Opinion
September 25, 1945.
November 26, 1945.
Practice — Judgments — Declaratory — Lands purchased by County Commissioners at County Treasurer's sales — Distribution of rentals — Acts of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840 and May 22, 1935, P. L. 228.
1. A petition for a declaratory judgment is a proper type of proceeding to determine the basis of distribution among various taxing authorities of rents from real estate purchased by the county commissioners at judicial sales for unpaid taxes and not redeemed by the former owners within the statutory period. [263-5]
2. The possible existence of a remedy by mandamus does not oust the jurisdiction of a court of common pleas to decide a legal question in a declaratory judgment proceeding under the Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, as amended. [263-4]
3. A remedy by a declaratory judgment may be more swift, certain and complete than the remedy provided by a bill in equity for an accounting in that appropriate rules of distribution can be stated in the former type of proceeding. [264]
4. The Act of May 22, 1935, P. L. 228, amending the Declaratory Judgments Act, constitutes a mandate from the legislature to the courts to get on with the business of deciding the people's questions for them. [264-5]
Constitutional law — Title — Sufficiency — Acts of May 26, 1943, P. L. 645, and June 18, 1923, P. L. 840.
5. The Act of May 26, 1943, P. L. 645, amending the Declaratory Judgments Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, is not unconstitutional on the ground that its subject is not clearly expressed in its title. [265]
Taxation — County Treasurer's sales — Purchase by County Commissioners — Rentals — Distribution to taxing authority — Individual accounts — Unpaid taxes — Act of May 29, 1931, P. L. 280.
6. Where lands are purchased by the County Commissioners at tax sales and not redeemed by the former owners during the statutory period, in determining the rights of the various interested taxing authorities to the rents, each property should be accounted for separately. [265]
7. Where lands are purchased by the County Commissioners at tax sales and not redeemed by the former owners during the period of time allowed by law, in determining the proportion of the rents due any taxing authority, the amount due it is to be determined under the Act of May 29, 1931, P. L. 280, as amended, by adding to the unpaid taxes at the time of sale taxes for two full years thereafter. [265-6]
8. In distributing the rentals from such lands among the various interested taxing authorities, if money enough is realized to pay all taxes the taxing authorities share proportionately; if not the oldest taxes are paid first in order of seniority. [266-7]
9. Rentals from such lands cannot be distributed until the lands from which they have been derived have been sold. [266-7]
10. There is no priority among the taxes of the various taxing authorities for the same year. [266]
Before MAXEY, C. J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 190, March T., 1945, from decree of C. P., Lawrence Co., Dec. T., 1944, No. 13, in case of School District of the City of New Castle v. Joseph F. Travers et al., Commissioners, et al. Decree affirmed.
Proceeding upon petition for declaratory judgment.
The facts are stated in the opinion, by BRAHAM, P. J., of the court below as follows:
This proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P. L. 840, as amended (12 P.S. 836 et seq.) prays for a declaration of rights determining the proportion in which taxing authorities are entitled to the rents from real estate "bid off" by the County Commissioners at County Treasurer's sale and not redeemed by the former owner during the period of time allowed by law. All agree that under the rule of Andrews Land Corporation's Appeal, 149 Pa. Super. 212, the county holds the lands so bought as trustee for the taxing authorities which have unpaid tax claims against the lands.
In an opinion of this court reported in 4 Lawrence Law Journal 1, the preliminary objections of the County of Lawrence were overruled, the contention that the presentation of a claim to the County Controller under the Act approved May 2, 1929, P.S. 1278, Par. 349, 16 P.S. 349, followed by mandamus is "a special form of remedy for a particular type of case" under the Declaratory Judgments Act being rejected. In our adjudication, reported in 4 Lawrence Law Journal 74, we discussed and rejected the idea that proceedings by bill in equity for an accounting are the exclusive remedy. Now the case is again before us upon exceptions to our adjudication.
The first exception again questions the jurisdiction of this Court to determine the case under the Declaratory Judgments Act. For the reasons herefore stated by us we believe this case is a proper one for a declaratory judgment. The County of Lawrence contends there is no dispute, pointing to a resolution adopted by all the parties to settle the dispute. By our finding of fact numbered 9 we determined that the same dispute existed after the adoption of the resolution as before. No exception was taken to this, or indeed to any, of our findings of fact; hence this point is not properly before us.
Plaintiff presented its claim to the controller who, because of the dispute among the parties as to the proper formula for distribution and his own uncertainty as to the law, did not approve any disposition. Plaintiff was thereupon entitled to proceed either by mandamus or by bill in equity for an accounting. But mandamus is "a remedy available only where there is a clear legal right" and "can never be invoked in a doubtful case": Homan v. Mackey et al., 295 Pa. 82, 85, 86; 11 Standard Penna. Practice, 151. The controller was confronted by a blanket demand with a continuing controversy raging about the manner of dispute. He did not act. We cannot say that the existence of the remedy by mandamus ousted the jurisdiction of this court to decide under the Declaratory Judgments Act the legal question which has caused all the uncertainty and delay.
As to the remedy in equity by a bill for an accounting it is useful only to repeat that the initial order in such type of case is only an order to account which "leaves open the precise liability" of the fiduciary until the accounting itself takes place: Ringer, Admrx., v. Finfrock, 340 Pa. 458, 464. The remedy by declaratory judgment is more swift, certain and complete because, in addition to directing an accounting, we can at this time lay down the appropriate rules of distribution. Furthermore, as remarked in our last opinion, the situation now before us comes squarely within the rule laid down by the legislature when the Declaratory Judgments Act was amended on May 22, 1935, P. L. 228, Par. 7, 12 P.S. 853, as follows: "Nothing in this act shall prevent a court from entering a declaratory judgment or decree in any civil proceeding, suit or action no matter how commenced, where all parties, to be affected, are actually in court or have had such notice of the proceeding, suit, or action as is required by law, and where the court is convinced, that such a judgment or decree is appropriate and proper to be entered."
One cause contributing to the diminution of public confidence in, and the diversion of business from, the courts of common pleas of the Commonwealth has been the courts' worship of technical points of procedure. In the present case the controversy has gone on for years before the aid of the court was invoked. We have written three rather lengthy opinions, almost entirely devoted to questions of procedure. This is regrettable. To the litigants, procedural questions mean nothing; they want the dispute decided. Thus the legislature has merely directed the courts to do what we should have known enough to do without the direction, — take the cause of parties who are all before the court with a controlling question of law which is apt and ripe for decision and decide the question.
In the Act of 1935 the people are speaking to a branch of their government which they believe to be lagging behind in the progress of government. They may be telling us to forget some of our technical learning; they are certainly telling us to get on with our business of deciding the peoples' questions for them.
Attention has been called to our failure to find that a declaratory judgment or decree will terminate the uncertainty or controversy. This will be corrected by an appropriate finding because we are convinced our decree will settle the controversy. Apparently not even a complete formal account will be necessary.
Defendant says the amendment to the Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923 which was passed May 26, 1943, P. L. 645, 12 P.S. 836, is unconstitutional because its subject is not clearly expressed in its title. The Act of 1936 was held constitutional in Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455. It was titled only "An act concerning declaratory judgments and to make uniform the law relating thereto." The amending act adds "further defining the circumstances under which the remedy is available." This is sufficient; the title need not be a synopsis of the act nor an index to its provisions; Equitable Society, Inc., et al. v. Bell, Secretary of Banking et al., 339 Pa. 449. The first exception is without merit.
Defendant's second exception is directed to our conclusion that each property should be accounted for separately. We see no other correct and feasible method. To attempt to distribute rents under a formula based upon all the properties would be impossible. The constant adding to, and subtracting from, the sale of properties would constantly change the formula.
The third exception relates to our conclusion, that in determining the proportion of the rents due any taxing authority the amount due it shall be determined by adding to the unpaid taxes at the time of sale taxes for two full years thereafter. This is pursuant to the Act of May 29, 1931, P. L. 280, Par. 16, as last amended by the Act of June 29, 1939, P. L. 498, Par. 8, 72 P.S. 5971-p, the material part of which is as follows: "When the county commissioners shall purchase any real property at a county treasurer's sale, they shall provide a book wherein shall be entered: (a) the name of the person as whose land the same was sold; (b) a brief description of the property, together with any lot and block number; (c) the amount of taxes, interest and costs for which it was sold. Such property shall not, so long as it remains the property of the county, be charged in the duplicate. During the redemption period following such sale, if the land remains unredeemed, the commissioners shall, in separate columns in the same book, charge every such tract of land with like county, city, borough, town, township, school and poor taxes, as would have been chargeable against the land had the same not been purchased by the county commissioners."
It thus does not matter whether the City of New Castle files its taxes in the Prothonotary's office under the permission given in section 21 of the Act of 1931 or with the commissioners under section 1; section 16 of the act, quoted above, relates to a time after sale. The county could not have sold for city taxes if none were filed with it but must nevertheless charge the land with city as well as all other taxes during the redemption period.
Here must be noted the very recent decision of the Superior Court in Lackawanna County's Appeal — In re Sale of Land to American Red Cross, No. 3 Feb. Term, 1945, decided on April 12, 1945. The court was there considering the basis for distribution of the proceeds of a sale of tax lands. The decision was that if money enough is realized from the sale to pay all taxes, the taxing authorities share proportionately; if not, the oldest taxes are paid first. There is no priority among the taxes of the various taxing authorities for the same year. This method must be followed in distributing the rents from tax lands. The rents must be distributed in the same proportion as the proceeds of the lands. As a necessary corollary, we cannot distribute rents until the lands from which rents have been derived have been sold. Here we should note also the case of Erie School District Appeal, 155 Pa. Super., 564, which establishes the place of municipal liens in distribution of the proceeds of sale; they are paid in full, if there is money enough, otherwise they are paid in order of seniority after the taxes of all taxing authorities. The same formula is followed as to rents. The third exception must be overruled.
Because the accounts have been so long standing and the expense incident to the handling of each property cannot now well be segregated we have decided to allow the amount of fifteen per centum to the county which all the parties have agreed upon. Our fourth conclusion of law will therefore be omitted.
The substance of the fifth, sixth and seventh exceptions has been discussed elsewhere and need not be repeated.
There is merit in the eighth exception. The reason we are entertaining this case under the discretionary powers given us by the Declaratory Judgments Act is because it will terminate the dispute quickly and finally. The superiority of this procedure over a bill in equity for an accounting will be apparent if we but consider what follows this decision. As the first step each taxing authority should present to the county controller an accurate statement of taxes due against any parcel of land. The controller, having all the tax statements, proceeds to approve a distribution of the rent fund conformable to this opinion. If all parties are satisfied distribution may at once be made and that part of our problem is disposed of. If, on the contrary, there are disputes they may be resolved under the powers granted by Section 8 of the Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P. L. 840, 12 P.S. 838.
Thus, now to require an accounting in court of the two hundred transactions involved, would encumber the court to no purpose and to require a formal accounting for future transactions would constitute a useless deviation from the simple practice of demand upon the county controller followed by suit or mandamus, as the party may elect. The eighth exception must be sustained.
County and County Commissioners appealed.
William McElwee, Jr., County Solicitor, for appellants.
Robert L. Wallace, for School District of City of New Castle, appellee.
Robert White, with him Gilbert E. Long, for City of New Castle, appellee.
Argued September 25, 1945.
This appeal is from a final decree in a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1923, as amended, which prays for a declaration of rights determining the proportion in which taxing authorities, county, city, school district and institution district, are entitled to the rents from real estate purchased by County Commissioners at County Treasurer's Sales and not redeemed by the former owners during the period of time allowed by law.
The taxing authorities have been unable to agree upon a satisfactory basis for distribution thereof because different "methods" of distribution have been pressed by some of the parties and opposed by others until an actual controversy exists. At the time of the hearing there were about 204 properties from which rents had been so received, and there was then more than $50,000 in the rent fund. The question is who gets the rentals collected from such properties while the county owns them, and upon what basis is division of the rentals to be made.
The learned court below, by its President Judge, Honorable W. WALTER BRAHAM, answered these questions in a satisfactory way in an able and thorough opinion. We cannot add anything helpful to what has been done. We therefore affirm on its opinion the final decree of the learned court below.
Decree affirmed.