New Hampshire Retail Groc. Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n

20 Citing cases

  1. In re Lafasciano

    175 N.H. 518 (N.H. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    In support of its interpretation of RSA 100-A:27, the Board invokes "the longstanding practice of NHRS without any legislative intervention to the contrary." See New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973). The hearing examiner found:

  2. United States v. Potter

    610 F. Supp. 3d 402 (D.N.H. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    New Hampshire's "administrative gloss" doctrine provides that "a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent." New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973). Importantly, "[t]he administrative gloss doctrine applies only when a statute is ambiguous," which is not the case here.

  3. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Ed.

    469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979)   Cited 12 times
    Ordering high school library to replace issues of MS Magazine removed from library and to resubscribe to MS

    Id. Defendants argue that the Board correctly decided that the "interim guidelines" were not applicable to it, stressing that New Hampshire law makes clear that interpretation by an administrative body of its own rules will be honored by a reviewing court unless the interpretation is patently unreasonable. The cases cited in support of this contention ( Bellows Falls, etc., Co. v. State, 94 N.H. 187, 49 A.2d 511; New Hampshire Retail Grocers Association v. State Tax Commission, 113 N.H. 511, 309 A.2d 890; Farrelly v. Timberlane Regional School District, 114 N.H. 560, 324 A.2d 723) so hold, but they are inapplicable in the context of the instant case. In cases of constitutional interpretation, the customary deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is inappropriate. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 145, n. 12, 556 F.2d 9, 22, n. 12 (1977 — concurring opinion of Bazelon, C.J.); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 516 F.2d 1101 (1974).

  4. Brady v. Sumski

    307 A.3d 1116 (N.H. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent."); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) ("It is a well[-]established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent."). [13] Further, we have characterized the homestead right itself, not as an "interest," but as a "personal privilege."

  5. N.H. Ctr. for Pub. Interest Journalism v. N.H. Dep't of Justice

    173 N.H. 648 (N.H. 2020)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing that courts may "look to the decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting similar acts for guidance .... Such similar laws, because they are in pari materia, are interpretatively helpful, especially in understanding the necessary accommodation of the competing interests involved."

    The DOJ contends its longstanding practice of keeping the EES confidential coupled with the legislature's "lack of ... interference" with that practice "comprises ‘administrative gloss’ on the statute." See New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) ("It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent."). However, the administrative gloss doctrine applies only when a statute is ambiguous.

  6. Union Leader Corp. v. Town of Salem

    173 N.H. 345 (N.H. 2020)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that "the balancing test we have used for the other categories of records listed in RSA 91-A:5, IV . . . appl[ies] to records relating to 'internal personnel practices'"

    For instance, the Town and Union argue that we should adhere to the per se rule we adopted in Fenniman because the legislature has not "overruled" Fenniman by legislative enactment. See Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 232, 75 A.3d 1083 (2013) (assuming that our prior holding "conforms to legislative intent" when it had "been over four years since we issued our [prior] decision and the legislature [had] not seen fit to amend the statute"); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that "[i]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to legislative intent"). However, such canons of statutory construction are not controlling.

  7. In re Phillips

    165 N.H. 226 (N.H. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. at 650, 972 A.2d 1025. Significantly, it has been over four years since we issued our decision and the legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute. Cf.New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that the interpretation conforms to legislative intent). Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent.

  8. In re Phillips

    165 N.H. 226 (N.H. 2013)

    Significantly, it has been over four years since we issued our decision and the legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute. Cf.New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that the interpretation conforms to legislative intent). Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent.

  9. In re Mone

    143 N.H. 128 (N.H. 1998)   Cited 13 times

    Regardless of the terminology employed, "parties are entitled under the established practice in this State to the most convenient procedure for the settlement of their controversy." New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 513, 309 A.2d 890, 891 (1973). The sheriff's association argues that this case is not justiciable because the petitioners have invoked this court's original jurisdiction and therefore there are no factual findings and no record to review.

  10. In re Richard M

    127 N.H. 12 (N.H. 1985)   Cited 11 times
    Observing that "the legislature is not compelled to follow technical rules of grammar and composition"

    We find to be without merit the division's argument that the "long-standing practical and plausible interpretation" the division has accorded RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 and Supp. 1983), without legislative interference, is evidence that its construction conforms to the legislature's intent. [10, 11] Although "[i]t is a well established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent," New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890, 892 (1973), "[t]his maxim of statutory construction has no application . . . where, as here, the agency's interpretation is in clear conflict with the express statutory language." Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).