Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3779 SECTION "C" (1).
October 16, 2000.
ORDER
On September 27, 2000, Plaintiff, Nghe Nguyen, filed a motion for partial summary on the issue of comparative negligence. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment.
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be]`genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial."Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
Partial summary judgment dismissing only certain claims is appropriate under the same standards. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).See also Corporate Investigative Div., Inc. v. American Tel. Tel. Co., 884 F. Supp. 220, 223-24 (W.D. La. 1995) (using same standard of review for partial summary judgment on liability alone under 56(c)).
Plaintiff has offered the deposition testimony of the ship's owner and captain, Nho Le, stating that "to the best of his knowledge," Plaintiff was without fault in causing the accident. Plaintiff has also provided the deposition testimony of Hung Nguyen to support his position that it was not contributorily negligent to use one's hands rather than a monkey wrench to operate the brake wheel. Defendant correctly points out, however, that Nho Le's assertions are limited "to his knowledge" and are not immune to challenge. Similarly, there is a disputed issue of material fact concerning the issue of whether the use of one's hands instead of a monkey wrench, while perhaps common in the industry, could ever constitute contributory negligence.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of comparative negligence is DENIED.