Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist

12 Citing cases

  1. Wooden v. County of Douglas

    751 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 2008)   Cited 4 times
    In Wooden v. County of Douglas, 275 Neb. 971, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2008), the issue was whether the timely filing of the affidavit of proof of service was necessary to vest the district court with jurisdiction of the condemnation appeal. The Court of Appeals had concluded that the timely filing of such affidavit was jurisdictional.

    01 (Reissue 2003) and Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist.Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal.

  2. Cole Investment Co. v. City of Lincoln

    329 N.W.2d 356 (Neb. 1983)

    We think the reference to "procedure" in 15-841 relates to matters occurring after the appeal has been perfected and jurisdiction has vested in the District Court. Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972), involved an appeal in a proceeding in eminent domain. The relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-715 (Reissue 1981), provided that an "appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal . . . ."

  3. Pinnacle Enters., Inc. v. City of Papillion

    302 Neb. 297 (Neb. 2019)   Cited 4 times

    Because the current version of § 76-717 does not specify a good cause standard (either explicitly or by incorporation of another statute), our earlier cases have been superseded by the legislative amendments to § 76-717. See, Singleton v. South Platte Nat. Resources Dist. , 215 Neb. 504, 339 N.W.2d 751 (1983) ; Estate of Tetherow v. State , 193 Neb. 150, 226 N.W.2d 116 (1975) ; Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist. , 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972) ; Jensen v. Omaha Public Power Dist. , 159 Neb. 277, 66 N.W.2d 591 (1954) ; City of Seward v. Gruntorad , 158 Neb. 143, 62 N.W.2d 537 (1954). See 1983 Neb. Laws, L.B. 270, § 1.

  4. Kansas Bankers Surety Co. v. Halford

    263 Neb. 971 (Neb. 2002)   Cited 15 times
    Stating that "a party seeking attorney fees in the trial court must make the request prior to the judgment" and reversing the award of attorney fees to the defendant because he had moved for attorney fees after the plaintiff had already dismissed the action

    153 Neb. at 845, 46 N.W.2d at 495. See, also, United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 225 Neb. 218, 403 N.W.2d 383 (1987); Miller v. Harris, supra; Gebhart v. Tri-State G. T. Assn., 181 Neb. 457, 149 N.W.2d 41 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972); Giesler v. City of Omaha, 175 Neb. 706, 123 N.W.2d 650 (1963). In Giesler, an action was commenced for a declaratory judgment to have an Omaha city ordinance declared unconstitutional.

  5. State v. Jacob

    256 Neb. 492 (Neb. 1999)   Cited 6 times

    We have held that a plaintiff may dismiss an action without prejudice as a matter of right, at any time before final submission of the case. See Gebhart v. Tri-State G. T. Assn., 181 Neb. 457, 149 N.W.2d 41 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-601 (Reissue 1995).

  6. State v. Joubert

    246 Neb. 287 (Neb. 1994)   Cited 36 times
    Finding Attorney General had no legitimate legal reason for moving to set execution date while federal stay was pending

    AMISUB v. Board of Cty. Comrs. of Douglas Cty., 244 Neb. 657, 508 N.W.2d 827 (1993); Arizona Motor Speedway, supra; State v. Escamilla, 237 Neb. 647, 467 N.W.2d 59 (1991). Furthermore, in construing a statute, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately. Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). By the time of the enactment of § 29-2545, the Legislature had already abolished most writs of error and provided that appeals under the criminal code would be the same as for civil cases.

  7. J. J. Schaefer Livestock Hauling v. Gretna St. Bank

    229 Neb. 580 (Neb. 1988)   Cited 29 times
    In J.J. Shaefer Livestock Hauling, Inc. v. Gretna State Bank, 229 Neb. 580, 428 N.W.2d 185 (1988), neither party claimed that mistake or fraud was involved.

    The general standard of review is that dismissal by a district judge will not be reversed on appeal if it was done in the exercise of sound discretion. Estate of Tetherow v. State, 193 Neb. 150, 226 N.W.2d 116 (1975); Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). "`A judicial abuse of discretion does not denote or imply improper motive, bad faith, or intentional wrong by a judge, but requires the reasons or rulings of a trial judge to be clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial system.'"

  8. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Heim

    388 N.W.2d 106 (Neb. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    Jurisdiction is the power to hear and decide a legal controversy. See Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). "Jurisdiction is the inherent power or authority to decide a case . . . ."

  9. Singleton v. South Platte Nat. Resources Dist

    339 N.W.2d 751 (Neb. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    Furthermore, we agree that, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, this court will not ordinarily set aside a determination by the District Court as to whether or not good cause has been shown. See Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972). The difficulty, however, in the instant case is that the record fails to disclose any showing of good cause upon which the court could act, and therefore its action must, of necessity, have been an abuse of discretion.

  10. Dawson v. Papio Nat. Resources Dist

    313 N.W.2d 242 (Neb. 1981)   Cited 8 times

    In order to maintain a cross-appeal on the issue of valuation, the party not first appealing must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the filing of the award. Gebhart v. Tri-State G. T. Assn., 181 Neb. 457, 149 N.W.2d 41 (1967) (overruled in part — Neumeyer v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 188 Neb. 516, 198 N.W.2d 80 (1972), holding filing of bond not jurisdictional). As already noted, the record discloses the condemnee did not file a timely notice of appeal. As such, no cross-appeal exists which would affect the condemner's right to dismiss the cause, assuming it did possess such a right. If the condemnee had filed a cross-appeal, the cross-appeal would not have been subject to dismissal and the issue in this case, viz, the amount of damages and the burden of proof, would not have changed.