Further, the cases cited by Malwarebytes for its proposed rule are unavailing: one decision, Vidillion, Inc. v. Pixalate, Inc., No. CV 18-7270, 2019 WL 13071961, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019), does not provide sufficient information for the Court to determine whether the present case is factually analogous, and the others-including the case on which Vidillion relies-involve factual analyses of the commercial advertisement question, rather than a threshold test. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding statement made by host of broadcast show about contents of show were not commercial advertising under Coastal Abstract because they were not made in promotion or marketing of show, but that nearly identical statements on jacket of videotape version of show “readily satisf[ied]” criteria for commercial advertisement); New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (applying Bolger factors and finding that challenged speech was not commercial because it occurred after conclusion of user's transaction with defendant and because it focused not on “any particular software program . . . but primarily on the larger issue of the surreptitious downloading of computer programs”).

Instead, Defendants assert that a plaintiff seeking discovery to challenge an anti-SLAPP motion under the Rule 56 standard must "explain with particularity why it is unable to oppose the motion, state with specificity what facts it intends to seek through discovery, and show how its discovery efforts are reasonably expected to create a triable issue." Id. at 7 (quoting New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). Meeting that burden "requires affidavits setting forth the particular facts expected from the movant's discovery."

.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1106 (2001)). Here, the allegedly defamatory statements giving rise to plaintiff's action were published on defendant's website, which is widely accessible by the public.

New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal cites and quotation marks omitted).

To establish good cause for discovery, DRA must demonstrate that it lacks "information that is essential to its opposition." New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Specifically, it "must explain with particularity why it is unable to oppose the motion, state with specificity what facts it intends to seek through discovery, and show how its discovery efforts are reasonably expected to create a triable issue." Id. at 1102.

Another court in this circuit has similarly defined "competitor" to mean "a rival" or "one selling or buying goods or services in the same market as another." New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Both parties rely on these definitions and appear to agree they accurately convey the meaning of "competitor" for the purposes of the protective order. See, e.g., Ltr. 2, 7.

The Supreme Court has set forth three factors relevant in determining if a statement is commercial speech: "(1) whether the statements are in a typical advertising format; (2) whether the statements refer to a commercial product; and (3) whether the defendant had an economic or commercial motivation for making the statements." New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983)). While all factors need not be present for speech to be commercial, no one factor is itself sufficient.

To do this, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1098 (C.D.Cal.2004) (quotations, emphasis, and citations omitted). “The court also considers the defendant's opposing evidence, but only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law.”

II. LEGAL STANDARD This Court may grant judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which allows Defendants to challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's complaint. New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2004). A 12(c) motion "is a vehicle for summary adjudication, but the standard is like that of a motion to dismiss." Id. Accordingly, a 12(c) motion may only be granted "when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

No further discussion of discovery under the anti-SLAPP statute appears in the decision. The district courts have struggled in their attempts to determine under what circumstances, if at all, the discovery limiting aspects of the California anti-SLAPP statute apply in federal court. See, e.g., Moser v. Triarc Companies, Inc., 2007 WL 3026425 (S.D.Cal. 2007) (interpreting Metabolife's holding as requiring the court to use Rule 56(f) standard ( i.e., requiring discovery where non-moving party has not had the opportunity to discover information essential to its opposition) in denying anti-SLAPP opponent's motion for discovery); Aeroplate Corporation v. Arch Insurance Company, 2006 WL 3257487 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (interpreting Liberty Lobby and Metabolife as requiring the court to allow discovery where the non-moving party "has not had . . . any [prior] opportunity for discovery"); New.Net v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1101-02 (S.D.Cal. 2004) (concluding there is no "inherent `direct collision' between the expedited procedure contemplated in the Anti-SLAPP statute, and the provisions of Rule 56" and that the opposing party must "persuade the court that discovery is essential to its opposition"). Flores v. Emerich and Fike, 2006 WL 2536615 (E.D.Cal.)