Naranjo v. Corriz

25 Citing cases

  1. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura

    477 U.S. 299 (1986)   Cited 1,349 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that damages awards under section 1983 "may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries such as . . . mental anguish and suffering"

    Petitioners' counsel expressly objected to the authorization of damages based on the value of constitutional rights, on the ground that such damages were impermissible under Carey v. Piphus, supra, and on the ground that they required the jury to "speculate as to what the value of the Constitutional right is." App. 97-98. The District Court responded by stating that it relied on Herrera v. Valentine, supra, at 1227, and on Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892 (CA10), cert. dism'd, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982). App. 98. Both of those cases held that jury Page 305 instructions similar to those used here were permissible under Carey.

  2. Alabama v. Evans

    461 U.S. 230 (1983)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding a petition for habeas was "without merit" and vacating a stay of execution that the district court entered because it concluded " ‘the time available does not permit this Court to make a meaningful review or study’ "

    At that late hour a petition that could have been presented long before was thrust upon a judge who had no previous contact with the case. See Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061 (1982), and Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982). This Court is fully familiar with the records in the state and federal courts on Evans' case; the claim now presented is wholly without merit and the Court appropriately vacates the stay of execution granted yesterday.

  3. Dopp v. HTP Corp.

    947 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1991)   Cited 77 times
    Holding that the nonparty appellant lacked standing to appeal the trial court's judgment when it "departed from the case, on its own motion, long before the judgment" was entered

    Those objections were manifestly insufficient to alert the trial court to the need for differentiation between full damages and accessory damages. See Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 1981) (objection to sufficiency of § 1983 damages claim held inadequate to preserve for review issue of whether damage award was duplicative), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; see also CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 858-59 (1st Cir. 1985) (to preserve objection to jury instructions for appeal, aggrieved party must distinctly state the ground of objection before the jury retires), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986); Jordan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1984) (similar). 3.

  4. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City

    879 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1989)   Cited 210 times
    Holding that plaintiff was deprived of a property interest in his status as a retired police officer because state statutes and the city's operations manual provided benefits to retired officers

    United States v. Young, 470, U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). See also Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 901 (10th Cir.) (Doyle, J., specially concurring) (instructions not properly objected to at trial to be reviewed where error may well have been a generating factor which culminated in unwarranted verdict or where a "miscarriage of justice may occur"), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); 1 S. Childress M. Davis, Standards of Review § 4.3 at 241-42 (1986) (federal appeals courts have fashioned a plain error exception in both criminal and civil cases by which to review unpreserved error for a miscarriage of justice). Because no reasonable jury could find that Melton's testimony was the cause of his discharge on the evidence before it, the district court erred in failing to grant judgment to defendants on that point as a matter of law.

  5. Canterbury Belts Ltd. v. Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd.

    869 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1989)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that personal jurisdiction over alleged nonparty contemnor in diversity action had to be supported by adequate contacts with forum state

    Furthermore, the concept of substantial equality has been given consideration in reapportionment cases which cast some light on the issue we must decide, despite the differing context. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), for example, the Supreme Court, in requiring "substantial equality of population among the various [legislative] districts," id. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, ruled that "[m]athematical exactness or precision" was not required, provided that the districts were "as nearly of equal population as is practicable," id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390; see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745-46, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-28, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) ("substantial equality" consistent with "minor deviations from mathematical equality"); Flateau v. Anderson, 537 F.Supp. 257, 263 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), appeal dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982). We conclude (1) that the "substantially equal prominence" provision of paragraph 3 of the consent decree precludes use of the word "Canterbury" by Limited and its privies without appending the words "of New Zealand" in characters that are not significantly different in size or any other feature affecting the prominence of the display; and (2) that the design logo reproduced hereinabove, which purports to comply with paragraph 3 of the consent decree, does not satisfy this requirement.

  6. Weir v. Federal Ins. Co.

    811 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1987)   Cited 67 times
    Holding that in Colorado, " reason for purchasing a particular product beyond the ordinary reason for selecting that product must be shown in order to give rise to an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose"

    This specific objection requirement provides the trial court with an opportunity to make proper changes to the jury instructions. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853, 105 S.Ct. 176, 83 L.Ed.2d 110 (1984); Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); Rogers v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 580 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, we have held that "the grounds stated in [an] objection must be obvious, plain, or unmistakable."

  7. Walje v. City of Winchester

    773 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1985)   Cited 14 times
    In Walje v. City of Winchester, 773 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1985), this Court addressed the issue of what a district court must do to "make clear" that it has considered the relationship between the degree of success and the fees awarded.

    We joined two other circuits in finding such an unreasonable seizure to be closely analogous to the common law tort of assault and battery, for which general damages were presumed from the violation of the victim's right to bodily integrity. See Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897-98 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1227-31 (8th Cir. 1981). In the present case, we are confronted with a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech and association.

  8. Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District No. 70

    766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that parents have standing to allege that the state acts unconstitutionally to establish a religious preference

    Here we need only distinguish the actions of the District which caused a deprivation of substantive rights from those actions initiated by third parties. This Circuit held without elaboration in Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982), that presumed damages are available for violations of substantive constitutional rights. Corriz involved the deprivation of liberty interests in bodily integrity and arrest based on probable cause.

  9. Lavicky v. Burnett

    758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985)   Cited 65 times
    Holding unlawful search and seizure and taking of plaintiff's property without a hearing gave rise to § 1983 liability, but concluding punitive damages award was properly set aside because "there was no evidence of malice, wantonness, or oppressiveness"

    Here there was a violation of plaintiff's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and, as a result, he may recover damages for that violation. See Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1982); cf. Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing cases awarding damages in civil rights cases where no pecuniary loss shown), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976). Defendants Otis and Coppock claim that the trial court erred in not granting their motions for a directed verdict or for judgment n. o.v. A court determining whether to grant such motions must determine whether there is evidence upon which the jury properly could find for the nonmoving party.

  10. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing

    738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984)   Cited 120 times
    Holding that nonobjected-to general verdict should be upheld "if the proof on various theories is sufficient to sustain the general verdict."

    The purpose of this rule is to "prevent a litigant from taking advantage of an error which could be rectified by the court if called to its attention by timely and specific objection." Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 971, 102 S.Ct. 2233, 72 L.Ed.2d 844, cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1983) (by stipulation); see also Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir. 1984); Taylor v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1971); 9 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2551 (1971). Accordingly, Rule 51 requires counsel "to make abundantly clear to the trial court the objecting party's position."