Opinion
Catherine S. Nasser, JONES DAY, San Francisco, CA, Donald J. Munro (admitted pro hac vice), JONES DAY, Washington, DC, Attorneys for Plaintiffs NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, AND LOS ANGELES JUNCTION RAILWAY ADDITIONAL COUNSEL ON SIGNATURE PAGE.
KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney General of California, TAMAR PACHTER, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Peter Chang, Attorneys for Defendants. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, and JULIE SU, in her official capacity as Labor Commissioner.
JOINT STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO EXTEND THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS FOR ADDITIONAL NINETY DAYS
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
Plaintiffs National Railroad Passenger Corporation (d/b/a Amtrak), BNSF Railway Company, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and Los Angeles Junction Railway (collectively, "Plaintiffs") and Defendants the State of California, the State of California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, and Julie Su, in her official capacity as Labor Commissioner (collectively, "Defendants"), hereby request and jointly stipulate to an extension of the current stay of all proceedings in this case for an additional period of ninety (90) days.
Recitals
WHEREAS the Court had previously stayed proceedings to allow Plaintiffs and Defendants (collectively, "the Parties") to engage in settlement discussions [Dkt. No. 23]; and
WHEREAS the Parties have made progress in their negotiations but have not yet completed those negotiations, and would like the opportunity to continue their discussions before advancing litigation further and potentially wasting judicial resources; and
WHEREAS "the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its own docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). "[T]he law favors and encourages compromise settlements, " Ahern v. Cent. P. Freight Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1988), and courts routinely order stays to facilitate settlement efforts. See, e.g., 13B Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.2 (2009) ("[A] court may stay proceedings if the parties are working toward settlement...."); and
WHEREAS the Parties agree that a stay is desirable both to facilitate their ongoing settlement efforts and to conserve judicial resources. See White v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 06-cv-00665, 2006 WL 1409556, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2006) ("[B]ecause the parties appear to be in agreement that a stay is warranted, or at least acceptable, the court sees no reason not to exercise its inherent power to issue one.");
NOW, THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Parties jointly stipulate that it is in the interests of all concerned and will promote judicial economy to extend the stay this case in its entirety as set forth below, or on such other terms as the Court may order:
1. The stay of all proceedings shall be extended for a period of 90 days beyond the current expiration date of October 28, 2015.
2. Within the 90-day stay period, the Parties shall continue to meet and confer in good faith to explore settlement.
3. Should the case be resolved, the Parties will notify the Court promptly by filing appropriate dispositional documents.
4. Should the case not be resolved, the Parties will notify the Court at the close of the 90-day period so that the Court may issue a new scheduling order.
ORDER
Pursuant to the joint stipulation of the Parties:
1. The stay of all proceedings shall be extended for a period of 90 days beyond the current expiration date of October 28, 2015, to January 26, 2016.
2. Within the 90-day stay period, the Parties shall continue to meet and confer in good faith to explore settlement.
3. Should the case be resolved, the Parties will notify the Court promptly by filing appropriate dispositional documents.
4. Should the case not be resolved, the Parties will notify the Court at the close of the 90-day period so that the Court may issue a new scheduling order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.