Opinion
No. 05-05-00624-CR
Opinion Filed June 6, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-05-00428-VT. Affirmed.
Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ronald Everett Newton was indicted for the aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon of Jimmy Lee Coleman. The indictment included two enhancement paragraphs citing Newton's prior convictions. He pled not guilty and subsequently waived his right to a jury trial, which resulted in a bench trial. The trial court convicted him of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He waived arraignment on the enhancement paragraphs and pled true to both. The trial court assessed punishment at 25 years' confinement. Newton appeals, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and whether the state proved the failure of his self-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In his first and second points of error Newton argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the judgment. We apply the appropriate standards of review. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (legal sufficiency); Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (legal sufficiency); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (factual sufficiency); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (factual sufficiency). We may not substantially intrude on the jury's role as sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. The jury is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). A person commits aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Tex. Penal Ann. Code §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). "Deadly weapon" means anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Id. § 1.07(17)(B). The record includes evidence of a physical struggle between Newton and the complainant, Coleman. During the struggle, Newton struck Coleman with Coleman's walking cane; the resulting injury caused Coleman to lose his right eye. After Newton fled the scene, a passerby called police and an ambulance for Coleman. Dallas Police Officer Raymond Watts went to the scene after obtaining a description of Newton from Coleman. At that time, Coleman claimed Newton had attacked him because they were fighting over money that had fallen out of Coleman's pocket. However, at trial Coleman admitted the two men were fighting about a disputed amount of crack cocaine. Newton admitted he struck Coleman; however, he contends that it was accidental. Having considered the evidence in the record (including the above evidence) in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Mason, 905 S.W.2d at 574. Furthermore, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the trial court was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. We need not further detail the rest of the evidence. See Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. Therefore we overrule Newton's first and second points of error. In his third point of error, Newton argues the trial court erred by not finding that he proved his self-defense theory. In his argument Newton cites evidence supporting his self-defense claim and attempts to refute contrary evidence. Therefore we interpret his third point of error as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the rejection of the defense. The standard of review is the same as mentioned above. Newton testified he gave crack cocaine to Coleman, who smoked it and became wild and out of control. As a result, Newton merely defended himself from Coleman's attacks. Coleman testified, however, that Newton had come at him swinging a wine bottle and telling Coleman that if he wanted the contested money back, he would have to kill him. Reconciling conflicting testimony is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact, not this Court. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's rejection of Newton's self-defense claim. Therefore we overrule his third point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.