Opinion
Civil No. 4:22-cv-00331-SMR-SBJ
2023-10-19
Lauren NELSON, Plaintiff, v. Melissa WAALK, individually and in her official capacity as an officer for the Urbandale Police Department, Justice Weaver, individually and in her official capacity as an officer for the Urbandale Police Department, Rob Johansen, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Urbandale Police Department, and the City of Urbandale, Iowa, Defendants.
Adam Clifford Witosky, Christopher Stewart, Gribble, Boles, Stewart & Witosky, LLC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff. Katherine E. Gral, Michael C. Richards, Dentons Davis Brown PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Adam Clifford Witosky, Christopher Stewart, Gribble, Boles, Stewart & Witosky, LLC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Katherine E. Gral, Michael C. Richards, Dentons Davis Brown PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE
Defendant Melissa Waalk ("Officer Waalk"), an officer with the Urbandale Police Department, conducted a routine traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Tyrek Adams and occupied by one passenger, Plaintiff Lauren Nelson. While Officer Waalk completed tasks related to the stop's purpose, she discovered a possible arrest warrant for Adams. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Justice Weaver ("Officer Weaver"), also an officer with the Urbandale Police Department, arrived on scene as backup. After the warrant was confirmed, Adams was placed in the back of the police cruiser, while Nelson remained in her vehicle. The officers then stated they smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle, ordered Nelson to step out, and conducted a search of her person and vehicle. No marijuana was found and Nelson was permitted to leave with her vehicle. Nelson filed this suit nearly two years later.
This matter is presently before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants, which includes the two officers involved in the incident, the Chief of the Urbandale Police Department Rob Johansen ("Chief Johansen"), and the City of Urbandale ("the City"). Nelson resists the Motion. For reasons set forth in this Order, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Neither party has requested a hearing on the Motion and the Court finds it can be resolved without one. See LR 7(c).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The facts described in this section are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Officer Waalk conducted the traffic stop after observing a Jeep driven by Adams speeding in Urbandale, Iowa. The traffic stop was captured by Officer Waalk's body-worn camera and later by Officer Weaver's. Officer Waalk approached the driver's side and explained the reason for the stop to Nelson and Adams. She then obtained Adams's driver's license and the registration for the vehicle. The registration showed that Nelson was the owner of the vehicle. Officer Waalk returned to her police cruiser to run the license. She did not mention any marijuana odor during this initial interaction.
Once in her vehicle, Officer Waalk received information from dispatch that Adams possibly had an outstanding arrest warrant for domestic abuse. Officer Waalk exited the police cruiser and approached the vehicle for the second time. When questioned, Nelson and Adams initially denied any domestic incident had occurred between them. Nelson and Adams then
alluded to a past domestic incident, but they claimed they had no information about any pending charges. Officer Waalk obtained additional proof of identification to confirm the possible warrant and returned to her vehicle. She did not mention any marijuana odor during this second interaction. Officer Waalk soon after confirmed the arrest warrant for Adams around the same time Officer Weaver arrived on scene as backup.
Officer Waalk approached the vehicle for the third time. She stood by the driver's side of the vehicle, whereas Officer Weaver remained at the rear end. Officer Waalk informed Adams that he had a valid arrest warrant out of Polk County. Adams then exited the vehicle, while Nelson remained sitting in the passenger seat. At no point during this third approach did Officer Waalk express a belief that she smelled marijuana.
Once Adams was out of the vehicle, Officer Weaver proceeded to pat him down. A wad of money and a cell phone were removed from his pockets. With his permission, Officer Weaver took the money, walked over to the passenger's side, and handed it to Nelson who had opened the passenger door. Officer Weaver did not mention any marijuana odor at this point. Neither officer indicated they smelled any marijuana odor emanating from Adams when he had stepped out of the vehicle or during the pat down.
Adams was then placed uncuffed in the back seat of the police vehicle. He was permitted to use his cell phone. After the officers confirmed that no bond had been set, Officer Weaver approached the vehicle to relay this information to Nelson, who was now sitting in the driver's seat. Officer Weaver then told Nelson, "Give us a few minutes. We still need to confirm everything, okay? Alright hang tight." [ECF No. 13-3 at 8:47-8:49 (Officer Weaver Bodycam)]. The parties' descriptions of the material facts drastically differ after this point. The officers contend that they smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. They argue that this provided them with probable cause to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle and extend the seizure of Nelson during the traffic stop. In the alternative, they argue that Nelson and Adams consented to the vehicle search. Nelson denies there was any marijuana odor and categorically denies she or Adams voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle.
"In articulating the factual context of the case ... '[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The Court may depart from this rule only when a party's facts are "[so] blatantly contradicted by the record... that no reasonable jury could believe it." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
First, there is no dispute that Officer Weaver informed Nelson of Adams's no bond status and then immediately stated she smelled marijuana in the vehicle. Officer Waalk also told Officer Weaver that she noticed the smell earlier when she had first approached the vehicle. Shortly after this brief exchange, Officer Waalk whispered that she could smell the marijuana
In her sworn interrogatory answer, Officer Weaver claimed she first detected the marijuana smell at this point. [ECF No. 23-1 at 7 (Officer Weaver's Answer to Interrogatory No. 22)]. By logical inference, she did not smell marijuana earlier.
In her sworn interrogatory answer, Officer Waalk also indicated the odor was emanating from inside the vehicle and stronger on her second approach. [ECF No. 23-1 at 4 (Officer Waalk's Answer to Interrogatory No. 22)].
odor on Adams. She asked Officer Weaver if she thought he had the drug on him, to which Officer Weaver answered affirmatively.
Under Nelson's narrative, no marijuana odor was present. In their sworn affidavits, Nelson and Adams denied ever smoking any marijuana inside that specific vehicle. In fact, they denied smoking any marijuana on that day altogether and denied any odor of it emanating from the vehicle or their clothing.
After the officers' conversation, Officer Weaver told Adams the vehicle smelled like marijuana. She then asked him if he had smoked that day or if there was any marijuana inside the vehicle. He answered "no" to both questions. Officer Weaver proceeded to put him in handcuffs and placed him back inside the police cruiser. She told him, "This won't take us very long. We just need to clear the car. Make sure there isn't anything illegal. Make sure she doesn't get in trouble for anything, okay?" [ECF No. 13-3 at 12:11-12:16 (Officer Weaver Bodycam)]. In response, he said, "Alright." Id. at 12:16.
Officer Weaver then walked over to the driver's side of the vehicle, told Nelson to step out, informed her that the vehicle smelled like marijuana, and asked if there was any marijuana in the vehicle or if they had smoked that day. Nelson verbally answered "no" to both questions. The officers then informed her that her person and vehicle will be searched. Nelson did not respond verbally.
It is disputed whether Nelson nodded her head during this exchange to signal her admission to either question. [ECF Nos. 18-2 ¶ 32; 23-2 ¶ 32].
The two officers searched the vehicle. During the search, the officers made several comments about the smell:
Officer Waalk: "It smells really bad in here." [...]
Officer Waalk: "I don't know why it would smell this bad ..."
Officer Weaver: "It doesn't smell that bad in here now."
Officer Waalk: "I thought I smelled it when I walked up the first time, but then I wasn't quite sure, but when I came up to get [the second time] I smelled it."
Officer Weaver: "Yeah, it's more on their clothes ... [Nelson] said they smoked."
Nelson claims this statement is false. [ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 32].
The search lasted a total of 2.5 minutes. No marijuana was found. Nelson was permitted to return to her vehicle and she drove away.
B. Procedural Background
Nelson filed this lawsuit against Officer Waalk, Officer Weaver, Chief Johansen, and the City. She later filed an Amended Complaint asserting six causes of action against Defendants for violations of the United States Constitution, Iowa Constitution, and the common law.
First, Nelson maintains Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they seized her after the initial traffic stop was resolved and searched her person and vehicle without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Her claim rests on her assertion that the officers did not, or could not, detect the odor of marijuana in the vehicle.
Second, Nelson argues the two officers violated Article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the state analog of the Fourth Amendment. The existence of probable cause remains the central issue underpinning this claim. Third, Nelson asserts Chief Johansen and the City are liable under Monell for failure to train and supervise the officers of the Urbandale Police Department. She claims Defendants failed to take sufficient action to ensure the police officers performed the warrantless searches and seizure without intruding upon her constitutional rights.
See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Fourth, Nelson maintains Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver falsely arrested her. Because Nelson claims the officers detained and restrained her without cause, whether the officers detected the odor of marijuana is again the primary controversy of the false arrest claim.
Fifth, Nelson argues Chief Johansen and the City are liable for negligent supervision and training based on the conduct of Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver. Similar to the Monell claim under Count III, she claims Defendants failed to ensure the Urbandale police officers did not pose a threat to the public when the two officers purportedly acted without cause during the disputed incident at issue in this case.
Lastly, Nelson claims the City is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the officers' unlawful conduct and/or omissions when acting within their scope of employment with the City. She repleads her assertion that the officers' actions constitute a violation of her rights under the applicable laws.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a ruling in their favor on all of Nelson's claims. Nelson resists the motion, asserting there are material facts in dispute precluding summary judgment.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Paulino v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 774 F.3d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 2014). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case." Amini v. City of Minneapolis, 643 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving plaintiff must make a sufficient showing on every essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence is viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," which includes drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 744 F.3d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)). But "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. First, they argue Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver are entitled to summary judgment on Nelson's unreasonable search and seizure claim because there was probable cause to search the
vehicle and extend the seizure of Nelson. Even if the Court finds that probable cause did not exist, they contend the officers are still entitled to summary judgment as they obtained voluntary consent to search the vehicle. In the alternative, they insist the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as they did not violate a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment.
Second, they argue summary judgment is appropriate for the warrantless searches and seizure claim under the Iowa Constitution, as well as the tort of false arrest, as they acted with probable cause and in good faith and reasonable belief. Even if the Court finds that no probable cause existed to justify the searches and seizure, the officers assert they should be granted immunity under Iowa law as they acted with all due care. They moreover contend they are immune from liability under Iowa Code 670.4A for the same reasons they are entitled to federal qualified immunity.
Third, they maintain Chief Johansen and the City are entitled to summary judgment for all remaining claims. Specifically, they argue there is no municipal liability under Monell because there was no constitutional violation by the two officers or no direct causal link between the municipal's action and Nelson's alleged constitutional deprivation. They also contend the City cannot be held liable in a § 1983 suit under a respondeat superior or any other vicarious liability theory. Finally, they claim Chief Johansen and the City are entitled to summary judgment for Nelson's negligent supervision and training claim, as well as the respondeat superior claim against the City, as Nelson failed to demonstrate that the officers engaged in any wrongful, negligent, or tortious conduct.
Nelson resists the Motion. She mainly argues the existence of the marijuana odor is a dispute of material fact, requiring a fact-finder to make a credibility determination whether probable cause existed. She also asserts that no voluntary consent was given. In other words, there is a preliminary question whether the circumstances of this case fall under the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and this preliminary question falls squarely within the purview of the fact-finder. Absent the resolution of this preliminary question, Nelson claims summary judgment is not proper at this stage.
B. Warrantless Searches and Seizure under Fourth Amendment
Establishing a Fourth Amendment violation requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a seizure or search occurred and prove that it was unreasonable. McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, the parties agree for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment that the officers extended the traffic stop to seize Nelson and conduct a search of her person and vehicle. [ECF Nos. 13-1 at 18; 18 at 2]. The question remains whether the scope of the traffic stop was lawfully expanded in order to conduct the warrantless searches and seizure.
"There is no per se time limit on all traffic stops, and complications in carrying out the traffic-related purposes of the stop may justify a longer detention than when a stop is strictly routine." United States v. Anguiano, 795 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has long held that a law enforcement officer "can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause" under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). "If, during a traffic stop, an officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a vehicle is carrying contraband, he has 'justification for a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic offense.'" United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1994)). "[I]f the investigating officer discovers information leading to reasonable suspicion, he may justifiably extend the stop." Anguiano, 795 F.3d at 876 (quoting United States v. Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2013)). "In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts, we 'look at the totality of the circumstances, allowing officers to draw on their experience and training.'" United States v. Lawhorn, 735 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Therefore, the Court must first determine whether Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver were aware of particularized and objective facts to suspect marijuana was in the vehicle. In this case, the two officers suspected marijuana was in the vehicle because they claimed the odor of marijuana was emanating from the vehicle. They maintain the odor alone is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant. If probable cause existed, the officers argue the traffic stop was justifiably extended in order to continue their investigation.
Defendants are correct that courts have consistently held that the odor of marijuana emanating from an automobile gives law enforcement probable cause to conduct a vehicle search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Parks, 902 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 484 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013). Inherent in Defendants' argument, however, is the presumption that the portions of the summary judgment record that support their position, namely their statements in the body-cam footage and their sworn interrogatory answers, establish an undisputed fact that the marijuana odor existed.
A deeper examination of the evidentiary record shows that this conclusion is unwarranted. The parties present to the Court two conflicting narratives based on the personal knowledge of the interested parties. In support of their position, Defendants highlight two sources of evidence: (1) the officers' statements in their body-cams that they smelled marijuana in the vehicle and on the occupants' clothes, and (2) their sworn interrogatory answers attesting to the existence of the marijuana odor. Nelson responds by presenting the following conflicting evidence: (1) Nelson and Adams' statements in the officers' body-cams that there was no marijuana in the vehicle and that they did not smoke marijuana that day, and (2) their sworn affidavits denying the officers' claims. It is often the case under these circumstances that a motion for summary judgment will likely turn on which party bears the initial burden of proof.
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "The moving party can satisfy its burden in either of two ways: it can produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case, or it can show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)). "Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party 'must respond by submitting evidentiary materials' of specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 997 (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011)).
Here, Defendants did not satisfy their initial burden because they have not produced evidence sufficient to negate Nelson's claim that there was no marijuana odor. Defendants rely on evidence that necessarily requires a fact-finder to weigh the conflicting accounts and determine the credibility of the witnesses. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (observing "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.").
As stated, the initial burden of proof is particularly relevant in this case due to the nature of the evidence in the summary judgment record. Nationwide Prop. and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 845 F.3d 378, 382 (8th Cir. 2016). In Faircloth, the Court explained:
If the testimony of a witness ... is necessary to carry the movant's burden of proof, we look carefully at whether the witness is unbiased and competent, and whether his testimony is positive, internally consistent, unequivocal, and in full accord with the documentary exhibits. If the movant makes this showing, then the opposing party cannot force a trial merely to cross-examine the witness or in the hope that something might turn up at the trial. However, summary judgment is improper when specific facts are alleged that if proven would call the credibility of the moving party's witness into doubt ... especially when the challenged testimony is an essential element of the plaintiffs case. Indeed, if the credibility of a critical interested witness is even partially undermined in a material way by the non-moving party's evidence, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof should be denied.
Id. at 382 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
While Nelson cannot survive summary judgment merely to cross-examine the officers, summary judgment is inappropriate here when both parties, who have personal knowledge of the facts, provide conflicting narratives in sworn statements not subject to cross-examination. See John A. Bauman, A Rationale for Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467, 481 (1958) ("the poorest type of evidence, particularly in cases where the testimony is that of an interested witness, because the affiant is immunized from the test of cross-examination"). The Court is also hesitant to rely on the officers' sworn interrogatory answers in the absence of a prior finding of their credibility. See United States v. Shumaker, 21 F.4th 1007, 1016 (8th Cir. 2021) (deferring to the district court's determination that the officers credibly testified to detecting the odor of marijuana when they drove behind the vehicle); United States v. Dunn, 928 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2019) (relying on the district court's determination that the officers credibly testified to seeing a plastic bag of crack cocaine inside the vehicle); see also Smith, 789 F.3d at 928-29 (finding the "smell of marijuana, along with the credible testimony by the officer, is sufficient to establish
probable cause to search an automobile and its contents.") (emphasis added).
It bears emphasizing that the parties did not provide any information regarding the two officers' training and experience with identifying the odor of marijuana. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 142 & n. 1 (10th Cir. 1974).
To put it another way, the existence of probable cause in this § 1983 action is a question of fact because neither party presented sufficient evidence that only one reasonable determination is possible. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Yancey v. Carroll Cnty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)); see also Smith v. Tucker, 304 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C. 1973) (concluding that "[i]t is the duty of the court when the facts are in dispute to submit the question to the jury with instructions that if they find the facts to be one way they amount to probable cause and if they find them to be another that they do not amount to probable cause.") (citation omitted). As the existence of probable cause is unresolved, it logically follows that any assessment of the officers' conduct at this early stage of the litigation is improper.
Therefore, the Court applies this conclusion to also deny summary judgment on Nelson's claim of false arrest. "The essential elements of the tort of false arrest are (1) detention or restraint against one's will and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint." Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 678-79 (Iowa 1983) (citation omitted). As Defendants' argument for summary judgment on this count relies on their presumption that probable cause existed, the Court cannot grant summary judgment for all the reasons set forth in this section.
Similarly, the Court cannot otherwise find qualified immunity to dispose of Count I. "Qualified immunity shields government actors from legal liability unless the actor's conduct violated 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting McGuire v. Cooper, 952 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2020)). "At summary judgment, qualified immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: '(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.'" Stark v. Lee Cnty., Iowa, 993 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 2018)); see Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep't., 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). "An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless both prongs are satisfied." Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). "When properly applied, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015)); see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). As the reasonableness of the officers' conduct remains unresolved, the Court cannot determine whether the officers deprived Nelson of a constitutional or statutory right. A determination whether Nelson's rights were clearly established at the time would necessarily follow from a conclusion whether the facts alleged show probable cause did or did not exist. Completing Defendants' argument for summary judgment on Count I, the issue of consent is a question of fact. United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he determination of whether [a defendant] expressed consent is a question of fact."); United States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "[t]he question of whether consent to search is present is an issue of fact that requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances.") (citing United States v. Severe, 29 F.3d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1994)). It is, therefore, the duty of the Court to submit this disputed issue to the fact-finder.
In sum, the Court concludes that the existence of probable cause is unresolved, as the circumstances of the warrantless seizure and searches necessitate a credibility determination by a fact-finder. Thus, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I, as well as the false arrest claim under Count IV, is DENIED.
C. Article I, Section Eight of the Iowa Constitution and Post-Burnett Cases
Nelson asks the Court to reconsider the lawfulness of all probable cause-based vehicle searches based solely on the odor of marijuana under Art. I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution. [ECF No. 18 at 17-22]. Nelson provides statistics and public policy considerations in support of her proposition. Id. It is not the Court's prerogative to reinterpret state constitutional law.
The Court reaches a different conclusion under the state analog of the Fourth Amendment due to the Iowa Supreme Court's recent ruling in Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). "[A]rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect[s] individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials." State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997). This provision uses "nearly identical language and [was] generally designed with the same scope, import, and purpose" as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). A government official in Iowa is entitled to immunity under the Iowa Constitution if they exercised "due care" in the course of their duties. Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259, 281 (Iowa 2018). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that "lack of due care" amounts to "proof of negligence" and "a government official whose conduct is being challenged will not be subject to damages liability if she or he pleads and proves as an affirmative defense that she or he exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the law." Id. at 280-81.
In Godfrey v. State, the Iowa Supreme Court held for the first time that direct constitutional claims for monetary damages can be brought against state officials for violations under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution. Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 293 (citing Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 870-72). The Godfrey court reasoned legislation was not required to enforce these constitutional provisions because the Iowa Constitution was self-executing for the purposes of damages in law. Id.
On May 5, 2023, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled Godfrey in Burnett, eliminating "a standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of a provision of the Iowa Constitution." Id. at 307. The Burnett court specifically declined to recognize a constitutional tort claim under Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution such as the one brought by Nelson. Id. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Count II against Officer Waalk and Officer Weaver is GRANTED. D. Municipal Liability under Federal and State Law
Nelson alleges that Chief Johansen and the City failed to adequately train employees of the Urbandale Police Department, or unofficially adopted "a custom of disregard for what is constitutionally or departmentally required." [ECF Nos. 5 at 10-13; 18 at 29-31]. Defendants present three distinct arguments in opposition. First, they reassert the officers did not violate Nelson's rights and, without a constitutional violation, it follows accordingly that there is no basis for municipality liability against Chief Johansen and the City. Second, they claim generally that "a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." [ECF No. 13-1 at 18]. (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011); Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018). Third, they argue Nelson failed to proffer any evidence of a direct causal link between a municipal action and Nelson's alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 19. For these reasons, Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for Count III.
The Supreme Court has held that local governments and municipalities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and may be liable for damages arising from constitutional violations. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. A § 1983 claim may not lie against a municipality under a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "A municipality may only be liable for a constitutional violation resulting from (1) an official municipal policy; (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) failure to train or supervise." Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2021).
The present case only concerns the second and third theory. To establish liability under an unofficial or unwritten custom theory, a plaintiff
must demonstrate (1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the municipality's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the municipality's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that [she] was injured by acts pursuant to the municipality's custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Meier v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 934 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2018)).
To establish liability under a failure to train or supervise theory, a plaintiff must show the municipality's conduct amounted to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact." Robbins, 984 F.3d at 682 (cleaned up) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350). "Deliberate indifference requires proof the municipality disregarded a known or obvious consequence of its action or inaction." Id. "[A plaintiff] must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). "That is, ... [a plaintiff] must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." Id.
Here, Nelson attempts to establish municipal liability under Monell by presenting the officers' alleged violations of two departmental policies as evidence of
wrongdoing by the municipality. She argues that the conduct of the two officers "evidences a failure to properly train on it," or shows at the very least "a custom of disregard for what is constitutionally or departmentally required." [ECF No. 18 at 30]. In other words, Nelson appears to claim that an individual employee's unconstitutional misconduct is by itself sufficient evidence to show that a municipality disregarded the injuries inflicted by said misconduct.
Specifically, Nelson highlights the following two department policies: (1) the Urbandale Police Department Policy requiring exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and (2) the Urbandale Police Department Policy controlling the circumstances by which consent to a search is given. [ECF No. 18 at 29-30]. The Chief of the Urbandale Police Department, Rob Johansen, reviews these policies annually. Id. at 14 (Chief Johansen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 9). In addition, "[a]ll officers review and sign off on the Urbandale Police Department's policies and procedures at the time of hiring." Id. "Policies and procedures that are new, modified, or updated are reviewed by all officers and acknowledged, with a log of same kept for each officer." Id.
There is no controlling authority to support this line of reasoning. In fact, the United States Supreme Court expressly stated otherwise. See Bryan Cnty., Okl., 520 U.S. at 406-07, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (stating "[t]hat a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the employee acted culpably.") (emphasis in original). "In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city 'could have done' to prevent the unfortunate incident." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (citations omitted). It therefore reasons that Nelson must show more than the officers' actions that day to establish municipal liability in a § 1983 action.
No such evidence exists in the summary judgment record. Nelson only proffered the disputed incident at issue in this case. "Generally, an isolated incident of alleged police misconduct ... cannot, as a matter of law, establish a municipal policy or custom creating liability under § 1983." Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013); but see Folkerts v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2013) ("It may be, however, that 'evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal liability.'") (citation omitted). After a review of the evidentiary record, no colorable argument exists that there is a "continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct" by the Urbandale Police Department. Meier, 934 F.3d at 828. There is no evidence that the municipal was apprised of recurring violations similar to those alleged in this case. Importantly, the evidence does not establish a direct causal link between the municipal action and the alleged constitutional violations.
In her Brief in Resistance, Nelson asks the Court to consider the racial disparity of marijuana arrests in Iowa compared to other states and a proposed theory questioning the accuracy by which police officers can detect the odor of marijuana. [ECF No. 18 at 17-22]. None of the proffered statistics, however, relates directly to the City of Urbandale, Iowa or its police department.
Nelson cannot establish the existence of an essential element under
Count III in the absence of evidence linking a municipal action and the alleged deprivation of rights. Summary judgment is proper if there is a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case," which "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court declines to speculate on what the municipal could have done to prevent the alleged violations against Nelson that day. "Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee." Bryan Cnty., Okl., 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Nelson failed to meet the rigorous standards of culpability and causation required by Supreme Court precedent. Hence, summary judgment is proper for this cause of action.
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under the applicable law." Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
A similar conclusion applies to Count V under the tort claim of negligent supervision and training against Chief Johansen and the City. To succeed on a negligent supervision claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the employer knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its employee's unfitness at the time the employee engaged in wrongful or tortious conduct; (2) through the negligent... supervision of the employee, the employee's incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous characteristics proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff; and (3) there is some employment or agency relationship between the employee and the defendant employer.
Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 41 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Est. of Harris v. Papa John's Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 2004)). Nelson failed to produce any evidence that the municipal had any prior knowledge of the officers' alleged unfitness at the time of the subject incident. There is no evidence in the record that links a municipal action to Nelson's injuries. Thus, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III and Count V is GRANTED.
E. Respondeat Superior Claim Against the City
Finally, Nelson claims the City is liable for the officers' tortious conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. "The doctrine of vicarious liability imposes liability against an employer for an employee's tortious conduct committed within the scope of employment." Martin v. Tovar, 991 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Iowa 2023) (citing Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1999)). Such a claim "rests on two elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship (or employment as an independent contractor), and proof that the injury occurred within the scope of that relationship." Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 201 (2007) (citing Biddle v. Sartori Mem. Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994)). "To come within the scope of employment, an employee's actions 'must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.'" Martin, 991 N.W.2d at 763 (citing Godar, 588 N.W.2d at 705). The Iowa Supreme Court has found that "an employee's conduct [is] outside the scope of employment if it substantially diverges from conduct that the
employer actually authorizes." Id. at 763-64 (citation omitted). "Said another way, 'a deviation from the employer's business or interest to pursue the employee's own business or interest must be substantial in nature to relieve the employer from liability.'" Id. at 764 (citation omitted).
The lawfulness of the officers' actions is again at the center of the issue. Defendants move for summary judgment on the respondeat superior claim under the presumption that the officers acted with probable cause. If the officers' conduct was lawful, they argue any vicarious liability claim against an employer fails as a matter of law. Nelson responds in opposition. As the determination of the lawfulness of the officers' actions requires the Court to make a credibility determination, as set forth in a previous section of this Order, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Count VI against the City is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part consistent with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.