Indeed, the most dramatic illustration of the overinclusiveness is the fact that while Mr. Warner can never be deemed a "parent" of Serge, nevertheless, if he should marry, his wife could qualify as a stepparent, entitled to obtain for Serge the preferential status that Mr. Warner cannot obtain. Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (SDNY 1967); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (SDNY 1965). Similarly, a man who, in an adulterous affair, fathers a child outside his marriage cannot be the "parent" of that child, but his wife may petition as stepparent.
For instance, the dictionary definitions comprehend only the children of former marriages, whereas many jurisdictions recognize that an illegitimate child may be a stepchild to a person the parent subsequently marries. E.g., U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Atlanta, 135 Ga. App. 390, 217 S.E.2d 647 (1975) (worker's compensation statute); Lipham v. State, 125 Ga. 52, 53 S.E. 817 (1906) (incest); Pigford Brothers Construction Co. v. Evans, 225 Miss. 411, 83 So.2d 622 (1955) (worker's compensation); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (immigration statute provides that one may be a stepchild whether or not born out of wedlock). Some jurisdictions accord "stepchild" a broader meaning in determining entitlement to benefits than the term is given in general parlance, including even adulterine children.
Previous decisions have exhaustively studied the legislative history of the statute and concluded that visa preference is available to stepchildren as a class without further qualification. See Hyppolite v. Sweeney, Civ. No. 77-1865 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 6, 1979); Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). We follow these decisions.
103 Cong.Rec. 15497 (1957) (remarks of Senator Pastore). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1957); H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1952); 1957 U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News, pp. 2020-2021; 103 Cong.Rec. 16719 (1957) (remarks of Senator Kennedy); 103 Cong.Rec. 16307 (1957) (remarks of Representative Rodino); Immigration Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 219-220 and n. 9, 87 S.Ct. 473, 477-478, 17 L.Ed.2d 318 (1966); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531, 534-535 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The courts must distill the general legislative purpose from the legislative history, particularly where it supports a reasonable non-sexist interpretation.
The plaintiff contends that a marriage between a natural father and a woman creates a stepparent-stepchild relationship between the woman and the child and that any consideration of a pre-existing family unit is irrelevant. Both parties purport to be following Judge Feinberg's decision in Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the only reported court case involving an interpretation of the subsection of the statute presently in question. In Nation, the beneficiary was born out of wedlock to the plaintiff's future husband and another woman in Kingston, Jamaica, on February 12, 1947.