When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the underlying merits of the dispute, such as interpreting a contract's terms, the summary judgment standard is the appropriate standard to employ. See Paul, 2017 WL 2462492, at *2 ("In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion on the basis of the underlying merits, the court assumes the facts alleged by the nonmoving party to be true and draws all reasonable factual inferences in its favor, and judgment is appropriate only if the moving party establishes that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Facello, No. 5:13-CV-21730, 2014 WL 801051, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 28, 2014) (applying the summary judgment standard for a 12(c) motion for a declaratory judgment in an insurance dispute (citing King v. Gemini Food Servs., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 964, 966 (E.D. Va. 1976) )); Bell Atl.-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's Cty., 155 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (D. Md. 2001) (applying the summary judgment standard for a 12(c) motion determining whether a state statute was preempted (citing King, 438 F. Supp. at 966 )). As the instant matter involves cross-motions seeking a Rule 12(c) declaratory judgment on the basis of the underlying merits, and as both parties posit that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the Court will apply the summary judgment standard.

"[T]he Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that a declaratory judgment action 'is appropriate when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and . . . when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.'" Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Facello, Civil Action No. 5:13-cv-21730, 2014 WL 801051, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2004)). "However, a court may decline to hear a declaratory judgment action for 'good reason.'"

In Facello, however, the insureds sold the home to a third party through a rent-to-own agreement, and the court did not address the "residence premises" provision in context with West Virginia's standard fire policy—mostly likely because the insureds did not file a response to the insurer's motion for summary judgment. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Facello, No. 5:13-cv-21730, 2014 WL 801051 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 28, 2014) (Berger, J.). Thus, the Facello case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar, as the plaintiffs maintained control over the Dutch Hollow home at the time of the fire, and they have raised the standard fire policy issue.

Courts addressing substantially similar language, under Alabama law, have concluded that homeowners who rent their property but do not reside there are not covered. See, e.g., Country Cas. Ins. Co. v. Massey, 2010 WL 5579881, at *2–4 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 20, 2010) (upholding fire loss claim denial to insured who rented his property because the policy “did not—by its express terms—provide coverage for the ... dwelling, as that was not where [the claimant] “principally reside[d]” ”); see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 447 Fed.Appx. 51 (11th Cir.2011) (holding a similar policy provision “plainly and unambiguously required [the insureds] to reside at the property listed on the policy.”); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Facello, 2014 WL 801051 (S.W.W.Va. Feb. 28, 2014) (holding that the policy did not provide coverage for a dwelling because the named insured did not reside at the property). Accordingly, for coverage to exist for the dwelling under the clear terms of the AICH policy, Plaintiff must have primarily resided at the Property at the time of the loss.