However, Illinois and a number of other states were granted an extension until February 15, 1973, to submit the transportation control portions of their implementation plans. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A., 154 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968, 970 (1973) (hereinafter referred to as Natural Resources). Suit was immediately instituted in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging these extensions, inter alia.

Id. In deciding to add such indirect source review to the list of transportation control measures states had to consider in their attempts to meet ambient air quality standard deadlines, EPA was no doubt prompted to some extent by our decision in NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ( NRDC I). In that case, we found that EPA had no authority to extend the statutory deadlines for either state submission of the transportation control plan portions of their SIPs or for achievement of primary air quality standards for certain pollutants.

under § 1857h-5(b)(1). Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968, 969 (1973). In assuming jurisdiction, the District of Columbia Circuit looked to several of the factors that also had influenced the First Circuit:

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, on a petition for review, held that this extension was not authorized by the Act, and also found that the record did not show whether the Administrator had conducted a state-by-state determination on the efficacy of the state plans to provide for the maintenance of the primary and secondary standards beyond May 31, 1975. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968, 970, 971-972 (1973). The court established a new time schedule under which the Administrator was to review the maintenance provisions of the state plans and disapprove those which he determined did not contain sufficient measures for maintenance of the primary standard.

However, in cases involving metropolitan areas encompassing two or more states, there may be several appropriate circuits. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 475 F.2d 968 at 969 (D.C.Cir. filed February 10, 1973). 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2).

Certain other questions relating to the timing of the Massachusetts plan and E.P.A. regulation of vehicular emissions, originally raised before us, were recently resolved by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. v. E.P.A., 475 F.2d 968, Order filed Jan. 31, 1973, see 465 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1972). THE RHODE ISLAND PLAN I

We believe it is necessary to "literally comply with all the formal steps provided by the statute" even if "the extent to which compliance with these requirements might produce beneficial results is not known." NRDC v. EPA, 154 U.S.App. D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968, 972-3 (1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). One reason to enforce compliance is seen in the disagreement on the comparative rigors of the "adverse effect" standard in § 108 and the "will endanger" standard in § 211.

The statutory scheme and New York's prior efforts at compliance are outlined in detail in CCO I, 683 F.2d at 651-55, and will only be highlighted here. States are required to include in a SIP transportation control strategies where necessary to meet air quality standards promulgated by EPA. See § 7410(a)(2)(B); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In 1973 EPA approved an amendment to New York's SIP in which New York proposed, among other things, to curtail automobile use in New York City and thereby reduce air pollution by imposing tolls on the bridges over the East and Harlem Rivers. 38 Fed.Reg. 16,550, 16,560 (1973).

Moreover, despite the EPA's apparent belief to the contrary, the statute does not give the EPA discretion to permit Indiana to remain in noncompliance indefinitely. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, see District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 475 F.2d 968, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and other courts, see Sierra Clubs v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d 1145, 1153 (7th Cir. 1983); Connecticut Fund for the Environment, 672 F.2d at 998; Citizens for a Better Environment v. Costle, 610 F. Supp. 106, 111 (N.D.Ill. 1985) have decided, this statute imposes on the EPA a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate a proper SIP if the State fails to do so. At oral argument, in response to a question raised by the court, EPA represented that under its view of the statute it was still required to give Indiana more time to act and it could not (or would not) tell the court just how much more time Indiana was entitled to. See also Citizens for a Better Environment v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 270 (N.D.Ill. 1982) ("[The EPA's] position is that everyone should stand still until the EPA decides to act.").

The states revised their SIPs to include transportation control strategies where other measures would not by themselves ensure attainment. See § 7410(a)(2)(B); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C.Cir. 1973). Reference to provisions of the Clean Air Act will henceforth be made only to the appropriate section number of 42 U.S.C. (Supp.III 1979).