Hartnett added: “As with all of our Proposals, the actual cost would be reduced by any labor, materials or equipment which you provide, and actual choices in final material selection & installation choices. As indicated above, this should also be considered as a Maximum Budget Estimate.” Nicholson testified that he understood the document to mean that he would pay no more than $140,850 for the project. Nicholson testified that he believed that anything that would defray from the cost would reduce the maximum amount and that he would owe Hartnett for unbudgeted extra work he requested as part of the overall cost.
Nicholson testified that he accepted Hartnett's proposal. But Hartnett—representing himself—indicated there is “a total difference between a maximum sum and a maximum budget” and argued that the document was a maximum budget proposal, which should be treated as an estimate.
After the project began, Nicholson asked Hartnett for more detailed billing in his monthly statements. Nicholson paid each bill in full from February to June 2009. Nicholson testified that he paid the bills without knowing how the bills affected the previously agreed-upon budget. In October 2009, Hartnett issued a final statement that listed the total cost as $158,037.50 with a balance due of $15,926.61. The statement showed $124,194 in budgeted work and $33,844 in unbudgeted and “known extra work.” Nicholson testified about a spreadsheet that he prepared showing items that were overbudget, items that were not included in the budget, and unbudgeted extra work for which he admitted that he owed compensation. Nicholson agreed that he owed Hartnett $105,348.50 of the cost of the project and that he already paid Hartnett $108,545.70. (The Nicholsons had also paid $33,500 in direct payments made for some materials and to some of the subcontractors.) The Nicholsons didn't pay the balance due.
On February 12, 2010, Hartnett filed a mechanic's lien for $16,654.11 on the Nicholsons' residence, attaching the electrical subcontractor's bill and a statement charging the Nicholsons the same amount claimed by the lien. In May 2010, the Nicholsons filed suit alleging breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment that he didn't owe Hartnett the balance due. The Nicholsons also sought a declaratory judgment that Hartnett's mechanic's lien was invalid. In June 2010, Hartnett filed a cross-claim seeking to enforce the mechanic's lien.
In January 2011, Hartnett and the Nicholsons each moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the Nicholsons' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the mechanic's lien, finding that Hartnett's lien was invalid because it wasn't filed within statutory time limits. Based on agreed-upon factual statements, the court noted that Hartnett had completed his work on the project by July 14, 2009, and that the electrical subcontractor finished its work October 13, 2009. The court concluded that Hartnett couldn't use the subcontractor's ending date to extend the time limit for filing his own claim. Thus, the court found that Hartnett's lien was filed beyond the statutory 4–month time limit; the mechanic's lien therefore was invalid and the court ordered it removed. In April 2011, the court denied Hartnett's motion to reconsider from the bench. The remaining issues pertaining to the Nicholsons' breach-of-contract claim proceeded to trial.
After a 1–day trial to the court, sitting without a jury, the district judge ordered the Nicholsons to pay Hartnett $4,800. The court found that “the language of the original contract meant that no monies were to be spent by [the Nicholsons other] than $140,850.00 for this project, unless of course, there were requested change[s], which have been factored in.” The court concluded that the Nicholsons should have paid $108,470, noting the $33,500 they had paid in direct payments for some items and subcontractors. The court found that the Nicholsons already had paid Hartnett what they owed except for $1,670 for patio concrete, $880 for interior beam installation and removal, $1,000 for additional electrical work, and $1,250 for roof repairs caused by wind damage. The court found that “all other items that went over budget or were not included in the original bid are mistakes to be borne” by Hartnett.
Hartnett has appealed to this court.
Standards of Review on Appeal
The case comes to us on appeal after a trial in the district court, which heard several witnesses and reviewed the documents that the parties had submitted. We must accept the district court's factual findings to the extent they are supported by substantial evidence. Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 65, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Progressive Products, Inc. v. Swartz, 292 Kan. 947, 955, 258 P.3d 969 (2011). In addition, to the extent that there are any gaps in the district court's factual findings, we must presume that it found the facts (where supported by substantial evidence) that would support its judgment. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, 282 Kan. 349, 356, 144 P.3d 1279 (2006). No party requested additional factual findings from the district court or suggested that its factual findings were inadequate.
There are also some legal issues involved in this appeal—the interpretation of the parties' written contract and the interpretation of the applicable mechanic's lien statutes. We interpret both contracts and statutes independently, without any required deference to the district court. See Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900–01, 220 P.3d 333 (2009) (contracts); Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446, 450, 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (statutes).
In sum, we review the district court's factual findings to be sure that they are supported by substantial evidence. After making that determination, we review all legal conclusions independently. See Progressive Products, Inc., 292 Kan. at 955.
Analysis
I. The District Court Correctly Interpreted the Parties' Contract to Provide a Maximum Contract Price, Not an Estimated One.
Hartnett argues that the contract set out a budget estimate, not a maximum contract price. In support, he notes that the word “budget” was inserted between “maximum” and “sum,” which he says emphasized that the contract provided only an estimate of the total cost. According to Hartnett, a contract for a maximum contract price wouldn't include the term “budget” at all. In a letter Hartnett wrote to the Nicholsons after their dispute arose, Hartnett contended that the parties had essentially entered into a cost-plus contract, under which some fixed fee or percentage is added onto the costs actually incurred by the contractor. See Black's Law Dictionary 368 (9th ed.2009).
The Nicholsons contend that the contract set out a maximum price that would be exceeded only if they asked for changes as work proceeded.
In our view, the contract language emphasizes that it sets out the maximum price; it is not a cost-plus contract. Hartnett's proposal letter, which became the parties' contract when the Nicholsons accepted it, opened with language that emphasized that it should be considered a maximum amount—and that the amount was probably overstated: “Although this seems rather high to myself, the following should be deemed as the maximum budget as indicated below. I haven't received any bids on the roofing at all yet, so I've included enough in those portions that should be more than adequate for the final costs.” (Emphasis added.) Hartnett then proposed “to furnish all of the Labor, Equipment, Material and Sales Taxes ... for the MAXIMUM BUDGET SUM OF” $140,850. (Emphasis added.) The proposal then provided detailed breakdowns for specific portions of the work, which would allow some to be omitted or done by the Nicholsons if desired. It also set out some specific potential cost add-ons for extra work, such as an additional $25 if the Nicholsons wanted “2x6 Walls and R–19 Insulation.” The proposal then concluded: “As with all of our Proposals, the actual costs would be reduced by any labor, materials or equipment which you provide, and actual choices in final material selection & installation choices. As indicated above, this should also be considered as a Maximum Budget Estimate.” (Emphasis added.)
If anything, Harnett's opening sentence suggested that the contract overstated what would the cost would be—noting that it seemed “rather high” to Hartnett but “should be deemed as the maximum budget.” A budget is “[a]n itemized summary of estimated or intended expenditures” and can fit within the concept of a limited budgeted amount, as in: “A new car will not be part of our budget this year.” See American Heritage Dictionary 241 (5th ed.2011). So the proposal's opening sentence seems most compatible with the Nicholsons' understanding—that the contract price wouldn't exceed $140,850 unless they made changes to the work and those changes resulted in increased costs.
Hartnett contends that his use of the word “estimate” at the end of the proposal—“As indicated above, this should also be considered as a Maximum Budget Estimate”—should have been understood as an indicator that the maximum price under the contract had only been estimated. But Hartnett began that sentence with the phrase “[a]s indicated above,” and the word “estimate” hadn't been used elsewhere in the document. If indeed the concept set out in this key sentence introduced some new topic, i.e., that there was no maximum contract price or “maximum budget sum,” then that would itself have seemed unlikely to the reader since Hartnett began the sentence by suggesting that it merely summarized what had already been “indicated above.”
Moreover, that a figure has been estimated does not mean that it has been understated. Instead, an objective reader here would note the frequent use of the word “maximum,” the statement that the proposed contract amount “seem [ed] rather high” to Hartnett, and the statement that he had included an amount for roofing costs “that should be more than adequate,” and that reader would conclude that the contract proposal contained a maximum, not-to-be-exceeded price. That contract offer—and that price—were accepted by the Nicholsons.
In sum, we think the contract unambiguously set out a maximum price that would not be exceeded. If we are wrong and there is some ambiguity in this contract, we note that when an ambiguous contract has been drafted by one of the parties, it is strictly construed against the party who drafted it. Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Kan. 235, Syl. ¶ 3, 824 P.2d 971 (1992). So whether this contract was unambiguous (as we conclude it is) or had some ambiguity (in which event it would be construed against Hartnett, its author), the district court properly interpreted the contract as setting a maximum contract price—subject only to agreed changes—of $140,850.
We must address two other points raised by Hartnett on the contract-interpretation issue. First, Hartnett cited several provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. We have not discussed them because the UCC applies to the sale of goods, not services. See K.S.A. 84–2–102. For contracts involving both the sale of goods and services, the UCC applies only if the predominant purpose of the contract is the sale of goods. See Care Display, Inc. v. Didde–Glaser, Inc., 225 Kan. 232, 238, 589 P.2d 599 (1979). Here, construction services—not the provision of specific goods—constituted the bulk of what was contracted for, so the UCC doesn't apply. Second, some of Hartnett's arguments seem to argue something akin to equitable estoppel, under which one party has done something that led the other party to believe that certain facts existed. Here, Hartnett suggests that because the Nicholsons paid some of his early invoices without questioning how the statements had been put together, the Nicholsons led Hartnett to believe that everyone understood that this was a cost-plus contract.
But equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be pled before the district court, something Hartnett didn't do. See K .S.A. 60–208(c). And even if equitable estoppel had been pled, the Nicholsons payment of invoices shouldn't have misled Hartnett. A party may claim equitable estoppel only when that party reasonably relied upon the other party's actions and would now be prejudiced if the other party were allowed to take a different position. See Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 283 Kan. 911, 927, 157 P.3d 1109 (2007). As long as the total amount the Nicholsons had paid didn't exceed the maximum contract price (plus any add-on costs for changes), Hartnett had no cause to think that the Nicholsons thought this was a cost-plus contract.
II. The District Court's Conclusion That the Nicholsons Owe an Additional $4,800 to Nicholson Is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
The district court found that the maximum contract price should be increased by $4,800 to reflect three add-ons to the work to be done and roof repairs that were caused by wind damage. The court found that all other items Hartnett was claiming were included within the maximum-price contract and, thus, that any extra costs were Hartnett's responsibility.
On this issue, Hartnett is challenging the district court's factual findings, which we must accept so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Charles Nicholson's testimony supported the district court's conclusion that $4,800 in extra charges should be assessed against the Nicholsons:
• He acknowledged that he asked for the stamped colored patio concrete ($1,670), which was not part of the contract proposal.
• He had asked for the replacement of some interior beams that, when installed, he hadn't liked ($880).
• There had been wind damage ($1,250) to the roof while the construction was ongoing, and the court apparently found that the unfinished roof had been susceptible to damage because of delays that had occurred when the Nicholsons chose to change the roofing materials and to remove the initially installed interior beams.
• The Nicholsons' attorney conceded during closing arguments that there might have been as much as $1,000 in extra labor and material costs incurred because of changes in the electrical work; the evidence showed that things like surround-sound wiring in the attic had been added.
On appeal, Hartnett specifically argues that $498 in the cost of additional decking materials should have been assessed against the Nicholsons. Hartnett also claims that delays caused by the Nicholsons drove up costs. But his citations to the record—other than to his own spreadsheets—contain little more than conclusory claims asserted by Hartnett himself or an electrician's statement that a meeting had been postponed once or twice. More generally, Hartnett argues that had the district court considered various documents, “a much more equitable figure may have been arrived at.” Hartnett had sought an additional $22,084 from the Nicholsons.
Hartnett's claim is based on his understanding that this was a cost-plus contract. It wasn't. The district court, which judges witness credibility, found that only $4,800 constituted true add-on costs that weren't contemplated within the maximum-price contract proposal. We do not find that the district court has ignored any uncontroverted evidence about costs that were due to change orders or otherwise weren't covered by the contract proposal. We therefore find no error in the district court's decision to award Hartnett only $4,800 in additional charges beyond the contract amount.
III. The District Court Wrongly Concluded That Hartnett's Mechanic's Lien Wasn't Filed Before the Statutory Deadline, but the Error Is Harmless Because the Lien Documents Didn't Include a Reasonably Itemized Statement.
Hartnett filed a mechanic's lien for $16,654.11 on February 12, 2010. The district court held that Hartnett missed the statutory deadline for filing a mechanic's lien. As a contractor, Hartnett had to file his lien “within four months after the date material, equipment or supplies, used or consumed[,] was last furnished or last labor performed under the contract.” K.S.A. 60–1102(a). Hartnett agreed that his own last work had been done in July 2009, more than 4 months before he filed the lien. Hartnett claimed the lien was timely, though, because one of his subcontractors had performed work that ended October 13, 2009, within the 4–month period. The district court noted that subcontractors have their own 3–month time limit to file mechanics liens, K.S.A. 60–1103(a)(1), and concluded that Hartnett's 4–month period couldn't be extended based on the work of a subcontractor.
The district court was wrong on this point. K.S.A. 60–1102(a) clearly allows the contractor to file a lien within 4 month after the last work is done “under the contract.” And the subcontractor is doing work under the contract—thus the very term, subcontractor. A contractor is hired to do the work but often tasks parts of the jobs to a subcontractor. Even so, the contractor remains responsible for getting the job done under the contract, and the contractor also has a duty in most cases to pay subcontractors. Hartnett's lien claim was filed within 4 months of the last work performed under the contract, so it was timely filed.
But the Nicholsons also challenged Hartnett's mechanic's lien on another basis—that it didn't include “a reasonably itemized statement” in support of the amount of the claim, as required by K.S.A. 60–1102(a)(4). The district court didn't reach this issue, since it had found the lien untimely.
Our consideration of the issue begins with the overall rule that a contractor must strictly comply with the statutory requirements for a mechanic's lien to be valid. Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 276 Kan. 218, 230, 73 P.3d 753 (2003); Buchanan v. Overley, 39 Kan.App.2d 171, Syl. ¶ 5, 178 P.3d 53,rev. denied 286 Kan. 1176 (2008). Additionally, the lien's validity must be determined entirely from the verified lien statement and its attachments. See Trane Co. v. Bakkalapulo, 234 Kan. 348, Syl. ¶ 3, 672 P.2d 586 (1983).
Hartnett's lien claimed that $16,654.11 was due him, and he attached two documents to the lien filing. The first was an invoice from the electrical subcontractor, which listed charges for $2,714.04 in materials and $5,890 in labor. The invoice gave no information about how either amount had been calculated. Instead, it listed only these general statements found on six separate lines: “wire new addition,” “redo service wire going into house,” “run wires for surround sound,” “put computer cable to basement,” “hook up oven,” and “replace light in kitchen.” Moreover, it appears that the electrical subcontractor's invoice was attached to the lien filing only in support of the claim that the last work furnished on the job took place on October 13, 2009, something the lien filing said was “evidenced by” the electrical subcontractor's invoice.
Hartnett also attached a one-page statement summarizing the separate invoices he'd sent throughout the project and showing a balance due of $16,654.11. For subcontractors, the statement listed only the total amount each had billed. The description of the charges for Hartnett's own services consisted primarily of these two listings: “Equipment, Insurance & Services” for $41,652.74 and “Materials w/Sales Taxes” for $64,893.99. No breakdown was provided for either of these amounts, which represented more than half of the total charges.
Whether a mechanic's lien filing complies with statutory requirements presents a legal question that we review independently, without any required deference to the district court. Buchanan, 39 Kan.App.2d at 173. Moreover, our court has held that a “reasonably itemized statement” is one “that is fair and sufficient ... to enable the landowner to ascertain whether the work was completed and whether the charge therefor is fair.” Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 5 Kan.App.2d 565, Syl. ¶ 4, 620 P .2d 1167 (1980). Setting out claims for more than $100,000 with no more information than “Equipment, Insurance & Services” and “Materials w/Sales Taxes” does not constitute a reasonable itemization. See In re The Bluffs, LLC (Corefirst Bank & Trust v. First Management, Inc., et al.), No. 09–11978, 2011 WL 2414212 (Bankr.D.Kan.2011) (online publication only) (finding invoices that included only broad category descriptions of the work done and were hard to reconcile did not meet the requirement of a reasonably itemized statement).
Here, of course, the Nicholsons couldn't have determined whether Hartnett's charges were fair from the lien statement and its attachments alone: The charges exceeded the maximum contract price, but that could only be determined by examining the contract language, and it wasn't included. Nor did the lien statement provide the information needed to determine whether the work for which Hartnett charged the Nicholsons was within the scope of work in the contract—or if it fell outside that scope so that a charge beyond the contract price could be made. The level of detail needed will vary depending upon the facts of each case, but in a case involving a maximum contract price there would at least need to be some indication of how the charges relate to that maximum price.
By way of comparison, Harriett's lien filing provided substantially less information than the contractors provided in two cases in which our court found that the statements were sufficient to meet the “reasonably itemized” standard: Scott v. Strickland, 10 Kan.App.2d 14, 691 P.2d 45 (1984), and Kopp's Rug Co., 5 Kan.App.2d 565. In both of these cases, the lien statements provided substantially more detail than Hartnert's statement provided. Scott involved a subcontractor's lien statement, and the subcontractor was a lumber company that simply supplied materials. The lien statement attached all of that company's invoices—and while those photocopies were hard to read, the total amount of each invoice was legible and the invoices showed the specific materials supplied for the job (blocks, cement, pallets, and masonry). Our court noted that it could be determined from the face of the lien statement what most of the materials furnished were so that the statement “enable[d] the landowner to determine whether the material was furnished and whether the amount claimed [was] reasonable.” 10 Kan.App.2d at 23–24.Kopp's Rug Co. also involved a subcontractor's claim, this time for installing a furnace and air conditioner. The subcontractor's lien statement listed the specific model of furnace and air conditioner installed, as well as specific charges for other items (such as $56 for 70 feet of “2x3 Pipe”). Once again, our court found that the statement was sufficient. 5 Kan.App.2d at 571–72. Hartnett's statement provided far less detail and wasn't sufficient either for the Nicholsons to determine—from the face of the statement—whether the job had been completed or whether the charges were fair.
The statute does offer one other option beyond including “a reasonably itemized statement” as part of the mechanic's lien filing: “[I]f the amount of the claim is evidenced by a written instrument, or if a promissory note has been given for the same, a copy thereof may be attached to the claim in lieu of the itemized statement.” K.S.A. 60–1102(a). But an “instrument” is a legal document that defines the parties' duties, like a contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate. Black's Law Dictionary 869 (9th ed.2009). That statutory option is met when the legal instrument itself provides the amount to be paid. See Ruber Co. v.. DeSouza, 32 Kan.App.2d 614, 616–17, 86 P.3d 1022 (1986). It doesn't allow a party to turn a nonitemized invoice into a “written instrument” that eliminates the need to provide a reasonable itemization of the amounts claimed.
The district court's judgment is affirmed.
* * *
GREENE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority in all aspects of its opinion except that portion concluding that the lien statement of Hartnett was legally insufficient. I would conclude the lien statement was reasonably itemized and legally enforceable.
K.S.A. 60–1102(a)(4) requires the statement to show a “reasonably itemized statement and the amount of the claim.” Our court has recognized that “reasonably” means “a well-balanced statement, one that is not extreme, i.e., one that is neither excessive nor insufficient in detail” but only one that “is fair and sufficient to inform the landowner of the claim and to enable the landowner to ascertain whether the work was completed and whether the charge therefor is fair. Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 5 Kan.App.2d 565, 571, 620 P.2d 1167 (1980).
Here, the lien statement generally described the work as “completion of addition & remodeling work billed to date.” The statement then itemized the sub-components of the total including subtotals for equipment, insurance & services, material with sales taxes, and subcontractors with sales taxes.” The subcontracting work was then further detailed with separate line items for “concrete work, electrical work, HVAC, drywall finishing, contract labor, plaster & stucco, Al Flores Flrg Inst., Henton Plumbing, and rental equipment.” The statement then provided detail of each payment to date on the total project cost. The statement also attached the entire invoice for the final work, specifically the electrical work performed by Enlow Electric. That invoice detailed each aspect of the electrical work performed and broke out the material cost from the labor cost.
Given this level of detail, could the Nicholsons fairly determine whether the work was completed and whether the charges for each aspect were fair? Absolutely. The majority seems to suggest that more information was required, but one can only guess what the majority might have expected to see, other than “some indication of how the charges relate to the maximum price” as determined by examining the contract language.
This was a rather major remodeling project with multiple phases and multiple subcontractors. It is simply not practical to require a detailed listing of all costs incurred by each subcontractor on each aspect, broken down by each material cost and each labor cost, for each such aspect of the project. In fact, this level of detail would require a book be attached to the lien statement, and probably a CPA to compile and list all such detail. And to suggest that contract information be included in the lien statement is a wholesale departure from Kansas law; imagine what might have been required here given the parties' dispute as to the meaning of the contract and the “extra” work and its relationship to the maximum contract amount. The statute certainly does not explicitly require such detail, and the general rule is to the contrary. See 53 Am.Jur.2d, Mechanics' Liens § 219, p. 273 (unless required by statute, the notice of lien does not need to state the contractual relations existing between the claimant and the owner, or the terms and conditions of the contract under which labor was performed or materials furnished). We have never indicated that “relationship to contracted amount” be specified on a lien statement; in fact, we have upheld sufficiency of lien statements despite substantial disputes as to the underlying contract(s). See, e.g., Building Erection Services Co. v. Eisner, No. 94,238, unpublished opinion filed February 16, 2007, slip op. at 4–5.
This level of detail is simply not what is expected or required by the Kansas statute. As we have stated, all that is required is a well-balanced statement, one that is neither excessive nor insufficient in detail. It is notable that at no time in this litigation have the Nicholsons suggested that they could not determine whether the work was completed and whether the cost for each aspect was fair; instead, this dispute arose over a matter of contract interpretation.
Mechanics' liens are the backbone of construction trades across our state. Literally hundreds of such liens are undoubtedly filed weekly in Kansas, and they provide the assurance that those providing valuable labor and materials to the improvement of real property will be paid. To elevate the requirements for lien statements to imponderable detail only serves to either discourage the entire policy underlying our lien statutes or to set traps that will imperil the recovery of compensation that is justly due. I must respectfully suggest that the majority's opinion here has not honored the implicit purpose of our lien statutes, nor has it benefitted the construction trades, nor has it protected landowners from uncertainty. The result of the majority's opinion is to the sole benefit of attorneys, who will undoubtedly litigate the question of “reasonable itemization” to an extent that will render lien enforcement in Kansas as no longer cost justified.
I would reverse the district court's conclusion that the lien was unenforceable and remand for further proceedings to modify and declare enforceability of the lien statement in question.