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Nelson v. Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Mar 4, 2002
33 F. App'x 273 (9th Cir. 2002)

Summary

holding that while FLSA does not require compensation for work during break times, it "requires that both hours worked and meal periods treated as hours worked be included in wage and overtime calculations"

Summary of this case from Porteous v. Capital One Servs. II, LLC

Opinion


33 Fed.Appx. 273 (9th Cir. 2002) Clyde L. NELSON, Jose A. Barbas; Marcelino Louis Campa; Robert Cortez; Rudy M. Espaza; Willie Hamilton; Anthony Scalese, Jr.; Alvin D. Silva; Fernando Silva; Curtis L. Stredic; Steve Vallerga; Harold Atchison Young, Plaintiffs--Appellants, v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, INC., and Does 1-20 inclusive, Defendant--Appellee. No. 00-16361. D.C. No. CV-99-00120-SI/JL. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. March 4, 2002

Argued and Submitted February 12, 2002.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)

Employees sued employer for alleged violations of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Susan Yvonne Illston, J., 2000 WL 868523, granted summary judgment for employer. Employees appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) statute of limitations could be applied to employees' claims for unpaid overtime, even though limitations defense was not raised in employer's original motion for summary judgment; (2) employees failed to establish that their claims for overtime pay came within exception to two-year statute of limitations for claims based on FLSA violations; and (3) FLSA does not require employer to compensate employees for an additional half hour for times that the employees did not receive a duty-free meal period.

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding.

Before D,W, NELSON and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, District Judge.

Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

Page 274.

MEMORANDUM

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The district court did not err in applying the two-year statute of limitations to the employees' claim for unpaid overtime prior to November 16, 1995 ("Period I"). Even though the statute of limitations defense was not raised in Waste Management's original motion for summary judgment, it was raised in the original answer to the complaint and in Waste Management's reply/opposition to the employees' counter-motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the parties had an opportunity to address the statute of limitations issue at the hearing on the summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the parties had a "full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved," In re Rothery, 143 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir.1998), and it was not error for the district court to rule upon the issue.

The district court also correctly concluded that the two-year statute of limitations applied. Violations of the FLSA are ordinarily subject to only a two-year statute of limitations, and the party claiming an exception to the normal period bears the burden of showing the violation was willful in order to trigger the extended three-year period. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Mere negligence by the employer in determining its legal obligation is not sufficient; there must be evidence that the employer affirmatively knew it was violating the FLSA or that it was acting with "reckless disregard" of the FLSA. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 135 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). The district court correctly concluded that the employees did not raise a genuine issue regarding the willfulness of Waste Management's actions during Period I.

Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the FLSA does not require the employer to compensate employees for an additional half hour for times that the employees did not receive a duty-free meal period. The FLSA requires that both hours worked and meal periods treated as hours worked be included in wage and overtime calculations. 29 C.F.R. § 778.320(a). It is undisputed that Waste Management did pay the employees for the meal period (whether duty-free or not) and included that half-hour in the total hours worked. Accordingly, there is no violation of FLSA requirements. Even if the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") requires that the employees receive a duty-free paid half-hour lunch break, the FLSA does not. The employees, who are barred from bringing a claim for breach of the CBA, cannot convert their contractual claim into a claim under the FLSA.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Nelson v. Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Mar 4, 2002
33 F. App'x 273 (9th Cir. 2002)

holding that while FLSA does not require compensation for work during break times, it "requires that both hours worked and meal periods treated as hours worked be included in wage and overtime calculations"

Summary of this case from Porteous v. Capital One Servs. II, LLC
Case details for

Nelson v. Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:Clyde L. NELSON, Jose A. Barbas; Marcelino Louis Campa; Robert Cortez…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Mar 4, 2002

Citations

33 F. App'x 273 (9th Cir. 2002)

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