Opinion
B325454 B328612 B330346
10-30-2024
CHRIS NELSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PHOEBE BRIDGERS, Defendant and Respondent.
Clark Hill, Bradford G. Hughes, Richard H. Nakamura Jr., and Tiffany B. Hunter for Plaintiff and Appellant. Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Michael H. Strub, Jr., and Lena Streisand for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21STCV35635, Curtis A. Kin, Judge.
Clark Hill, Bradford G. Hughes, Richard H. Nakamura Jr., and Tiffany B. Hunter for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Michael H. Strub, Jr., and Lena Streisand for Defendant and Respondent.
WEINGART, J.
INTRODUCTION
Chris Nelson is a well-established music industry entrepreneur. Phoebe Bridgers is an acclaimed singer/songwriter who was formerly friendly with Nelson. Nelson sued Bridgers for defamation and related claims based on an October 2020 post Bridgers made to her Instagram account, which at the time had approximately 500,000 followers. Referencing an earlier Instagram post made about Nelson by another woman, Emily Bannon, Bridgers wrote, "I witnessed and can personally verify much of the abuse (grooming, stealing, violence) perpetuated by Chris Nelson, owner of a studio called Sound Space, that is being brought to light. For anyone who knows him, is considering working with him, or wants to know more, there is an articulate and mind blowing account on "emilybannon's page as a highlight. [¶] TRIGGER WARNING for basically everything triggering."
Bridgers responded to Nelson's lawsuit by filing a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.That statute "sets out a procedure for striking complaints in harassing lawsuits that are commonly known as SLAPP suits (strategic lawsuits against public participation), which are brought to challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights." (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 196, fn. omitted.) The moving party must first demonstrate that the plaintiff's claim arises from an "act . . . in furtherance of [the defendant's] right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the moving party does so, then the opposing party must "establish[ ] that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (Ibid.) The trial court granted the motion, finding that Bridgers's post was made in a public forum and related to an issue of public interest, and that Nelson had not produced evidence showing a probability he would prevail on his claims. The court later awarded Bridgers attorney's fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
We refer to section 425.16 as the anti-SLAPP statute. For clarity, we refer to a SLAPP or anti-SLAPP motion as "a special motion to strike"-the language used in the statute (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)).
Nelson appeals the dismissal of his claims and the award of attorney's fees. Nelson does not challenge the trial court's determination that he failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing that his claims had minimal merit. Nelson focuses solely on the anti-SLAPP statute's first prong, arguing that Bridgers's post was not protected conduct. We affirm the granting of the special motion to strike and the related award of attorney's fees. The content and context of Bridgers's post shows it falls within the scope of conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The post related to public concerns, especially prevalent in light of the #MeToo movement, about men using their power to abuse women. It also provided consumer protection information about Nelson, who operated a substantial business selling musical instruments and recording equipment, as well as a recording studio. Lastly, it furthered public discourse by adding to an on-going discussion summarized in Bannon's post about Nelson's business practices and alleged abuse of young females.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Nelson's operative complaint alleges he "is a well-established record producer, musician, and businessman" and that "[n]umerous well-known artists and musicians have worked with [him] or worked at [his studio] Sound Space." Nelson asserts he "is also a respected expert musical instrument collector, distributor and reseller of new, used, and vintage musical instruments and recording equipment.....[Nelson]'s expertise in evaluating highly collectible guitars is sought by collectors . . . across the United States and abroad. [Nelson] has sold millions of dollars' worth in collectible musical instruments and recording equipment on Reverb.com, the largest online marketplace dedicated to buying and selling new, used, and vintage musical instruments and recording equipment."
Bridgers is a singer, songwriter, and guitarist. She is also a social advocate. Nelson alleges that "[a]mong other things, in approximately 2019, [Bridgers] detailed multiple accounts of alleged abuse by Ryan Adams, a singer-songwriter and record producer," including a post on her Instagram account. Other evidence showed Bridgers previously commented publicly on allegations of abuse made against the musician Marilyn Manson.
Nelson asserts that "in or around 2018, [he] and his girlfriend at the time, Emily Bannon . . ., began having consensual sexual encounters with . . . Bridgers." According to Nelson, he and Bannon ended their relationship "in or around the [F]all of 2019," but Bannon maintained her relationship with Bridgers.
In October 2020, Bannon made a lengthy post to Instagram summarizing negative experiences of persons doing business with Nelson and of his romantic partners, and recounting her own bad experiences with him. The post included numerous screenshots of complaints from persons who had done business with Nelson and other women claiming he had abused them. According to Nelson's operative complaint, Bannon's post included the following "false and misleading statements": "a. [Nelson] 'beat a young Latinx man to death after provoking him with a racial slur'; [¶] b. [Nelson] 'killed the young man'; [¶] c. [Nelson] 'bludgeoned at least one other man with a baseball bat . . . and left him to bleed out in an alleyway'; [¶] d. [Nelson] committed racially-motivated hate crimes, including 'intentionally rear-end[ing] drivers of color and then challenging them to call the police, knowing that his white privilege would protect him from any consequences whatsoever but expose his victims to a prohibitive level of risk (of deportation, incarceration, or brutality) by forcing them to interact with cops'; [¶] e. [Nelson] 'defrauded [a] neighbor out of an estimated $100,000-$130,000'; [¶] f. [Nelson] 'forging [the neighbor's] signature and then stealing $50,000 from' the neighbor; [¶] g. [Nelson] 'robbed [a] storage unit of an estimated tens of thousands of dollars of belongings'; [¶] h. [Nelson] sells stolen gear and 'manufactures fake "rare" guitars to defraud collectors and museums . . . and uses all manners of devious engineering to trick unwitting . . . buyers into paying a premium for modified junk'; and [¶] i. [Nelson] 'was hacking [defendant Bannon] and other women's email accounts.' "
Less than two days later, Bridgers (who had substantially more followers on Instagram than did Bannon) made a post to her Instagram story stating the following: "I witnessed and can personally verify much of the abuse (grooming, stealing, violence) perpetuated by Chris Nelson, owner of a studio called Sound Space, that is being brought to light. For anyone who knows him, is considering working with him, or wants to know more, there is an articulate and mind blowing account on "emilybannon's page as a highlight. [¶] TRIGGER WARNING for basically everything triggering."
B. Nelson Sues Bannon
Before suing Bridgers, Nelson separately sued Bannon for defamation and related claims based on her Instagram post. Bannon filed a special motion to strike, which the trial court (Judge Robert B. Broadbelt) denied. Our colleagues in Division Five reversed, finding Bannon's statements implicated public issues by warning others of misconduct by Nelson in his business and romantic dealings, and furthered public discussion of those issues. (Nelson v. Bannon (June 26, 2024, B319433) [nonpub. opn.].) The case was remanded for the trial court to assess whether Nelson could demonstrate a probability that he would prevail on his claims against Bannon. (Ibid.)
C. Nelson Sues Bridgers
Nelson later sued Bridgers for her Instagram post, asserting claims for defamation per se, defamation per quod, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nelson sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Nelson alleged that "Bridgers maliciously and intentionally posted the false and defamatory statements about [Nelson] as part of a vendetta to destroy [Nelson]'s reputation that was enflamed by . . . Bridgers and Bannon's sexual relationship." Nelson alleged Bridgers's statements were false, and that she made them knowing they were false or having "serious doubts about" their truth. Nelson further averred that "[a]s a result of . . . Bridgers'[s] statements, musicians and artists removed [Nelson] from their projects and stripped [Nelson] of credits that he had obtained in producing their music."
D. Bridgers's Special Motion to Strike
1. The Motion
Bridgers filed a special motion to strike, contending that her Instagram post was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as a "writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) As pertinent to this appeal, she asserted that Instagram is "a public forum." She contended that Nelson was a public figure based on his allegations he was "a well-established record producer, musician, and businessman," had worked with many "well-known artists," and was "a respected expert musical instrument collector" known in the United States and abroad, and that statements about a public figure concern "an issue of public interest." Bridgers also contended her statements concerned "a matter of public concern," namely, "[a]busive behavior toward women and minorities by figures within the entertainment industry." Bridgers averred that she is openly bisexual and has been an advocate for women's rights and a public critic of racist, xenophobic, and misogynistic conduct. Bridgers further contended her statements were intended to "warn[ ] consumers about doing business with . . . Nelson."
2. Nelson's Opposition
Nelson opposed the special motion to strike. Relevant to this appeal, Nelson contended that Bridgers's statements were not made in connection with an issue of public interest because he "is not a public figure and the specific subject matter of the posts do not affect a broad segment of the population." Nelson argued that Bridgers's claim that her comments related to abuse of women in the music industry was belied by the fact that her statements "[did] not specifically identify the music industry." Nelson further argued that Bridgers did not post her statements for the purpose of warning others, but instead did so at Bannon's request and as part of Bannon's desire for revenge.
3. Bridgers's Reply
In reply, Bridgers claimed that Nelson had used her past positive social media posts about him to promote his business, and she decided to disassociate herself from him and warn others because of what she had learned about him. She also argued that the many articles published about the instant lawsuit showed he was a public figure because they described him as a well-established music producer and owner of a well-known recording studio.
4. The Trial Court's Ruling
After hearing argument and taking the matter under submission, the trial court (Judge Curtis A. Kin) issued an order granting the motion. The court found that Bridgers's statements in her Instagram post were "made in a place open to the public or a public forum" under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and thus proceeded to analyze whether they were made "in connection with an issue of public interest" under that provision. The court applied the test stated in Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 624, that a statement is made "in connection with an issue of 'public interest'" where it concerns "a person or entity in the public eye," "could directly affect a large number of persons beyond the direct participants," or "involv[es] a topic of widespread interest." (Id. at pp. 631-632, citing Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.) The court concluded that Bridgers's statements qualified for protection because they concerned a person "in the public eye in the music industry and the musical instrument collector community."
The court also concluded that Bridgers's statements were protected as affecting a large group of people because they provided "consumer information to musicians." The court relied on Bridgers's deposition testimony that she had a large following on Instagram, had endorsed Nelson's business on her account, wanted to make clear that she no longer endorsed him, and intended to provide information to other musicians so they could make an informed decision whether to work with him.
Nelson timely appealed following the court's entry of a judgment of dismissal.
E. Bridgers's Motion for Attorney's Fees
Bridgers thereafter filed a motion for $622,099 in attorney's fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), which provides that a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike is entitled to recover their fees. In opposition, Nelson contended that the amount of fees sought was unreasonable. In her reply, Bridgers withdrew her claim for certain fees and sought additional attorney's fees incurred on the fees motion, which when netted increased the total request to $670,512.
The trial court granted Bridgers's motion, reduced the amount of fees sought as excessive, and awarded her $493,135.60. Nelson appealed the court's order. After the trial court entered an amended judgment reflecting its award of fees and costs, Nelson also appealed the amended judgment. We consolidated Nelson's three appeals for purposes of decision.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"[The] anti-SLAPP statute makes available a special motion to strike meritless claims early in litigation-but only if the claims arise from acts in furtherance of a person's 'right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.' (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)" (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 139 (FilmOn).) Among other things, the statute identifies "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest" as protected conduct. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) "If the defendant makes the required showing [that the challenged claim arises from protected conduct], the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success." (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
We review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a special motion to strike de novo. (Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 816.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Special Motion to Strike
1. Nelson Contests Only the First Prong
"[O]nly a claim' "that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute . . . is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute."' [Citation.]" (Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 872.) Nelson's sole contention on appeal is that Bridgers's statements are not protected conduct under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. He does not challenge the trial court's finding that he failed to establish a probability of success. Therefore, to the extent Bridgers's statements are protected conduct, Nelson concedes that his claims based on those statements must be stricken. Accordingly, his appeal rises or falls based on whether Bridgers's Instagram post was protected conduct under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
2. Nelson's Claims Arise from Bridgers's Instagram Post and Not That of Bannon
"The defendant's first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A 'claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.' [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must 'consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.' [Citation.]" (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.)
The parties agree that Nelson's claims all arise from Bridgers's statements in her Instagram post. Thus, the question we analyze is whether Bridgers's statements fall within section 425.16, subdivision (e). As noted above, Bannon's comments (on which Bridgers commented, and to which she directed readers) have already been held to be protected conduct under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). (Nelson v. Bannon, supra, B319433.) Neither party disputes that collateral estoppel dictates treating Bannon's Instagram post as protected conduct under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) for purposes of this appeal. Bridgers further contends Nelson is collaterally estopped from denying other issues such as whether he is a public figure based on the decision in Nelson v. Bannon, supra, B319433. We need not address whether such additional issues were "necessarily decided in the previous suit" and "identical to the issue sought to be relitigated" in this appeal (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 910), because we independently conclude Bridgers's statements themselves are protected conduct.
We deny Nelson's request for judicial notice of an opinion in a third case in which Nelson accused another woman (Noel Wells) of defamation and other torts for sending an email to a music manager accusing Nelson of predatory behavior towards Wells and other young female musicians. (Nelson v. Wells (Oct. 27, 2023, B320223) [nonpub. opn.].) In Nelson v. Wells, our colleagues in Division Two found the private email at issue was not protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP law. (Ibid.) Although we deny the request for judicial notice, we have considered both Nelson v. Wells and Nelson v. Bannon to the extent they are relevant to the issue of collateral estoppel. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115(b)(1).)
3. Bridgers's Instagram Post Was Made in a Public Forum in Connection with an Issue of Public Interest
Bridgers contends that her post was subject to section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) as a "writing made in . . . a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Bridgers initially asserts, and Nelson does not contest, that her public Instagram account constitutes a "public forum." We agree. (See Barrett v. Rosenthal, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 41, fn. 4 ["Web sites accessible to the public . . . are 'public forums' for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute"]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1252 [posts on the defendant's Facebook page and Instagram account were "made 'in a place open to the public or a public forum' within the meaning of [§] 425.16, subd[.] (e)(3)"].)
The next question is whether Bridgers made her post "in connection with an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) This question involves two steps of its own. First, we must identify an "issue of public interest." Courts have generally recognized three types of statements as concerning "an issue of public interest": those relating to "a person or entity in the public eye," those which "could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants," and those involving "a topic of widespread, public interest." (Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924; see also FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149 [citing Rivero with approval].) The "first step [of identifying an issue of public interest] is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute." (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1253; see also FilmOn, supra, at p. 149 ["if the social media era has taught us anything, it is that speech is rarely 'about' any single issue"].)
"Second, we look to the 'functional relationship' between the challenged activity and the 'public conversation' about that issue, and ask whether the activity' "contribute[s]"' to public discussion of the issue." (Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1249, quoting FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150.) To determine whether an activity "contributes" to public discussion, courts "examine whether a defendant-through [the activity]- participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest." (FilmOn, at p. 151.)
Bridgers argues that FilmOn's "functional relationship" test applies only to conduct covered by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), and not to statements potentially covered by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). We disagree. The FilmOn court based its "functional relationship" test, in part, on the phrase "in connection with," which appears in both subdivision (e)(3) and (e)(4). (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151; see Bernstein v. LaBeouf (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 23, fn. 5 ["While FilmOn addressed the meaning of the phrase 'in connection with' as it is used in subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16, we see no reason why the same analysis should not apply when determining whether a statement was made 'in connection with' a public issue or a matter of public interest for purposes of subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16"].)
Finally, context, including "speaker, audience, and purpose," is an important consideration in both steps of analyzing whether Bridgers's Instagram post was "in connection with an issue of public interest" under section 425.16, subdivision (e). (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 148, 150; see also Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1253-1254.)
a. Bridgers's speech implicated issues of public interest.
Bridgers's post referred to "grooming" by Nelson "that is being brought to light." It then referred readers to Bannon's claims on her Instagram account, which Nelson alleges included the claim he "abuses women." Bannon's post referred to her being 11 years younger than Nelson when they began their relationship and how he took advantage of her, and further attached a screenshot of a text from another woman saying she later came to recognize Nelson's behavior as grooming. Given this context, Bridgers's post implicated the issue of men using psychological, economic, and other means of manipulation to gain control over, and abuse, women. This is a topic of widespread public interest. (E.g., Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 238 ["[d]omesic violence is an extremely important public issue in our society" and constitutes an issue of public interest under § 425.16]; Coleman v. Grand (E.D.N.Y. 2021) 523 F.Supp.3d 244, 259 ["sexual impropriety and power dynamics in the music industry, as in others, were indisputably an issue of public interest"].)
We reject Nelson's contention that Bridgers's argument that her post involved a topic of widespread public interest is too cursory for us to consider. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [" 'This court is not required to discuss or consider points which are not argued or which are not supported by citation to authorities or the record' "].) Bridgers expressly and sufficiently raises the issue at multiple points in her brief.
Bridgers's post further concerned an issue of public interest by warning those who might do business with Nelson about his alleged misconduct. Courts have found that providing such consumer protection information to the public can constitute protected conduct under section 425.16. "Consumer information . . ., at least when it affects a large number of persons, also generally is viewed as information concerning a matter of public interest." (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898.) For example, in Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 888, the court held that statements critical of a law firm's performance which were posted on the Yelp and Ripoff Report Web sites, an online lawyer directory, and the law firm's Facebook page, were protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). (Id. at pp. 885-886, 887-888.) In Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, the court held the defendant's statements "posted to the Ripoff Report Web site about [the plaintiff]'s character and business practices" were protected conduct because they "plainly f[e]ll within the rubric of consumer information . . . and were intended to serve as a warning to consumers about [the plaintiff's] trustworthiness." (Id. at p. 1146.)
Bridgers's post asserted that Nelson engaged in "stealing" and "violence," and directed "anyone who . . . is considering working with [Nelson]" to Bannon's post. Bannon's post, in turn, asserted, among other things, that Nelson "sells stolen gear,"" 'manufactures fake "rare" guitars to defraud collectors and museums . . . and uses all manners [sic] of devious engineering to trick unwitting . . . buyers into paying a premium for modified junk,'" had defrauded a neighbor and forged that neighbor's signature, and robbed a storage unit of its contents. It also included a screenshot from the Ripoff Report Web site about Nelson, the very same Web site mentioned in the cases cited above, along with screenshots from multiple other individuals accusing Nelson of dishonest business practices. Bannon's post also alleged that Nelson had committed multiple acts of violence.
The information provided by Bridgers affected the large number of people who might consider doing business with Nelson. Nelson alleges that he "has sold millions of dollars' worth in collectible musical instruments and recording equipment on Reverb.com, the largest online marketplace dedicated to buying and selling new, used, and vintage musical instruments and recording equipment," "maintain[ing] a monthly average of $58,000 worth of musical equipment sales on Reverb.com over the majority of his five-year tenure on Reverb.com, [and] achieving over $100,000 a month on some occasions (e.g., $102,663 in August 2020)." In addition, Nelson operated a recording studio, alleging that he "is a well-established record producer," and that "[n]umerous well-known artists and musicians have worked with [him] or worked at [his recording studio]." Nelson's trustworthiness and character thus constitute an issue of public interest because it is of interest to the substantial number of people who might buy musical instruments or recording equipment from Nelson, and musicians considering using Nelson's studio to record.
Although we conclude that Nelson's character is an issue of public interest because of the scope of his business ventures, we reject Bridgers's contention that Nelson's allegations show he is a public figure to the extent that any information about him is of public interest even if unrelated to whether one should do business with him.
b. Bridgers participated in the discourse on issues of public interest.
A defendant's statement that implicates an issue of public interest (as Bridgers's post did here) constitutes protected activity when the defendant, through the statement, "participate[s] in, or further[s], the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest." (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.)
i. Abuse
Warning others about abusive conduct by an individual such as Nelson furthers the public discourse. Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, cited by the FilmOn court as an example of a defendant "participat[ing] in, or further[ing]" public discourse on an issue, is instructive. In Cross, a homeowner sued her tenant after the tenant thwarted the sale of the home by, among other things, disclosing to a buyer's agent that a convicted sex offender lived nearby. (Cross v. Cooper, at p. 366.) The court concluded the tenant's disclosure was protected under section 425.16 because "preventing child sexual abuse and protecting children from sexual predators are issues of widespread public interest. Thus, insofar as [the tenant]'s disclosure served those interests by alerting prospective buyers of the potential risk to children posed by a registered sex offender who lived nearby, his conduct involved a private communication directly related to an issue of considerable interest to the general public ...." (Cross v. Cooper, at p. 375; see also Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1547 ["whether or not an adult who interacts with minors in a church youth program has engaged in an inappropriate relationship with any of the minors is clearly a matter of public interest"].)
Furthermore, Bridgers "participated in" and "furthered" the public discussion of abuse by commenting on Bannon's post, which itself was made in a public forum and was protected conduct. When public allegations of abuse are corroborated, it serves not only to further the discussion of the specific claims at issue, but also to embolden others who are being victimized to come forward. (See Elliott v. Donegan (E.D.N.Y. 2020) 469 F.Supp.3d 40, 51-52 [describing how "the #MeToo movement became a chorus bolstering the credibility of victims of sexual assault and harassment"].) Additionally, Bridgers had a history of publicly calling out abusive conduct by other men in the music industry, which placed the allegations against Nelson into a broader discussion of abusive conduct by men in the music industry.
ii. Theft and Violence
Bridgers also participated in a public discussion of whether it was advisable to do business with Nelson. Her post was expressly directed at those who were "considering working with" Nelson and stated Bridgers had "witnessed" and could "personally verify" "stealing [and] violence." As with the issue of grooming, Bridgers's post added to the public discussion begun by Bannon. Furthermore, Bannon's post did not simply raise the issue of her own personal experience with Nelson, but instead accused him of theft and fraud in his dealings with others and included screenshots of numerous complaints made by other individuals about Nelson's business practices. (See Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 634 [consumer protection information is protected under § 425.16 "when the 'consumer information' goes beyond recounting a onetime dispute between a buyer and a seller"]; Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1366 ["consumer information that goes beyond a particular interaction between the parties and implicates matters of public concern that can affect many people is generally deemed to involve an issue of public interest for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute"].)
Nelson distinguishes this case from Wilbanks v. Wolk, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 883, which involved internet posts by an individual who made a business of providing consumer information. (Id. at p. 899.) However, Wilbanks does not suggest that providing consumer information is only protected if it is done in the course of a person's business, and other cases have found consumer protection information provided by non-professionals to be protected conduct. (See Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 885-886, 887-888 [posts about a law firm by a former client]; Chaker v. Mateo, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1141-1142, 1146 [posts by the mother of a woman who had been personally involved with the plaintiff].)
Nelson apparently contends that, in deciding whether Bridgers participated in a public discussion of Nelson's trustworthiness and character, it is improper to consider the claims made in Bannon's post, in part because Nelson alleged that Bannon's claims were false. We disagree. First, Bridgers's post referenced and corroborated Bannon's post and thus Bannon's post provides critical context to determine what issues Bridgers's post implicated. Nelson provides no cogent argument to the contrary. Second, even if the truth of Bannon's claims were relevant to analyzing whether Bridgers's statements were protected conduct as opposed to analyzing the second prong of whether Nelson's claims have minimal merit, there was no evidence before the trial court that Bannon's claims were false.
Nelson makes the meritless argument that his complaint's allegations that Bannon's statements were false must be accepted as true in determining whether Bridgers's post constitutes protected activity. Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2) expressly states to the contrary, and requires that "[i]n making its determination [whether to grant a special motion to strike], the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based." This provision applies to the determination of whether a cause of action arises from activity protected by section 425.16. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
c. Nelson's allegations regarding Bridgers's motives.
Nelson argues that Bridgers's post was not made in connection with any issue of public interest because it was part of a personal vendetta by Bannon against Nelson, in which Bridgers participated because she had a relationship with Bannon.Nelson fails to explain how the alleged motivation of Bridgers is relevant to whether, through her post, she participated in public debate. Nelson's argument would appear to relate more to whether the post by Bridgers implicated any issues of public interest in the first place, or whether it instead implicated only a private dispute. Our Supreme Court, however, has made clear that whether a statement implicates a public issue is determined by how the statement is reasonably understood by an "objective observer." (Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1254.) This step of the test "is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Only when an expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at [this] step." (Id. at pp. 1253-1254, italics added.) As discussed above, we conclude that Bridgers's post "may reasonably be understood to implicate" issues of public interest. (Id. at p. 1253.)
Nelson again relies on the allegations in his first amended complaint to support his contentions that Bannon had a vendetta against him. As discussed, Nelson's argument that we must accept these allegations as true at this stage of the analysis is meritless. In any event, we conclude that Nelson's argument fails even if we assume his allegations are true.
Bridgers filed a motion requesting we take judicial notice of screenshots from a Web site allegedly belonging to Nelson and various documents related to an ex parte application and later motion Bridgers filed seeking to have the trial court order Nelson to remove material from his Instagram account. Bridgers contends these materials are relevant to Nelson's contention that his dispute with Bridgers is a "private matter." These materials all concern actions taken by Nelson after the trial court's ruling on the special motion to strike, and thus are not relevant to the issues presented in this appeal. Accordingly, we deny the motion. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)
4. Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude Nelson's claims arose from Bridgers's Instagram post, and that her post constituted protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). As Nelson admittedly did not show a probability of succeeding on his claims, the trial court properly granted Bridgers's special motion to strike and dismissed Nelson's claims.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Awarding Bridgers Attorney's Fees
Nelson does not challenge the trial court's attorney's fee award other than to contend we should reverse it if we reverse the granting of the special motion to strike. As we affirm the granting of the special motion to strike, we also affirm the attorney's fees award and the amended judgment incorporating that award.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's amended judgment and orders, including the attorney's fees award, are affirmed. Bridgers is awarded her costs on appeal.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J., BENDIX, J.