Opinion
No. 99 CV 4772
July 20, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Sammy Curtis Newton ("Newton") filed suit against his former employers, defendants The Signature Group ("Signature") and Montgomery Ward, L.L.C. ("Montgomery Ward") (collectively referred to at times as "defendants"), under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and for retaliation for having filed a workers' compensation claim under Illinois law. Newton claims defendants discriminated and retaliated against him when they discharged him in 1999. Defendants have filed this motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts comes from the parties' Local Rule 56.1(a) and (b) statements of material facts and accompanying exhibits.
Newton began working for Montgomery Ward in 1972. In November of 1996, Newton was offered and accepted a position with Signature as a full-time district sales manager for the Signature's Credit Security Plan ("CSP"). Newton's responsibilities and duties as a district sales manager was to market the sale of the CSP product to Montgomery Ward employees, including sales associates, and train Montgomery Ward's sales associates so they could solicit CSP sales to Montgomery Ward card holders. Newton's ultimate goal as a CSP district manager was to maximize the number of CSP enrollments within his district, which comprised of Montgomery Ward retail stores.
Like all other district sales managers, Newton was responsible for achieving a certain percentage of "penetration" for "new" and "existing" CSP enrollments in his district. "New" CSP enrollments were those in which a customer was successfully enrolled in the CSP program at the time he or she obtained a Montgomery Ward credit card, "Existing" CSP enrollments were those in which a customer with an existing Montgomery Ward credit card was later solicited and enrolled into the CSP program. The "penetration" percentage was the percentage of opportunities in the district to successfully enroll a card holder into the program. The penetration percentage was a very important aspect of Newton's job.
In January of 1998, Dave Teachman ("Teachman") became the CSP regional manager and Newton's supervisor. At that time, Teachman was 58 years old. On March 3, 1998, Teachman evaluated Newton and rated him as ineffective and placed him on a 30-day probation. Teachman also placed two other district sales manages, both whom were in their 20s, on probation. Rather than pursue their probation objectives, these two other district sales managers resigned. Teachman then asked Newton to cover their districts until replacements were found.
Pursuant to the probation of Newton, Teachman requested Newton to achieve the following goals: (1) increase new CSP enrollment penetration to 40%; (2) increase existing CSP enrollments penetration to 1%; (3) have 80 sales associates in licensing training by the end of the probation period; (4) maintain 100% staffing for credit specialists; and (5) increase credit application penetration to 100%. While Newton failed to attain any of the goals, in mid-April, Teachman removed Newton from probation because Teachman believed Newton had responded positively to the probation by improving in a few of the areas. In addition, Teachman had been promoted and he wanted to remove Newton from probation so he could allow him a "fresh start" under his new supervisor.
In late April of 1998, Bonnie Kinerd ("Kinerd") became the new CSP regional manager and Newton's direct supervisor. At that time, Kinerd was 50 years old. In early May, Kinerd met with Newton and traveled with him throughout his district. In July, one three separate occasions, Kinerd again traveled with Newton. During the July 30, 1998 meeting, Kinerd reviewed Newton's performance and indicated to Newton that his enrollment and licensing penetration were down. Kinerd followed the review with a mid-year performance evaluation. Kinerd gave Newton a rating of "ineffective" and placed him on a 30 day probation period.
Just as the previous probation period under Teachman, Kinerd requested Newton to achieve the following goals: (1) increase new CSP enrollment penetration to 27.1%; (2) increase existing CSP enrollments penetration to 2.6%; (3) have 80 sales associates in licensing training by the end of the probation period; (4) bring credit application quota percentage up to company average; and (5) submit timely flash reports, contact reports, and contest monies and disbursements. In August of 1998, Kinerd and Wynee Voss ("Voss"), the CSP program's human resources manager, met with Newton to discuss the mid-year review and probation status.
Again, on September 4, 1998, Kinerd and Voss met with Newton to discuss the progress of Newton's probationary period. Newton's new and existing CSP enrollment penetration levels remained below the regional and company average. Newton's new account penetration level was at 7.9% while the regional average was at 19.7% and the company average was at 22.8%. Newton's new account penetration level was at 0.1%, while the regional average was at 0.6% and company average was at 1.5%. At the meeting, however, Newton gave Kinerd a proposed schedule for training associations as well as the materials he had prepared for a Labor Day CSP contest for sales associates. Newton also informed Kinerd he had scheduled forty associates for license training classes later in September. Kinerd asked Newton to provide her a list of the associates scheduled to attend the license training class. At the conclusion of the meeting, Kinerd was satisfied that Newton was working towards achieving his probation goals. In fact, Kinerd and Voss informed Newton that, if he continued in this matter, he would successfully complete his extended probationary period.
Newton never provided Kinerd a list of the attendees for the license training class. Newton could not recall which stores, if any, provided him with names of sales associates who would attend the license training class. To that end, the class never took place. When Kinerd contacted Newton's stores to inquire about the classes, she was informed that none had ever been scheduled.
Newton had, however, sustained an injury to his back when he slipped and fell in a Montgomery Ward store on September 8, 1998. On September 18, 1998, Newton requested paid medical leave. On September 22, 1998, Newton filed a workers' compensation claim with Signature's insurance carrier. Newton's physician confirmed the medical leave request and indicated Newton should remain on medical leave for an extended period. Signature accommodated the requests and Newton remained on medical leave through November 24, 1998.
When Newton was released to return to work by his physician, he was to work for three days per week in the stores, for between four and six hours per day, and another two or three days from home. Kinerd and Voss understood this to mean that Newton was able to return to work as a full-time employee, working a minimum of thirty hours a week. Kinerd believed that this would be a workable schedule, and was prepared to accommodate Newton's scheduling request. On November 23, 1998, Newton returned to work. On that date, Kinerd sent Newton an e-mail which indicated she had divided Newton's district among his peers while he was out on medical leave. Kinerd also informed Newton that there were new rules and regulations for which he would have to obtain sign-offs within his district. Kinerd further informed Newton that she would be in Chicago on December 8, 1998 and would meet with him then.
On December 8, 1998, Kinerd and Voss met with Newton. They agreed that, in addition to his work days at the store, Newton was to work at home on Saturday and additional hours in the evening to reflect between five and six working hours. Kinerd informed Newton that his probation period would be extended to January 19, 1999 and that his next probation meeting would not be until the first week of January. Newton then requested that his probationary period be postponed until he could return to work without any restrictions. Kinerd and Voss rejected Newton's request, and instead, provided Newton with the following revised schedule and goals: (1) complete the rules and regulations sign-offs; (2) schedule license training classes and provide Kinerd a list of attendees; and (3) provide timely contact reports.
On December 28, 1998, Newton's physician removed some of Newton's restrictions, increasing him to four days per week in the stores. On January 5, 1999, Newton met with Kinerd and Voss to review his progress. At that time, Newton's new account penetration was at 6.0%, while the regional average was at 20.6% and the company average was at 24.1%. Newton's existing account penetration was at 0.1%, while the regional average was at 0.8% and the company average was at 1.1%. Kinerd also informed Newton that she had not received his contact reports for the period between November 24, 1998 to January 5, 1999 and reminded him that reports were due every Wednesday. Kinerd further requested that Newton provide more detail as to what work-related tasks he was performing at home. Newton had also failed to fully complete the rules and regulations sign-offs, instead only completing six of his seventeen stores. By the dates of the sign-offs, Kinerd could tell that Newton had not begun to work toward this goal of completing the sign-offs until the latter part of December. Newton also failed to meet the goal of scheduling license training classes and provide Kinerd with a list of attendees.
Based on the fact that Newton had not achieved any of his probationary goals nor demonstrated sufficient effort in achieving the probationary goals, Kinerd scheduled the next meeting for the following week. In the interim, Kinerd requested a specific date from Newton in which Newton believed he could provide her with completed rules and regulations sign-offs. Newton indicated he could have them completed by January 12, 1999. Kinerd also requested that Newton provide her with the list of license training attendees and the letters he had sent to the stores regarding the January license training classes.
Newton, Kinerd, and Voss met again on January 12, 1999. At the meeting, Kinerd reiterated the fact that Newton's new and existing penetration levels were below the regional and company average. Newton then informed Kinerd he had canceled the January license training class on account of bad weather. Yet, Newton admitted that he had not even contacted any of his stores about scheduling the class until after the January 5, 1999 meeting. In fact, a credit coordinator at a Montgomery Ward store called Signature on January 12, 1999, indicating no one had contacted her store about scheduling license training classes. At the meeting, Newton failed to provide Kinerd with any additional completed sign-off sheets, even though he had indicated he could have them completed by that date.
Kinerd still decided to continue Newton's probationary period through the next week and placed a number of news goals before Newton. Kinerd instructed Newton to continue working on the sign-off sheets, set up new license training classes, and conduct non-license CSP training for store associates. Kinerd also informed Newton that the next review session on January 19, 1999 would be the last.
Newton, Kinerd, and Voss met again on January 19, 1999. Newton did not provide Kinerd with any further sign-off sheets or any information or documentation to indicated he had scheduled license training. Newton admitted that he had failed to achieve any of his probation objectives. Kinerd terminated Newton's employment with Signature. Following his termination, Newton was not replaced. Instead, in April of 1999, the CSP program was reorganized and all district sales manager and credit coordinator positions were eliminated. Signature consolidated the duties of these positions into one position, that of a "trainer." In addition, the then existing districts were disbanded and each trainer was given the responsibility of approximately four or five stores.
Newton filed this lawsuit claiming that defendants violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act when they terminated his employment. Newton also claims the defendants retaliated against him after he filed a workers' compensation claim. Defendants have now filed this summary judgment motion. Defendants first argue that defendant Montgomery Ward is an improper defendant because it was not the employer of Newton at the time of his termination. Defendants also argue that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on both the ADEA and the ADA claims. Finally, defendants assert that the wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim fails under Illinois law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1996). This court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). There is no issue for trial "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
ANALYSIS
I. Preliminary Matter Regarding Montgomery Ward As Defendant
Before proceeding to the merits of Newton's claims, this court must first address whether defendant Montgomery Ward is a proper defendant in this case. Defendant Montgomery Ward argues that it cannot be held liable because Newton was employed solely by defendant Signature, which, at all relevant times, was a wholly-owned, but independent subsidiary of Montgomery Ward. In Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999), the Seventh Circuit identified three situations when affiliated corporations should be considered a single employer: (1) where the traditional conditions are present for piercing the corporate veil; (2) where an enterprise splits itself up into a number of corporations, each with fewer than the statutory minimum number of employees, for the express purpose of avoiding liability under the discrimination laws; or (3) where the parent corporation might have directed the discriminatory act of which the employee of the subsidiary is complaining. Thus, focus is on what corporation is the real decision maker. Id. Here, Newton concedes that Montgomery Ward and Signature should not be considered a single employer. In addition, Newton has not presented a shred of evidence to support any of the above three situations. Accordingly, defendant Montgomery Ward is a improper defendant and must be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Claim (Count I)
In Count I, Newton has brought a claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Newton can survive summary judgment on his ADEA claims either with direct evidence of discrimination or with indirect evidence under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Cowan v. Glenbrook Sec. Serv., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 1997); Fisher v. Wayne Dalton Corp., 139 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1998). Newton has presented no direct evidence of age discrimination, but instead relies solely on the indirect method of proof.
The McDonnell indirect approach requires a three-part inquiry: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and (3) the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not it s true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Fisher, 139 F.3 d at 1141; Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant is not required to prove its non-discriminatory reason, it need only produce evidence which if believed by the trier of fact would support the finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993). At that point, the issue becomes whether or not the plaintiff can produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could infer that the defendant's proffered reasons for the adverse employment action were not the true reasons, but a pretext for discrimination.Sirvidas v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 60 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1995).
In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, Newton must show: (1) that he was in a protected age group of 40 or older; (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (4) that younger employees were treated more favorably. Sirvidas v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 60 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Roper v. Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1995)). Signature does not contest that Newton can establish the first and third requirements of the prima facie case. At the time of his discharge, Newton was 54 years old. Instead, Signature argues that Newton cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA because he cannot show that he was performing his job satisfactorily or that other substantially younger employees were treated more favorably or his position was filled with a younger employee. See Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1998).
A. Performing Job to Signature's Legitimate Performance Expectations
Signature specifically asserts that Newton was not satisfying its legitimate performance expectations at the time of his termination because he failed to achieve any of his performance objectives that had been set for him during his probationary period. Newton all but concedes the fact that he failed to achieve any of the goals. Rather, Newton argues that his performance objectives were impossible, in that he had never in the past achieved the sales penetration or license training figures. In addition, Newton argues that the CSP program's overall poor performance made Newton's set of performance objectives "unrealistic and impossible."
As the Seventh Circuit recently reiterated, however, a court's "role is not to second guess the business decisions of a company and inquire as to whether the goals set by management demand `too much' from its employees." Robin v. Espo Engineering Corp., 200 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1997)). In that respect, courts are not to "`makes things less difficult for those who come before [them], regardless of the law.'" Id. (quotingFuja v. Benefit Trust Life Insur. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1407 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1994)).
According to Signature, Newton's failure to achieve his performance goal objectives resulted in his termination. Indeed, Newton admits that he failed to achieve each of the performance objectives set by his supervisor Kinerd. Newton offers nothing to contradict Signature's position other than to argue the objectives were unreasonable. Rather, the undisputed evidence before the court shows Newton was subjected to the same standards as all district sales managers. Therefore, because Newton has not presented any competent evidence establishing that Signature's expectations were made in anything less than good faith, this court finds that Newton fails to present a question of fact as to whether he was performing or meeting his employer's bona fide expectations at the time of his discharge. Without this evidence, Newton cannot establish the second prong of the prima facie case under the ADEA. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Signature is warranted on Newton's ADEA claim.
B. Treated Similarly Situated Younger Employees More Favorable or Replaced by Substantially Younger Employee
Even if Newton could have established that he had met Signature's legitimate expectations at the time of his discharge, Newton must also show that Signature treated similarly situated younger employees more favorably or he was replaced by a substantially younger employee in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Newton has failed to do so. First, as the undisputed evidence shows, Newton was subjected to same standards as all other district sales managers. As the evidence reflects, two substantially younger employees, who were also placed on probation and given the same performance objectives as Newton, chose to resign. Newton has not provided any evidence of any younger employees who were similarly situated in all respects that were treated more favorably.
Newton also argues that Signature hired younger employees to assume his job responsibilities. Yet, Newton, who bears the burden of establishing the fourth element, fails to present any admissible, competent evidence in the record regarding the specific ages of the new employees and how each assumed his specific job duties and responsibilities. Newton assumes that because Signature needed to hire a number of employees around the time of his discharge one of these employees must have assumed his specific job duties and responsibilities and had to have been younger than him. Newton, however, has the responsibility of presenting admissible, competent evidence in the record on this issue in his summary judgment submissions, as this court is under no obligation to scour the record and advocate on his behalf. Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[J]ust as a district court is not required to `scour the record looking for factual disputes,' it is not required to scour the party's various submissions to piece together appropriate arguments. A court need not make the lawyer's case.") (internal citations omitted). Newton's argument in this regard is based on pure speculation, and therefore must be disregarded by the court. Accordingly, because Newton cannot establish the fourth element of the prima facie case, summary judgment in favor of Signature is warranted on Newton's ADEA claim.
C. Pretext
Even if Newton had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, his ADEA claim fails for a more compelling reason — Signature's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging has not been shown to be a pretext for discrimination. Signature claims that it discharge Newton because Kinerd believed Newton was not putting forth sufficient effort with respect to his job responsibilities since he had not met any of his performance objectives. Newton essentially attempts to establish pretext by challenging Kinerd's credibility and the reasonableness of her beliefs, claiming that her credibility raises a genuine issue of material fact. This argument is without merit because in the Seventh Circuit "the pretext inquiry focuses on whether the employer's stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate."Helland v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1996). As previously stated, Newton admits that he failed to achieve any one of his performance objectives as set forth by Kinerd. Moreover, Newton has not presented a shred of evidence that his age was a motivating factor in his discharge. Accordingly, because Newton cannot establish pretext or even raise a genuine issue of material fact, he is not entitled to have his case go to the jury. Summary judgment in favor of Signature is warranted on this basis as well. Consequently, Count I of Newton's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
III. Americans with Disabilities Act Claim (Count II)
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with a disability because of the disability of such individual with respect to job application, hiring, advancement, discharge, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). In order to succeed with an ADA claim, Newton must show that: (1) he was or is disabled; (2) Signature was aware of his disability; and (3) he was an otherwise qualified individual for his job. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1996). Where there is no real issue that an employer who fired a disabled employee knew nothing of the disability, then summary judgment is appropriate. Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995); Adkins v. Briggs Stratton Corp., 159 F.3d 306, 307 (7th Cir. 1998).
The threshold question that Newton must satisfy' to succeed on his ADA claim is to show that he is a disabled person as defined by the statute. The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an individual, or a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). Newton argues in his memorandum in opposition to this summary judgment that his disability resulting from his back sprain substantially limited his ability to work. In addition, Newton argues that he was regarded as having an impairment and therefore disabled under the ADA.
If Newton's condition does not rise to the level of a disability, or if his employer did not regard him as having such a disability, then he cannot recover under the Act even if Signature terminated him on account of the impairment. "The Act is not a general protection of medically afflicted persons. . . . [I]f the employer discriminates against them on account of their being (or being believed by him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation." Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997). Signature argues that Newton is not protected under the ADA because his physical impairment was not substantially limiting and Signature did not regard him as having a substantially limiting physical impairment.
A. Substantially Limited In A Major Life Activity
Regulations passed to interpret the ADA define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i). "Substantially limits" means that the person is either unable to perform or is significantly restricted as to the manner or duration under which that person can perform a major life activity as compared to an average individual. Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1995). While substantial is not defined under the ADA, it generally suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, ___, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999) (internal quotes omitted). Still, the person must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996); Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151.
Thus, the inability to perform either a particular job for a particular employer or a narrow range of jobs is not a disability. Roth, 57 F.3d at 1454-55 n. 13. The impairment must substantially limit employment generally. Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1998). The court should examine if the impairment, for that person, constitutes a significant barrier to employment or if the person can perform or has procured other employment. The definition of "major life" activity is not to be interpreted to mean working at the specific job of one's choice. Id. at 1152.
As previously stated, without first establishing that he is an individual with a disability protected by the ADA, Newton cannot succeed on his ADA claim. Newton suffered from a back strain of which he alleges substantially limits his ability to work. Therefore, Newton must demonstrated that his condition left him impaired to the point that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. It is undisputed that despite his health condition, Newton was still able to perform day-to-day activities. There is also no dispute that Newton's back sprain was a physical impairment. Thus, the critical question is whether his impairment substantially limits his ability to work, as Newton alleges it did.
The analysis of Newton's ability to work must focus on his general capability to function in the general work force. In this case, there has been no showing that Newton's general ability to work was substantially limited. Merely because Newton believes that he could not perform a full day's work is insufficient to conclude that Newton is substantially limited in his ability to work. An inability to perform one particular job, a portion of one particular job for a single employer, or increased discomfort while performing a major life activity does not constitute a substantial limitation on the ability to perform such activities.Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Sys., Inc., 122 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1997). And, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence to identify how his or her impairment limits an entire class or broad range of jobs. Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Management Ltd. Partnership, 209 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2000).
Newton has provided no evidence from which an inference could be drawn in his favor to sustain his burden showing that his back sprain significantly restricted his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)(i). Thus, considering the evidence of medical impairment in the record favorably to Newton, the evidence fails to establish a substantial impairment of his ability to perform a broad class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Here, Newton was able to work a modified work schedule and still work thirty hours a week. Nevertheless, Newton has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude his back sprain substantially limits his ability to work. Accordingly, Signature is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
B. "Regard As" Claim
Newton also argues that he should be considered disabled because Signature regarded him as being disabled. Signature argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it did not regard Newton as disabled when it decided to terminate his position. Under the ADA, an employee is "regarded as" disabled if his impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity, but the employer treats the employee as if he had such a disability that substantially limited a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (g)(3); Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149-50. Employers regard their employees' condition as substantially limiting if they perceive them "to be significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which [they] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." Reimer v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal marks omitted).
Here, Newton has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Signature regarded him as disabled. While Newton argues that Kinerd and Voss regarded him as disabled, the undisputed evidence negates such a perception. Both Kinerd and Voss believed that Newton was still physically capable of performing his position only under a modified schedule. In fact, as previously stated, Newton still maintained his full-time employee status because he continued to work a minimum of thirty hours a week. Moreover, as the undisputed evidence reflects, Kinerd and Voss required Newton to follow through on each and every part of his job duties and responsibilities. Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence further indicates that Signature had no reason to regard Newton as disabled because all medical reports indicated that he had obtained a full recovery from his back strain and would be released from any restrictions on his ability to perform his work. See Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Systems. Inc., 122 F.3d 456, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1997).
Finally, under well-settled law, Newton cannot establish a "regarded as" claim merely because Kinerd and Voss knew of Newton's back condition or because he has filed a workers' compensation claim. Sutton, 119 S.C.t at 2150-52; Harrington, 122 F.3d at 460. The law is rather clear, Newton must present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Signature regarded him as having a physical impairment which substantially limited his ability to work. Newton has failed to present any evidence to support such a claim. Consequently, for the above stated reasons, Signature's summary judgment motion must be granted as to the ADA claim as well. Consequently, Count II of Newton's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Retaliation For Film Workers' Compensation Claim (Count III)
In Count III, Newton alleges a claim for wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim under Illinois law. Defendants moved for summary judgment on this count, asserting that Newton could provide no evidence that defendants did in fact retaliate against him for filing a workers' compensation claim. In response, Newton concedes that his claim of retaliation fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted. Count III is also dismissed with prejudice
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on all counts of plaintiffs complaint. This court dismisses plaintiffs complaint with prejudice as to both defendants. This case is dismissed in its entirety. All other pending motions are moot.