The defendants' motion to set it aside should have been allowed. Daniel v. Belhaven, 189 N.C. 181, 126 S.E. 421; Nall v. McMath, 177 N.C. 183, 98 S.E. 374; McIntosh N.C. Prac. Proc., 665. It is manifestly wanting in legal requirements. Daniel v. Belhaven, supra. It bears the earmarks of compromise. Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N.C. 87; Note, 134 A.S.R., 1061.
In the instant case it will be seen that the sum of $283.25 is arrived at by taking one-half of the $366.51 and adding to it $100, the sum admitted by the defendant to be due to the plaintiffs. In Nall v. McMath, 177 N.C. 183, Allen, J., said obiter dictum: "We would not be understood as holding that the jury has the right to compromise the claims of litigants, and if it clearly appeared that they had done so and had returned the verdict with nothing to sustain it, and that there was no notice of the purpose to do so, the parties would be entitled to relief." From the judge's charge and the evidence, the differences between the parties were irreconcilable, and the jury so understood and returned the verdict "Compromise $283.25."
No error. Cited: McCotter v. R. R., 177 N.C. 162; Trading Co. v. R. R., 177 N.C. 183; Moore v. R. R., 183 N.C. 218, 221; Riff v. R. R., 189 N.C. 588.