Opinion
EDCV 23-2337 JGB (SPx)
02-22-2024
Norma Nevarez v. FedEx Supply Chain Inc., et al.
Present: The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES-GENERAL
Proceedings: Order (1) DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 11); and (2) VACATING the February 26, 2024 Hearing (IN CHAMBERS)
Before the Court is Plaintiff Norma Nevarez's motion to remand. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 11.) The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering all papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court DENIES the Motion and VACATES the February 26, 2024 hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff Norma Nevarez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Bernardino against Defendant FedEx Supply Chain, Inc. (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 20, inclusive. (“Complaint,” Dkt. No. 1-1.) The Complaint alleges seventeen causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (2) failure to grant medical leave in violation of the CFRA; (3) denial of medical leave in violation of the CFRA; (4) restraint of medical leave in violation of the CFRA; (5) interference with medical leave in violation of the CFRA; (6) retaliation in violation of the CFRA; (7) disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (8) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the FEHA; (9) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of the FEHA; (10) sex and gender discrimination in violation of the FEHA; (11) retaliation in violation of the FEHA; (12) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FEHA; (13) failure to grant medical leave of absence in violation of pregnancy disability leave law; (14) interference with restraint, and denial of medical leave in violation of the pregnancy disability leave law; (15) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the pregnancy disability leave law; (16) retaliation in violation of pregnancy disability leave law; and (17) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Complaint at 1-2.)
On November 15, 2023, Defendant removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction. (“Notice of Removal,” Dkt. No. 1.) On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Motion. (See Motion.) In support of the Motion, Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice. (“Plaintiff RJN,” Dkt. No. 12.) Defendant opposed the Motion on February 5, 2024. (“Opposition,” Dkt. No. 14.) In support of the Opposition, Defendant filed a request for judicial notice. (“Defendant RJN,” Dkt. No. 15.) On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff replied. (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 16.) In support of the Reply, Plaintiff submitted a request for judicial notice. (“Second Plaintiff RJN,” Dkt. No. 17.)
Plaintiff requests that the Court take notice of five cases from this district. (See Plaintiff RJN.) Proceedings of other courts, including orders and filings, are the proper subject of judicial notice when directly related to the case, though not for the truth of the contents of the underlying documents. See United States ex. Rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 917 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”); Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[C]ourt orders and filings are the type of documents that are properly noticed under [Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).]”); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff RJN.
Defendant requests that the Court take notice of four cases and one jury verdict from the Superior Court for the State of California, as well as instructions from the Judicial Counsel of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI). (See Defendant RJN.) Proceedings of other courts, including orders and filings, are the proper subject of judicial notice when directly related to the case, though not for the truth of the contents of the underlying documents. See United States ex. Rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 917 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”); Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[C]ourt orders and filings are the type of documents that are properly noticed under [Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).]”); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LlC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court may also “take judicial notice of . . . matters of public record.” Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendant RJN.
Plaintiff requests that the Court take notice of one case from this district. (See Second Plaintiff RJN.) Proceedings of other courts, including orders and filings, are the proper subject of judicial notice when directly related to the case, though not for the truth of the contents of the underlying documents. See United States ex. Rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 917 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”); Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[C]ourt orders and filings are the type of documents that are properly noticed under [Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).]”); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Second Plaintiff RJN.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a matter to federal court where the district court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, “possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). As such, a defendant may remove civil actions in which a federal question exists or in which complete diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A removing defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days after receipt of the initial pleading. Id. § 1446(b).
The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Jackson v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 2014 WL 5514142, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014). The court must resolve doubts regarding removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Neither party disputes that they are citizens of different states, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (See Motion; Opposition.) They dispute only whether Defendant has shown that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
The Court first considers whether it is "facially apparent" from the Complaint that the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied. See Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). Here, the Complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought, stating only “past and future economic and non-economic damages[,] . . . costs of suit and attorney's fees.” (Complaint at 34.) Because the Complaint does not provide an amount of damages, the amount in controversy is not “facially apparent.”
When a complaint does not specify the amount of damages, “the court may examine facts in the complaint and evidence submitted by the parties.” Simmons, 209 F.Supp.2d at 1031. The jurisdictional minimum may be satisfied by claims for special and general damages, attorneys' fees, and punitive damages. See Conrad Assoc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F.Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 1998). The defendant bears the burden to establish the amount in controversy at removal. Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013). If “defendant's assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged . . . both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014). This proof can include affidavits, declarations, or other “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Singer, 116 F.3d at 377). Additionally, the defendant may rely on “reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant's theory of damages exposure.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198.
Defendant's estimated amount in controversy, including economic damages, emotional damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, is $531,481. (See Opposition.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant's calculations of Plaintiff's lost wages, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees are speculative. (See Motion.) The Court considers whether Defendant's estimates satisfy the amount in controversy requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 135 S.Ct. at 554.
Defendant estimates economic damages of $68,080, emotional distress damages of $25,001, punitive damages of $400,000, and attorney's fees of $38,400. (Opposition at 15-16, 19-20.)
A. Lost Wages
Plaintiff seeks recovery of economic damages, including future lost wages. (See Complaint ¶ 28.) First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's estimate of lost wages is unreasonable because it fails to consider Plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages. (Motion at 4.) The Court disagrees.
The amount in controversy reflects the “amount at stake in the underlying litigation” and does not reflect the impact of affirmative defenses. Greene v. Harley-Davidson, 965 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The district court erred in considering the merits of Harley-Davidson's affirmative defense to determine the amount in controversy.”); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex. rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“J]ust because a defendant might have a valid defense that will reduce recovery to below the jurisdictional amount does not mean the defendant will ultimately prevail on that defense.”); Jackson v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 2019 WL 3493991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) (“[M]itigation of damages is an affirmative defense, and a potential defense does not reduce the amount in controversy for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[I]f a district court had to evaluate every possible defense that could reduce recovery below the jurisdictional amount the district court would essentially have to decide the merits of the case before it could determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. As such, the Court does not consider Plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages in estimating the amount in controversy.
The Second Plaintiff RJN cites Ramirez v. Builder Services Group, Inc., 2023 WL 115561 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2023), a case which this Court decided. There, the Court considered Plaintiff's duty to mitigate by removing from the amount in controversy Plaintiff's earnings from subsequent employment. See id., at *5. However, that case is distinguishable. There, unlike here, the Court was presented with confirmation of Plaintiff's subsequent employment, as well as wage and hour information allowing the Court to estimate the scope of potential mitigation. See id.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's inclusion of future lost wages, from the date of removal to a predicted trial date, is unreasonable and overreaching. (Motion at 4-5.) Defendant's lost wage calculation is based on “an estimate that it will take the parties one-year post-removal to go to trial.” (Opposition at 15.) Defendant paid Plaintiff $18.50 per hour, amounting to $740 per week for a forty-hour workweek. (“Beckton Decl.,” Dkt. No. 1-5 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was terminated from her employment with Defendant on February 7, 2023. (Id. ¶ 6.) As such, 40 weeks passed between Plaintiff's termination and the date of removal, and another 52 weeks will pass between the date of removal and Defendant's predicted trial date of November 15, 2024. (See Opposition at 16.) All 92 weeks amount to lost wages of $68,080.
While Plaintiff contends that amount of controversy must be determined as of the date of removal, “if the law entitles [a plaintiff] to recoup . . . future wages if she prevails, then there is no question that future wages are ‘at stake' in the litigation, whatever the likelihood that she will actually recover them.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018). “In such a situation, although the plaintiff's employer would have paid the wages in the future had she remained employed, they are presently in controversy.” Id. (emphasis in original). In Chavez, the Ninth Circuit further clarified: “When we say that the amount in controversy is assessed at the time of removal, we mean that we consider damages that are claimed at the time the case is removed by the defendant.” Id. Plaintiff largely cites to Central District cases which pre-date Chavez and non-binding authority from the Third Circuit to support her proposition that the Court should not consider wages post-removal. (See Motion at 4-5.) However, while it was standard for courts in this district to decline projecting future lost wages, “[s]ince Chavez, district courts consistently have included as part of the amount in controversy future wages up to the expected date of trial in this action.” Uloa v. California Newspaper Partners, 2021 WL 6618815, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021) (emphasis in original).
The Second Plaintiff RJN cites Ramirez, 2023 WL 115561, a case which this Court decided. There, the Court declined to include future wages (or “front pay”) in its amount in controversy estimate. See id. at *4. However, the clear trend within courts in this district following Chavez, and as discussed in Uloa, is to consider future wages if the law entitles a plaintiff to recoup them. Uloa, 2021 WL 6618815, at *6; see also Thayer v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 2021 WL 1263837, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2021) (“[T]here is no question that Thayer's future wages are at stake.”); Velez-Guerra v. Crescent Hotels & Resorts, LLC, 2020 WL 7311349, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020); Cuevas v. Lowes Home Ctrs., LLC, 2020 WL 6439174, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020); Calhoun v. Consol. Disposal Serv., LLC, 2019 WL 2522677, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2019); Zambrano v. Rite Aid Corp., 2019 WL 1466744, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2019). Accordingly, the Court now considers future wages in its amount in controversy calculation.
Here, Plaintiff claims future wages as damages. (Complaint at 34 (“Past and future economic damages.”); Id. ¶ 28 (“Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings . . . and will for a period of time in the future be unable to obtain gainful employment.”).) Accordingly, future wages are at stake in this action and should be included in the amount in controversy calculation. Moreover, Defendant's estimate of one year between removal and trial is reasonable. See Fisher v. HNTB Corp., 2018 WL 6323077, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018) (“[T]he Court finds Defendants' proposed date of trial for purposes of this motion-one year from the date of removal-is a conservative estimate of the trial date.”); Beltran v. Procare Pharmacy, LLC, 2020 WL 748643, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (“Next, the Court considers future wages....[T]his Court will apply the conservative one-year prospective trial date.”); Uloa, 2021 WL 6618815, at *6 (“A projected future trial date within a year of removal has been adopted by other district courts.”). The Court finds that Defendant's calculation of lost wages is reasonable, and the estimated amount in controversy for lost wages is $68,080.
B. Emotional Distress Damages
Defendant estimates emotional distress damages of “at least” $25,001 for its amount in controversy calculation. (Opposition at 16.) Plaintiff argues these damages are speculative, as Defendant fails to provide closely analogous cases to support its estimate. (Motion at 5-6.)
To begin, the Court agrees with Defendant that the language of Plaintiff's Complaint appears to claim emotional distress damages above $25,000. (See Opposition at 16.) Each of Plaintiff's seventeen claims contains an allegation of emotional distress and states that Defendant's conduct has caused “Plaintiff great mental pain and suffering, in an amount in excess of this Court's minimal jurisdiction.” (Complaint ¶¶ 29, 41, 53, 65, 77, 89, 100, 111, 122, 133, 145, 157, 168, 179, 190, 201, 213.) The California Superior Court's minimal jurisdiction requires $25,000 in damages. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 86(a)(1). Plaintiff's estimate of her own emotional damages, as stated in the Complaint, is therefore at least $25,000.
Even so, the Court finds that Defendant's $25,001 estimate of emotional damages is reasonable, independent of the estimate in Plaintiff's Complaint. In determining the amount in controversy, a district court can consider emotional distress damage awards in “similar” cases. See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). The cases considered must be factually “analogous” to the case at issue. See Daley v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2018 WL 3104630, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (“To establish probable emotional distress damages, a defendant may introduce evidence of jury verdicts from cases with analogous facts.”). Defendant cites various cases to support its emotional damages estimate. (See Opposition at 17-18; Notice of Removal ¶ 24.) As such, the Court determines whether the cases Defendant cites are sufficiently analogous to the instant case to establish emotional distress damages of $25,001.
Plaintiff's factual allegations are as follows. Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant on January 22, 2018. (Complaint ¶ 11.) On January 2, 2023, she began feeling nauseous and confirmed she was pregnant. (Id. ¶ 12.) She brought a doctor's note to her supervisor on January 4, 2023, which included work restrictions such as no heavy lifting, pulling, or pushing. (Id. ¶ 13.) However, her supervisor allegedly responded to her restrictions by stating, “you'll be fine, just eat some crackers.” (Id.) Shortly after informing Defendant of her pregnancy, Plaintiff began receiving additional duties to move boxes that consistently violated her restrictions, and as a result of the duties, she began experiencing complications with her pregnancy. (Id. ¶ 14.) Because of the complications, Plaintiff was required to attend regular appointments with her OBGYN, and she regularly informed Defendant of her appointments. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also regularly experienced morning sickness that required time off or late arrivals, of which she informed Defendant. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 7, 2023, Plaintiff could not access her employee account and was later terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) On March 11, 2023, due to the stress of her termination, Plaintiff prematurely gave birth to her son, who later passed away. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was left “embarrassed, ashamed, emotionally broken, and in financial desperation for having been directly discriminated and retaliated against for having a pregnancy related disability.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
Defendant cites the jury verdict in Claudia Ventura v. Forever 21 Logistics, LLC & Ester Olvera, 2009 WL 1885484 (Cal. Super. 2009), a case which the Court finds to be factually analogous. (See Defendant RJN.) There, the plaintiff was a worker at a Forever 21 warehouse when she discovered that she was pregnant. Id. She reported that her employer “did not respect pregnancy-related restrictions issued by her doctors,” and she experienced pregnancy complications including bleeding. Id. She also reported that her employer harassed her because of her pregnancy and pregnancy-related restrictions. Id. The plaintiff's doctors took her off work, and she did not return after giving birth. Id. The plaintiff alleged severe emotional distress, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000 in emotional damages. Id.
Though the cases are not identical, the Court finds that Ventura is analogous to the instant action. The plaintiffs in both cases were pregnant workers and their employers allegedly did not respect their work restrictions, leading to complications. Both plaintiffs ceased work during their pregnancy, and neither returned to work after giving birth. The potential for emotional distress damages is arguably higher in the instant action as Plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Ventura, alleges that she was terminated (rather than recommended to leave work by her doctor) and that her son passed away due to a premature birth caused by the stress of her termination. As such, the Court finds that Defendant's estimate of $25,001 in emotional damages is conservative compared to the facts and verdict presented by Ventura. Defendant's calculation of emotional distress damages is reasonable, and the estimated amount in controversy for emotional damages is $25,001.
Together, the amount in controversy stemming from the estimates of lost wages and emotional distress damages-both of which the Court deems reasonable-is $93,081. This amount in controversy exceeds the threshold of $75,000 required to establish diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. As such, the Court does not analyze Defendant's estimates of punitive damages and attorney's fees, and it finds Defendant has met its burden of satisfying the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction exists.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand. The Court VACATES the February 26, 2024 hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.