Opinion
No. 17,093.
Filed January 19, 1944. Rehearing denied February 21, 1944. Transfer denied March 21, 1944.
1. APPEAL — Harmless Error — Facts Found Within Issues — Demurrer to Complaint Amended — Cure of Error. — Where the facts found are within the issues and a correct statement or declaration of the law may be made upon the facts found, error if any, in overruling demurrers to the complaint is cured. p. 579.
2. CONTRACTS — Third Party Beneficiaries — Trust Deed — Agreement Between Trustee and Creditor of Decedent — Trust Relationship. — Where, in order to obviate defects in the execution of a will, heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator conveyed testator's property to executor as trustee, by an instrument substantially embracing the trust provisions of the will and wherein the trustee was to pay indebtedness of the trust estate from the assets thereof, the trustee did not assume any personal liability to a creditor who agreed not to file a claim in the estate upon the trustee's promise to pay the debt from such assets and there was no contract for the benefit of the creditor as a third party beneficiary, but a trust relationship was created between him and the trustee. p. 579.
3. TRUSTS — Construction — Trust Deed Relationship of Creditor — Intention of Grantors. — Where heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator conveyed testator's property to executor as trustee, by an instrument substantially embracing the trust provisions of the will and wherein the trustee was to pay indebtedness of the trust estate from the assets thereof, the question of whether a creditor became a creditor of the trust or a beneficiary under it was a question of the intention of the grantors of the trust. p. 579.
4. TRUSTS — Management and Disposal of Property — Trust Deed — Creditor as Beneficiary — Right to Maintain Action. — Where heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator conveyed testator's property to executor as trustee, by an instrument substantially embracing the trust provisions of the will and wherein the trustee was to pay indebtedness of the trust estate from the assets thereof, no discretion was vested in the trustee with respect to the payment of debts owed by the testator, but given assets for the purpose, he was required to pay them immediately and unconditionally, and consequently a creditor of testator as a beneficiary had the right to maintain an action at law to collect regardless of the existence of equitable remedies. p. 580.
5. TRUSTS — Management and Disposal of Property — Jurisdiction of Administering Court. — An administering court has jurisdiction to supervise and control an express trust. p. 580.
6. APPEAL — Presumptions — Court Administering Trust — Failure of Findings to Disclose — Presumption Not Indulged. — Where a trustee, acting under an instrument executed by heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator whereby testator's property was conveyed to executor as trustee, never voluntarily submitted himself or the trust to the jurisdiction of an Indiana court and the findings did not disclose that jurisdiction over the trust was being exercised or that it was being administered by any court, the Appellate Court could not presume that it was being administered in the court which admitted the will to probate, for the instrument transferring the property inter vivos had no direct connection with the will. p. 580.
7. COURTS — Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction — Trust Deed Executed by Heirs of Illinois Testator — Trust Not Submitted to Indiana Courts — Effect on Beneficiary's Right of Action. — Where heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator conveyed testator's property to executor of will as trustee, the failure of the trustee, who transacted business in this State and for that purpose used and dealt in real estate and personal property owned by him as such trustee and located in this State, to submit himself or his trust to the jurisdiction of any court of this State, could not deprive Indiana courts of jurisdiction to assist beneficiaries of the trust in recovering their just dues in an action brought for that purpose, and it was not incumbent upon a creditor to bring the trust estate within the jurisdiction of an Indiana court in any other manner than by complaint, summons and general appearance. p. 581.
8. TRUSTS — Management and Disposal of Property — Trust Deed — Agreement of Creditor Not to File Claim in Estate — Promise of Trustee to Pay Debt From Assets. — Where, in order to obviate defects in the execution of a will, heirs and beneficiaries of an Illinois testator conveyed testator's property to executor as trustee, by an instrument substantially embracing the trust provisions of the will and wherein the trustee was to pay indebtedness of the trust estate from the assets thereof, a creditor who agreed not to file a claim in the estate upon the promise of the trustee to pay the debt from the trust assets, was entitled to recover against the trust estate. p. 582.
9. COSTS — Conclusion of Law Regarding Costs Unnecessary. — Since provision is made by statute for the assessment of costs, no conclusion of law with regard to them is necessary or proper. p. 582.
10. APPEAL — Points and Authorities — Failure to Support Assertion Waiver. — An assertion in appellants' brief which is not supported with any proposition, authority or reason is waived. p. 582.
From the Sullivan Circuit Court; Harvey L. Fisher, Special Judge.
Action by Theresa Newlin against Carl A. Newlin, as trustee of the Allen Newlin Estate, and others on promissory notes. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appealed. Reversed in Part and Affirmed in Part. By the court in banc.
Hays and Hays, of Sullivan, for appellants.
Thomas J. Gallagher and John W. Lindley, both of Sullivan, for appellee.
One Allen Newlin died a resident of Illinois, leaving large holdings of real estate and personal property there and in this State, all of which he undertook to dispose of by a will establishing a testamentary trust. His son, the appellant, Carl A. Newlin, was appointed executor in Illinois and thereafter, apparently to obviate defects in the execution of the will, the beneficiaries under it, who were all the heirs of the deceased, executed, their spouses joining, a certain agreement and deed of trust to Carl A. Newlin, as trustee, whereby all of said property, real and personal, was conveyed to him in trust with broad powers, for the use and benefit of all the heirs of Allen Newlin, including himself. This instrument substantially embraced the trust provisions of the will, and the trustee was therein charged among other things, with the duty of paying from the assets of the trust estate, any indebtedness thereof.
The appellee held two unpaid notes executed by the deceased, but on Carl A. Newlin's promise to pay them, filed no claim against the decedent's estate. He paid $950.00 on the notes in installments, but then refused further payment, and this action on the notes and to attach certain personal property in Sullivan County, Indiana, followed.
The pleadings are voluminous and it will be unnecessary to set them out. The court found the facts specially, stated conclusions of law favorably to appellee, rendered a money judgment against all appellants, and sustained the attachment.
While the appellee does not confess any error, she is content if the judgment against Carl A. Newlin, as trustee of the Allen Newlin estate, should be sustained, and we shall, therefore, consider only the validity of the judgment against him as such, without consideration of the validity of the judgment against him individually or against the other appellants.
It appears from the findings that Allen Newlin, at the time of his death, was indebted to appellee on account of the notes and at the time of trial they were past due and with the exception of the $950.00, unpaid. The court found as a fact the execution of the will and of the agreement and deed of trust, each of which by its terms required the trustee to pay the indebtedness from the assets of the estate, and which trust the trustee in writing accepted and agreed to carry out. That Carl A. Newlin, as trustee, promised to pay the notes in consideration of appellee's agreement to file no claim against the estate of Allen Newlin, deceased, and that the Allen Newlin trust was an operating trust, actively engaged in general farming and buying and selling cattle and stock in the State of Indiana. That Carl A. Newlin, as trustee of the Allen Newlin estate, owned the property attached and that the appellee and all other parties interested in the trust, all of whom have appeared to this action, were nonresidents of the State of Indiana. All other creditors have been paid from the proceeds of the trust. In the view that we take of the case it is not necessary to consider the other findings.
On the facts found, the court stated as its conclusions of law (1) that the law is with the appellee and that she is entitled to recover the sum of $2,424.22, (2) that each of the appellants is personally liable for the amount, (3) that the appellants were and are the owners of the corn attached and (4) that appellee recover from the appellants her costs.
The appellants first assert error in overruling their demurrers to each paragraph of the complaint, but it will be unnecessary for us to determine their sufficiency, for the facts found 1. are within the issues, and a correct statement or declaration of the law may be made upon the facts found, and will cure any error in ruling on the demurrers, if such there was. Woodward v. Mitchell (1895), 140 Ind. 406, 39 N.E. 437; Smith, Trustee, v. Wells Mfg. Co. (1897), 148 Ind. 333, 46 N.E. 1000.
It makes no great difference whether the trust be regarded as having been created by the will of the testator or by transfer inter vivos, but assuming, as the parties apparently 2, 3 have, that the agreement and deed of trust was necessary and that its execution, and acceptance by the trustee, effectuated the trust, we are of the opinion that it did not, so far as appellee was concerned, amount to a contract for the benefit of the appellee as a third party beneficiary, but created a trust relationship not only as between the trustee and the heirs of the deceased, but also as between the trustee and the appellee, for by the agreement the trustee did not assume a personal liability to the appellee in consideration of the transfer of the property, but on the contrary was required to pay the indebtedness from the assets of the trust estate. See American Law Institute, Restatement Law of Trusts, § 14. Moreover whether the appellee became a creditor of the trust, or a beneficiary under it, is a question of the intention of the grantors, and we believe that the instrument itself reveals that it was intended to accomplish the result above mentioned. Restatement Trusts, § 330h. The appellee manifested her willingness to accept the benefits of the trust when she accepted the trustee's assurances of payment, and neglected to file her claim against the decedent's estate.
No discretion was vested in the trustee with respect to the payment of the debts owed by the deceased. Given assets for the purpose, he was required to pay them immediately and 4. unconditionally, and that being true, the appellee as a beneficiary had the right to maintain an action at law to collect, American Law Institute, Restatement Law of Trusts, § 198; Cavanagh et al. v. O'Connor et al. (1920), 189 Iowa 171, 176 N.W. 881, regardless of the existence of equitable remedies.
The existence of the attached property resulted from the operation of the trust and the appellants admit that it was owned by the trustee as such, but contend that to permit this 5, 6. action would constitute an unwarranted interference with a trust being administered in another state. They further assert that appellee's only remedy is to file a claim in the trust estate or bring the trust estate within the jurisdiction of the court, and in support of these propositions they cite generally all sections of Burns' 1933 from § 56-601 to § 56-629 inclusive and particularly § 56-629 which reads as follows: "Said trustee and the funds in his hands shall be at all times under the equitable control of the court having jurisdiction thereof for the preservation of the funds and carrying out the purposes of the trust." In Premier Steel Co. v. Yandes (1894), 139 Ind. 307, 38 N.E. 849, it was said that these sections of the statute evince the purpose of the Legislature to give courts jurisdiction of conventional trusts, however created, and that it is the policy of our law to keep express trusts constantly under the supervision and control of the courts, so that trustees can be required by summary proceedings to answer as to their conduct. The jurisdiction of an administering court to supervise and control an express trust cannot be doubted, but this trustee has never voluntarily submitted himself nor this trust to the jurisdiction of an Indiana court. The findings do not disclose that jurisdiction over this trust is being exercised or that this trust is being administered by any court anywhere, and should we otherwise be able to do so, we may not in this case presume that it is being administered in the court admitting the will to probate, for the instrument transferring the property inter vivos has no direct connection with the will.
What the situation might be if this were a trust being administered in a court of this State, or involved personal property only and was being administered by a court of 7. competent jurisdiction in the state of the residence of all of these parties, we need not decide. Courts will sometimes refuse certain types of relief in matters involving trusts when a conflict of jurisdiction arises, In re Berry (1917), 178 App. Div. 144, 164 N.Y. Supp. 990, but no conflict of jurisdiction appears here. Our statute, § 3-501, Burns' 1933, defining those against whom attachments may be had, includes all nonresident defendants and nonresident trustees are not excepted. Certainly the failure of this trustee, who is transacting business in this State, and for that purpose is using and dealing in real estate and personal property owned by him as such trustee and located in this State, to submit himself or his trust to the jurisdiction of any court of this State, cannot deprive our courts of jurisdiction to assist beneficiaries of his trust in recovering their just dues in an action brought for that purpose, nor do we believe that it is incumbent upon them to bring the trust estate within the jurisdiction of the court in any other manner than by complaint, summons and general appearance, as was done in this case.
It, therefore, appears to us that the law is with the appellee and that she is entitled to recover the amount represented by the unpaid balance of the notes sued on, plus interest and 8, 9 attorney's fees from Carl A. Newlin, as trustee of the Allen Newlin estate, who as such has the legal title to the attached property. Our statutes make provision for the assessment of costs and no conclusion of law with regard to them is necessary or proper. McCabe et al. v. Grantham (1941), 108 Ind. App. 695, 31 N.E.2d 658.
The appellants assert that in some manner the attachment was vacated, but they do not support this assertion with any proposition, authority or reason and it is, therefore, 10. waived. The findings of fact herein mentioned appear to be sustained by the evidence, and other alleged errors, in the view we have taken of this case, have no application to it.
Judgment reversed as to all appellants except Carl A. Newlin, as trustee of the Allen Newlin estate, and cause remanded with instructions to restate the conclusions of law in accordance with this opinion and to render judgment accordingly.
NOTE. — Reported in 52 N.E.2d 503.