Opinion
C. A. 5:21-cv-2745-DCC-KDW
12-02-2022
Devon Neal, Plaintiff, v. Major Scott Weeks and Sgt. Tracey Miller, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 15, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 41. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on June 27, 2022. ECF No. 56. Defendants filed a Reply on July 5, 2022. ECF No. 57. The matter is now before the court for review of the Motion for Summary Judgment. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. Because this Motion is dispositive, an R&R is entered for the court's review.
I. Factual Background
On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in federal court alleging that, as a pretrial detainee, Defendants violated his constitutional rights in that they were deliberately indifferent to his conditions of confinement and violated his due process rights afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that on May 25, 2021, he was placed on suicide watch and put in a holding cell at Laurens County Detention Center (“LCDC”). From May 25, 2021 until August 17, 2021, the day he was removed from suicide watch, Plaintiff alleges he was only allowed to brush his teeth four times, despite complaining to several officers about brushing his teeth. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges as a result of not being allowed to brush his teeth for several days, his tooth weakened and broke, and he suffered other dental complications. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges he was unable to access paper, pens, or the kiosk machine while on suicide watch. Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that while on suicide watch, he was provided a ripped blanket, which the LCDC then charged him $150.00 to replace. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that while in C-Pod, he was not provided cleaning supplies, there were red ants everywhere in his cell, and the shower was full of mold and mildew. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further alleges that the shower in C-Pod did not afford any privacy. Id. Defendants deny these claims. ECF No. 23 at 1.
On March 15, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 41. According to Defendants, Scott Weeks is the current Jail Administrator of the LCDC, and Tracey Miller is an Administrative Assistant at the LCDC. ECF No. 41-1, Defs.' Br. at 1. The affidavit of Scott Weeks is attached to Defendants' Motion. According to Defendant Weeks' Affidavit, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch because, upon entering the facility, he mentioned harming himself and circled “suicidal” on the white card at booking. ECF No. 41-2, Affidavit of Scott Weeks, ¶ 2. Individuals placed on suicide watch are subjected to additional supervision and restrictions necessary to prevent self-harm and preserve order. Weeks Aff., ¶ 4. Defendant Weeks states that while on suicide watch, Plaintiff would have been given the opportunity to shower every other day and would be issued a clean smock and blanket. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Weeks further explains that Plaintiff would have been given the opportunity to brush his teeth at the time of his shower. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5. Inmates on suicide watch are not allowed to retain their toothbrush out of safety concerns because it could be used for self-harm. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5. As far as cell cleaning procedures, LCDC has a specific cleaning policy, and this policy provides for at least weekly cleanings. Weeks Aff., ¶ 6; see also ECF No. 41-41-2 at 10-11; Attachment 2 to Weeks' Aff. The shower area in C-Max, where Plaintiff was housed, is designed differently to allow for observation of inmates to some limited degree as a preventative measure for suicidal inmates. Weeks Aff., ¶ 8. Defendant Weeks explains in his affidavit that Plaintiff would have access to the kiosk and a telephone while on suicide watch, but not to a pen, as it is a restricted item. Weeks Aff., ¶ 11. Defendant Weeks acknowledges that Plaintiff has filed five grievances from the time he arrived at LCDC until the time he filed this Complaint. Weeks Aff., ¶ 12. Finally, Defendant Weeks states that Plaintiff, as a pretrial detainee, has access to dental care at his own expense. Weeks Aff., ¶ 13. Further, LCDC contracts with Southern Health Partners for medical, dental, and mental healthcare. Weeks Aff., ¶ 13. The physicians at Southern Health Partners have made no recommendations for referral of Plaintiff for any dental work. Weeks Aff., ¶ 13.
Defendant Weeks supplemented his affidavit on April 12, 2022 to explain that inmates on suicide watch are able to shower every other day except weekends, and thus, inmates would have the opportunity to brush their teeth every other day, except weekends. ECF No. 45, Supplemental Affidavit of Scott Weeks, ¶ 2.
In his Response, Plaintiff again provides much of the same information as was found in his Complaint; specifically, that his cell was not cleaned, he was charged for a ripped blanket, he was not provided a toothbrush, and he was forced to shower in moldy showers. ECF No. 56, Pl.'s Br. at 1-4. Both parties attach the kiosk grievances submitted by Plaintiff. Those grievances reveal the following: on July 30, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance asking why he was charged for a blanket that was damaged when he received it. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. Defendant Miller responded that she charges what she is told to charge, and that Plaintiff needed to speak with Mr. Braswell. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. On August 3, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating that Mr. Braswell never told anyone to charge Plaintiff for the blanket, and Defendant Miller responded that Mr. Braswell would need to resolve the issued with her. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. On August 6, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating his money was taken for a smock he did not destroy, and Defendant Miller again told Plaintiff she charges what she is told to charge and for Plaintiff to speak with Mr. Braswell. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating that in the three months he has been at LCDC he has only brushed his teeth four times, he was made to sleep on a wet floor, there are ants in his room, and he was placed in a dirty cell. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. Several weeks later, Lt. Lawson responded that Plaintiff has been moved. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. On August 17, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining of moldy showers, no shower curtain, and that the cells do not get cleaned. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1. Finally, on August 21, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance asking Defendant Miller who told her to charge him for the blanket, to which she responded, it was Mr. Braswell. ECF Nos. 41-2; 56-1.
Plaintiff submitted the declaration of Akeevius Smith, another inmate at the LCDC, as support for his allegations. Mr. Smith states that he has noticed mold in C-Pod, as well as an ant infestation. ECF No. 56-2, Declaration of Akeevius Smith. Mr. Smith further states that in the C-Pod shower, individuals can be seen by other inmates and officers working in the shower area. See Smith Declaration. He says no one ever brought a cleaning cart around to clean C-Pod. See Smith Declaration. Mr. Smith also states that he met Plaintiff on July 23, 2021, and prior to him leaving C-Pod on July 29, 2021, five days later, he did not see an officer provide Plaintiff a toothbrush or toothpaste. See Smith Declaration.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Defendants raise several arguments in favor of summary judgment: (1) Plaintiff's conditions of confinement allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation; (2) Plaintiff has not made a cognizable claim as to his dental care; (3) Plaintiff's allegations regarding the blanket do not implicate a constitutional violation; (4) Plaintiff has failed to prove personal involvement of the constitutional violations as to these Defendants; (5) Defendants are not liable on the theory of supervisory liability; (6) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (7) Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of law. Plaintiff disagrees. The undersigned will address each issue in turn.
1. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff argues that while being held on suicide watch at the LCDC, he saw rings in the toilets of two holding cells and mold in the showers, and his cell was never cleaned unless he asked for it to be cleaned. Pl.'s Br. at 1-2. Plaintiff argues that when he asked to have his cell cleaned, it would take two hours for anyone to clean his cell. Pl.'s Br. at 1. Plaintiff further alleges he was not allowed to regularly brush his teeth or have a toothbrush. Pl.'s Br at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed nude while showering on suicide watch. Pl.'s Br. at 2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that while on suicide watch, he was not given access to paper, pens, or the kiosk machine. ECF No. 1 at 3. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 based on his allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Specifically, Defendants argue that as a pretrial detainee on suicide watch, certain additional precautions were put in place, all of which were safety measures intended to protect Plaintiff while detained.
This particular allegation was not reiterated in Plaintiff's response to summary judgment.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims about the conditions of confinement at the LCDC are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); see also Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees are to be evaluated under the Due Process Clause). This is the case because the due process rights of pretrial detainees are at least as great as those afforded the protections entitled to individuals that have already been convicted of crimes; thus, pretrial detainees may not be subjected to any form of “punishment,” as they have not been adjudicated guilty. Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To prevail on such a claim, a pretrial detainee must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish or (2) a lack of a reasonable relationship to a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.” Hill, 979 F.2d at 991 (quoting Martin, 849 F.2d at 870).
Plaintiff alleges that the toilets and holding cells at LCDC were dirty, there was an ant infestation, and that the showers were moldy and contained mildew. Akeevius Smith claims that he also saw mold in the shower, he noticed ants and bugs, and that “no one ever brought a cleaning cart around” to clean rooms; however, he does not provide a time frame for when he was in C-Pod. See Smith Declaration. Defendants produced the affidavit of Defendant Weeks, as well as the cleaning schedule at LCDC, to refute these claims. Affidavit of Scott Weeks, ECF No. 41-2; see also Attachment 2 to Weeks Affidavit. Defendant Weeks explains that LCDC has an established policy for cleaning, and that in the areas housed for inmates on suicide watch, the areas are cleaned on a weekly basis. Weeks Aff., ¶ 6. The attached cleaning schedule supports Defendants' contention that the area where Plaintiff was housed was to be cleaned on a weekly basis, following a specific and set schedule. See Attachment 2 to Weeks Aff. The only evidence that Plaintiff ever complained of dirty conditions was via a kiosk grievance on August 12, 2021 and again on August 17, 2021, which resulted in Plaintiff being moved to another unit. ECF No 41-2 at 16-17.
First, courts have previously held that exposure to mold, mildew and odors does not meet the standard of “excessive risk” to the health and safety of an inmate under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Webb v. Nicks, No. 1:18-2007-HMH-SVH, 2019 WL 2896447, at *1-4 (D.S.C June 4, 2019), adopted by, No. 1:18-2007-HMH-SVH, 2019 WL 2869626 (D.S.C. July 3, 2019). Living conditions in prison are not always ideal, and inmates cannot expect the services and amenities afforded at a good hotel. See Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir 1988) (finding no constitutional violation when an inmate was not provided soap, a toothbrush, or toothpaste for ten days). Short term sanitation issues, while perhaps unpleasant, do not amount to constitutional violations. Harris v. FNU Connolly, 5:14-cv-128-FDW, 2016 WL 676468, at *5 (W.D.N.C Feb. 18, 2016) (citing Whitnack v. Douglas Cnty., 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994)). Thus, the undersigned recommends finding that the allegations related to cleanliness do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that any failure to clean was in an effort to punish detainees. Indeed, some of Plaintiff's own evidence indicates that upon complaints of a dirty cell, officers came to clean the cell or moved him to a different cell. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he suffered any harm as a result of these alleged violations. In fact, Plaintiff affirmatively stated that within two hours of him complaining that his cell was not clean, an officer came to clean his cell. Finally, Plaintiff does not otherwise refute that LCDC followed the cleaning schedule outlined by Defendant Weeks. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of an actionable constitutional violation.
As to Plaintiff's allegations regarding conditions of confinement related to the conditions of the housing units for detained individuals under suicide watch, as explained in Defendant Weeks' affidavit, Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell under suicide watch when he was initially booked at LCDC because he mentioned harming himself and circled “suicidal” on a card at booking. Weeks Aff., ¶ 2. After that, Plaintiff was seen by a mental health professional eleven times between the time he was booked on May 26, 2021 and the time he was cleared from suicide watch on August 17, 2021. Weeks Aff., ¶ 2. This is the general timeframe within which Plaintiff contends the alleged constitutional violations occurred. Plaintiff alleges he was unable to access paper, pens or the kiosk machine, and that he was unable to brush his teeth. The only injury Plaintiff complains of as a result of these conditions is a broken tooth, which he attributes to the inability to brush his teeth more than four times between May 25, 2021 and August 17, 2021. As pointed out by Defendants, Plaintiff did not file a grievance related to the issue of a broken tooth.
Defendants point out that the measures in place in the housing unit designated as suicide watch are put in place to prevent self-harm. Defs.' Br at 3-4; Weeks Aff., ¶ 4. Further, Defendant Weeks indicates that individuals are able to brush their teeth during the same time they take a shower, and he provided the shower schedule attached to his affidavit. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Weeks further explained that inmates on suicide watch are not allowed to keep a toothbrush because they can be used for self-harm. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5. Finally, Defendant Weeks indicated that to his knowledge, Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to shower every other day, except on weekends. Weeks Aff., ¶ 5; Supplemental Weeks Affidavit, ¶ 2; ECF No. 45. Similarly, Defendant Weeks explained that Plaintiff would have had access to the kiosk (and indeed, Plaintiff's own exhibits indicate that he accessed the kiosk during this timeframe). Weeks Aff., ¶ 11. However, Defendant Weeks explained that a pen is a restricted item to individuals on suicide watch. Weeks Aff., ¶ 11. Finally, Defendant Weeks explained that the shower area in the pod where Plaintiff was housed is specifically designed for inmates who are on suicide watch and allows for some observation to a limited degree during the shower process given the need to prevent harm to inmates or other property. Weeks Aff., ¶ 8.
Plaintiff's evidence to refute these claims is again found in the declaration of Mr. Akevius Smith. Mr. Smith states that he was in C-Pod for five days with Plaintiff. See Smith Declaration. Smith further states that when he came out of the shower on a Monday and Wednesday in July, he did not see an officer give Plaintiff a toothbrush. See Smith Declaration. Finally, Mr. Smith states that while in the shower, an inmate's body is in view to corrections officers working in the booth. See Smith Declaration. The undersigned notes that Mr. Smith and Plaintiff were in the same housing area for five days, a very short period. To the contrary, Defendants have presented evidence of the shower schedule in place (wherein inmates are given time to brush their teeth), and further evidence that there is a reason for the policies that provide some restriction of items in the suicide housing units. In response, the only evidence Plaintiff has produced to support his allegations is a declaration from an inmate who admittedly only interacted with Plaintiff for five days. Defendants have explained the reason behind or the necessity for the conditions resulting in Plaintiff's allegations. Again, Plaintiff does not allege the restrictions in place in the pods designated for individuals on suicide watch were punitive in nature. Nor does he allege that he should not have been put on suicide watch. Plaintiff's only alleged injury related to these conditions is his claim that he had a broken tooth resulting from the failure to brush his teeth more than four times in a relatively short time span. However, he offers no evidence to support that he actually has a broken tooth, that his broken tooth was caused by the alleged inability to brush his teeth during the relatively short time frame involved, or that he notified anyone of a broken tooth. Thus, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants should be granted summary judgment as to these claims, as well.
This declaration also supports Defendants' contention that inmates are allowed to shower every other day.
To the extent this allegation is construed as deliberate indifference to his medical needs, the undersigned notes that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee violates the due process clause. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiff does not allege or provide any evidence that he complained of a broken tooth or sought dental care and was denied treatment. Further, as indicated by Defendant Weeks in his affidavit, there is no indication that the healthcare provider at the detention center diagnosed Plaintiff or referred him for dental treatment. See Weeks Aff., ¶ 13.
2. Allegations Related to Charges to Plaintiff's Account
Plaintiff alleges that he was charged $150.00 by the LCDC for the issuance of a ripped blanket, and as a result, his due process rights were violated. Plaintiff alleges that he had the ripped blanket for most of the month of July until he showed it to a mental health doctor. ECF No. 1 at 3. After that time, Deputy Braswell confiscated what Plaintiff terms the “torn suicide blanket.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Upon learning that he was charged money for the blanket, Plaintiff states he wrote a grievance on the kiosk system, which was dated July 30, 2021. Id.; ECF No. 56-1. He alleges Defendant Miller responded and told him that she charged him that amount because she was told to, and he would have to speak to Deputy Braswell. Id. The copies of the kiosk grievances show that Plaintiff asked why he was charged for damaged property that was damaged when he received it. ECF No. 56-1, 1-3, 6. Defendant Miller responded several times to indicate that Plaintiff should speak with Braswell. ECF No. 6-1 at 1-3, 6. Plaintiff did not name Braswell in this lawsuit, and there is no indication that Defendant Weeks had any involvement or knowledge with respect to the charges associated with a ripped blanket.
Plaintiff does not specify what due process rights were violated. It is clear from the record that the blanket was somehow ripped. It is also clear that he was afforded the use of the kiosk to complain about the charges, to which Defendant Miller clearly told him several times he would need to discuss with Deputy Braswell. Indeed on August 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance and said, “one last ? about the blnket [sic] who told you to charge me.” ECF No. 56-1 at 6. Defendant Miller responded, “[i]f you are referring to the suicide blanket, it was Braswell.” ECF No. 56-1 at 6. After this exchange, there is no evidence within the record presented by either party to suggest whether Plaintiff attempted to speak with Deputy Braswell regarding the issuance and subsequent charge related to the ripped blanket.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations that he was charged due to a damaged suicide blanket sound in breach of contract or tort law, rather than a violation of a constitutional right. They argue that a § 1983 cause of action cannot be premised upon a violation of a state law. Defs.' Br at 10. To the extent Plaintiff argues a § 1983 violation based upon a violation of state law, the undersigned agrees that claim would not necessarily include a constitutional violation. See Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the court firmly dismissed the contention that a section 1983 violation could rest on a violation of state law). However, as pro se plaintiffs are afforded a liberal construction of their pleadings, the undersigned has considered whether Plaintiff has made an appropriate claim based on a due process violation.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend XIV, Section 1. While an inmate's rights may be diminished by the needs of the institutional environment of the penal system, a prisoner is not “wholly stripped” of the protections afforded under the Constitution while incarcerated. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). In order to state a due process violation has occurred, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir, 2015). Here, assuming Plaintiff's claimed property interest is in the money he was charged, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate deprivation of the money in his account without due process of law. It is clear from the kiosk grievances that Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to inquire about the charges, even though he stated in the kiosk grievance that he did not receive written notice or a chance to dispute the charge for the blanket. ECF No. 56-1 at 3. Plaintiff does not allege that upon being told by Defendant Miller that he needed to speak to Deputy Braswell, Plaintiff attempted to speak with Deputy Braswell about the charges associated with the blanket. The most recent kiosk grievance, dated August 21, 2021, shows that after Plaintiff asked who asked Defendant Miller to charge him for the blanket, she replied it was Deputy Braswell. Plaintiff did not provide anything further in the record to show that he was denied the opportunity to contest whether he damaged the blanket. Instead, a few days after sending the kiosk inquiries, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff did not name Braswell, who as evidenced in the record, appears to be the individual responsible for making the decision to charge Plaintiff for the damaged blanket. Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he was charged for the blanket without due process of law. Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendants as to this claim.
In the event Plaintiff's allegations could be read as an allegation that the charge was considered punishment, the undersigned disagrees and finds that the record is clear that the charges are related to the fact that the blanket was somehow damaged. Whether Plaintiff received the blanket already damaged appears to be Plaintiff's contention; however, as stated in this R&R, aside from his kiosk grievances, which were responded to, he does not set forth any evidence to suggest he sought and was denied the ability to contest the charges or that he was denied the opportunity to speak with Deputy Braswell about these charges.
3. Personal Involvement & Supervisory Liability
Within their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that because Defendants were not personally involved in the daily interactions with Plaintiff giving rise to the allegations in his Complaint, there is no basis for liability under § 1983. Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their case.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted). Importantly, this issue is ordinarily one of fact, rather than law. Id.
Plaintiff named two individuals as Defendants in this case. In Defendants' Motion, Defendants state that Tracey Miller is an administrative assistant and her duties including record keeping related to inmate commissary accounts. Defs.' Br. at 1. In three of the kiosk grievances submitted by Plaintiff, Defendant Miller appears to be the individual who attempted to resolve the grievances. In each of those responses, she clearly indicates to Plaintiff that she only charges inmates what she is told to charge, and that Plaintiff would need to speak to Officer Braswell to discuss any complained of issues. ECF Nos. 56-1 at 1-3, 6. Plaintiff does not otherwise allege Defendant Miller had any supervisory role. Instead, Plaintiff's allegations attributable to Defendant Miller appear to be related solely to the issue of being charged for a ripped blanket, and the only interaction with Defendant Miller regarding these issues was via kiosk responses. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Miller personally participated in any other issues. Plaintiff simply states that Defendant Miller was the individual who charged him for the blankets; however, she otherwise had no personal involvement in any of the other alleged violations.
As to Defendant Weeks, according to Plaintiff, he asked an officer named Officer Armstrong to allow him to clean his cell, but Officer Armstrong told him it could not happen right away. Pl.'s Br. at 1. Plaintiff further states in his brief that Defendant Weeks was the major/supervisor over the jail; therefore, he would be liable for the issues Plaintiff complained about. The inmate grievances on file include Plaintiff's complaints regarding a smock/blanket he did not destroy, mold in the shower, no shower curtain, and his cell does not get cleaned. He also complained about being unable to brush his teeth, having to sleep on a wet floor, and ants in his room. However, even assuming Defendant Weeks was a supervisor responsible for the daily workings of the jail, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Weeks had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegations complained of by Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support a finding that he suffered any constitutional violation was as a result of Defendant Weeks' inaction. Indeed, the undersigned has previously considered Plaintiff's claims and recommends finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional injury or violation. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are not liable under a theory of supervisory liability.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity, which precludes imposition of individual liability on them as Defendants. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In evaluating whether qualified immunity applies, the court must determine: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the complained of misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). If a plaintiff satisfies the first step, the court must then determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. The Fourth Circuit has stated that the purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials can perform their job free from the specter of endless and debilitating lawsuits. Torchinksy v. Siwinksi, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations stem from his classification as an inmate on suicide watch. Defendants argue that they have provided sufficient evidence to show that the conditions and restrictions Plaintiff complains of were put in place to prevent self-harm and were necessary to handle the unique challenges presented by inmates who present a mental health risk. As a result, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not suffer from the violation of a constitutional right. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. For the reasons previously established, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants' conduct did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
5. Injunctive Relief
Finally, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff makes any claim for injunctive relief, this claim must be dismissed. Within Plaintiff's Complaint, he requests a “permanent injunction” to order Defendant Weeks to enforce weekly cleaning of every cell, and to enforce Defendant Weeks to enforce “proper disciplinary hearings.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has wholly failed to make any showing that injunctive relief is appropriate in this case.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction, though it appears at that stage in the litigation he would be seeking a preliminary injunction. The standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same as a preliminary injunction, except that a plaintiff must show actual success on the merits. Smith v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 901 F.Supp.2d 639, 649 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2012). “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). To establish the need for a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending a resolution on the merits of a case. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1960)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, nor has he made a showing of actual success on the merits. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is likely to suffer any irreparable harm, or any harm beyond his dental issues. Nor has Plaintiff made a showing that the balance of equities tip in his favor or that any injunctive relief is in the public interest. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying any request for injunctive relief.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 41, be granted for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).