Summary
prevailing defendants sought attorney's fees under § 1988 for frivolous claims; the court denied fees based on Harris because the state-law claims were not clearly frivolous, and the defendant failed to separate out work done on frivolous claims from that done on non-frivolous claims
Summary of this case from Garedakis v. Brentwood Union School DistrictOpinion
No. 2:11-CV-02054 JAM-CKD
10-22-2012
JEAN NEWFARMER-FLETCHER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SIERRA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' County of Sierra, Sierra County Department of Human Services/Social Services Department, Carol Roberts, James Marks, Larry Allen, Van Maddox, and Jodi Benson, (collectively "Defendants"), Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Doc. #31). Plaintiff Janis Starkey ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion (Doc. #33). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is denied.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally scheduled for October 3, 2012.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND & FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging civil rights violations and state tort violations (Doc. #1). After Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6), Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (Doc. #12). Defendants again filed their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17), which the Court granted but allowed Plaintiff leave to amend four of her claims (Doc. #22). Once Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #23), Defendants moved once more to dismiss (Doc. #24). The Court issued an order on July 9, 2012, dismissing all of Plaintiff's remaining claims (Doc. #29). The Court, however, did not reach the merits on Plaintiff's related state law claims for slander and invasion of privacy because it declined to exercise jurisdiction over those claims, and they were dismissed without prejudice.
II. OPINION
A. Legal Standard for Award Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Normally, "a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988] upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). "[T]he bringing of cases with no foundation in law or facts at the outset" can give rise to an award of fees to a prevailing defendant under § 1988. Mitchell v. Office of L.A. Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986).
A defendant seeking fees has the burden to "establish that fees are attributable solely to the frivolous claims," which "is from a practical standpoint extremely difficult to carry." Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2011)).
B. Discussion
Defendants contend that they are entitled to fees under § 1988 because all the claims were dismissed and because the claims were frivolous. Plaintiff argues that attorney's fees are unwarranted because there was no bad faith as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In Defendants' reply, they clarify that they are not seeking attorney's fees under § 1927, and therefore, bad faith is not required.
For purposes of this present motion, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the fees requested arise solely from Plaintiff's dismissed civil rights claim, and it is probably impossible for them to do so. See Harris, 631 F.3d at 968. Defendants moved for and achieved a dismissal with prejudice of all claims except the slander and invasion of privacy claims, which were dismissed without prejudice. Moreover, the slander and invasion of privacy claims were dismissed in an earlier order, but with leave to amend, which means the claims could have been saved by amendment. Thus, it is unclear whether those claims were meritorious. Additionally, Plaintiff's civil rights claim and state tort claims are intertwined because the state law claims are based on the conduct that Plaintiff alleges was retaliatory in her § 1983 claim. Therefore, a fee award would be inappropriate. See Braunstein, 683 F.3d at 118 (holding that a fee award is not available for frivolous claims intertwined with non-frivolous claims).
Further, even if the claims could be separated, the declaration submitted in support of the present motion makes no distinction between the fees expended on the civil rights claims and the fees expended on the slander and invasion of privacy claims. Dividing the fees by the hours each attorney worked on each motion is not enough to satisfy Defendants' burden. See Harris, 631 F.3d at 971. It is also impossible to adequately distinguish the different claims from the statement of the services rendered because in the statement, the hours expended are not separated by claim. Statement, Exhibit A to the Declaration of Kristina M. Hall, Doc #31.
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, a fee award under § 1988 is inappropriate. Defendants' motion is therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE