In support of its interpretation of RSA 100-A:27, the Board invokes "the longstanding practice of NHRS without any legislative intervention to the contrary." See New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973). The hearing examiner found:
New Hampshire's "administrative gloss" doctrine provides that "a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent." New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973). Importantly, "[t]he administrative gloss doctrine applies only when a statute is ambiguous," which is not the case here.
Id. Defendants argue that the Board correctly decided that the "interim guidelines" were not applicable to it, stressing that New Hampshire law makes clear that interpretation by an administrative body of its own rules will be honored by a reviewing court unless the interpretation is patently unreasonable. The cases cited in support of this contention ( Bellows Falls, etc., Co. v. State, 94 N.H. 187, 49 A.2d 511; New Hampshire Retail Grocers Association v. State Tax Commission, 113 N.H. 511, 309 A.2d 890; Farrelly v. Timberlane Regional School District, 114 N.H. 560, 324 A.2d 723) so hold, but they are inapplicable in the context of the instant case. In cases of constitutional interpretation, the customary deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is inappropriate. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 145, n. 12, 556 F.2d 9, 22, n. 12 (1977 — concurring opinion of Bazelon, C.J.); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 516 F.2d 1101 (1974).
Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent."); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) ("It is a well[-]established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent."). [13] Further, we have characterized the homestead right itself, not as an "interest," but as a "personal privilege."
The DOJ contends its longstanding practice of keeping the EES confidential coupled with the legislature's "lack of ... interference" with that practice "comprises ‘administrative gloss’ on the statute." See New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) ("It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent."). However, the administrative gloss doctrine applies only when a statute is ambiguous.
For instance, the Town and Union argue that we should adhere to the per se rule we adopted in Fenniman because the legislature has not "overruled" Fenniman by legislative enactment. See Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 232, 75 A.3d 1083 (2013) (assuming that our prior holding "conforms to legislative intent" when it had "been over four years since we issued our [prior] decision and the legislature [had] not seen fit to amend the statute"); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that "[i]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to legislative intent"). However, such canons of statutory construction are not controlling.
Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. at 650, 972 A.2d 1025. Significantly, it has been over four years since we issued our decision and the legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute. Cf.New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that the interpretation conforms to legislative intent). Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent.
Significantly, it has been over four years since we issued our decision and the legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute. Cf.New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890 (1973) (noting that it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that the interpretation conforms to legislative intent). Thus, we assume that our holding conforms to legislative intent.
Regardless of the terminology employed, "parties are entitled under the established practice in this State to the most convenient procedure for the settlement of their controversy." New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 513, 309 A.2d 890, 891 (1973). The sheriff's association argues that this case is not justiciable because the petitioners have invoked this court's original jurisdiction and therefore there are no factual findings and no record to review.
We find to be without merit the division's argument that the "long-standing practical and plausible interpretation" the division has accorded RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 and Supp. 1983), without legislative interference, is evidence that its construction conforms to the legislature's intent. [10, 11] Although "[i]t is a well established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that such a construction conforms to the legislative intent," New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 113 N.H. 511, 514, 309 A.2d 890, 892 (1973), "[t]his maxim of statutory construction has no application . . . where, as here, the agency's interpretation is in clear conflict with the express statutory language." Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).