Summary
reversing grant of motion for judgment on the pleadings where trial court indicated that complaint's "basic allegation was susceptible of many interpretations."
Summary of this case from Meeco, Inc. v. Clean Growth Fund III, LPOpinion
April 30, 1964.
July 1, 1964.
Torts — Supplier of defective chattel — Work shoes — Implied warranties — Uniform Commercial Code.
1. In this appeal from a summary judgment for defendants on the pleadings, in which it appeared that plaintiff claimed damages for breach of implied warranty of fitness of work shoes which caused an extensive contact dermatitis of the feet and hands, and alleged "On or about June 14, 1961, the Plaintiff was in the employ of the Giant Portland Cement Co., . . . and on said date Plaintiff commenced wearing a pair of safety work shoes which had been supplied to him by Giant Portland Cement Co., which had been purchased by them from Lehigh Safety Shoe Co. . . ., which shoes were . . . manufactured by the Defendant, Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co.", it was Held that the court below erred in determining as a matter of law that plaintiff is excluded from the class of persons to whom the implied warranties extend under the Uniform Commercial Code of 1953, P. L. 3, §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-318 and the developing case law.
Practice — Summary Judgment — Judgment on the pleadings — Pa. R.C.P. 1034.
2. When ruling upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1034, a court may not consider depositions or other collateral evidence. [138]
3. Judgment on the pleadings may be entered only in a case which is clear and free from doubt. [138]
Before JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
Appeal, No. 243, Jan. T., 1964, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, April T., 1963, No. 83, in case of Jacob W. Nederostek v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co. and Lehigh Safety Shoe Co. Judgment reversed.
Assumpsit.
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings granted and judgment entered for defendant, opinion by HENNINGER, P. J. Plaintiff appealed.
Paul A. McGinley, for appellant.
E. Drummond King, with him Robert B. Doll, for appellees.
In this suit for breach of implied warranty of fitness, the court below granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1034. Therefore, we must consider as presently admitted by defendants all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint. Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
The crucial paragraph in the complaint alleges: "On or about June 14, 1961, the Plaintiff was in the employ of the GIANT PORTLAND CEMENT CO., . . . and on said date Plaintiff commenced wearing a pair of safety work shoes which had been supplied to him by Giant Portland Cement Co., which had been purchased by them from Lehigh Safety Shoe Co. . . ., which shoes were . . . manufactured by the Defendant, Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co."
The complaint continues that as a result of wearing the shoes, plaintiff developed extensive contact dermatitis of the feet and hands.
The court below held: "The word `supplied' is a broad term and could include any number of relations. When used in the context of plaintiff's complaint, that an employer supplied safety shoes to its employee, we take it to mean something similar to the supply by a government to its soldiers through a supply sergeant. It may be a fringe benefit, but it is not a sale and purchase.
"Resort to the depositions taken in this case supports that connotation for the term. . . ."
We must observe at this point that the court's consideration of the depositions was improper. When ruling upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may not consider depositions or other collateral evidence. Emery v. Metzner, 191 Pa. Super. 440, 445, 156 A.2d 627, 630 (1959); Bogojavlensky v. Logan, 181 Pa. Super. 312, 124 A.2d 412 (1956); 2A Anderson, Penna. Civil Practice § 1034.21 (Supp. 1964); 1 Goodrich-Amram, § 1034(b)-1 (Supp. 1964).
The court below stated that "supplied . . . could include any number of relations," yet proceeded to grant defendants' motion based upon the court's own limited (and, to plaintiff, most unfavorable) interpretation of one of those relations. This Court cannot hold, on the record which we may consider at this stage of the litigation, that, as a matter of fact or law, plaintiff is excluded from the class of persons to whom the implied warranties extend under the Uniform Commercial Code, April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-318, as amended, 12A P. S. § 2-314, 2-315, 2-318 (Supp. 1963), and the developing case law.
Judgment on the pleadings may be entered only in a case which is clear and free from doubt. Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., supra. The court below indicated that plaintiff's basic allegation was susceptible of many interpretations. This being so, the relief to be afforded defendants is not final judgment against plaintiff. The entry of judgment on the pleadings, therefore, was improper.
Our present disposition is without prejudice to plaintiff's request (in his brief) for leave to amend.
Reversed and remanded with a procedendo.