Opinion
No. 03-CV-1519 (SJF)(ETB).
March 31, 2005
OPINION ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Rakhi Nagpal ("plaintiff") commenced this action, alleging that her termination from the employ of defendants Harmon Associates and Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("defendants") was the result of sex and disability discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (" Fed.R.Civ.P.") 56.
The facts are derived from defendants' statement of undisputed material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 and the accompanying affidavits and other evidentiary material filed in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, as well as plaintiff's statement of disputed material facts and the accompanying evidentiary material filed in response to the motion. The facts are not in dispute except as noted.
Harmon Associates ("Harmon") is wholly-owned by Fort James Operating Company, which is in turn wholly-owned by Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("Georgia-Pacific"). (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2). Plaintiff was hired as a computer programmer for Harmon's two-person information technology department in September 2001. (Id. ¶ 1). Three days later, she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff claims that, at that time, she notified her supervisor that her expected delivery date was April 3, 2002, and that she would require maternity leave at or about the time of her delivery. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 12, in Defs.' Ex. 2). Plaintiff's subsequent thirty (30)-day performance evaluation was positive, (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11), as was her sixty (60)-day performance evaluation. (Id. ¶ 12).
On January 25, 2002, plaintiff was involved in a car accident. (Id. ¶ 19). On January 29, 2002, her orthopaedic surgeon found whiplash and back strain as a result of the car accident, (Id. ¶ 21), and sent a letter to Harmon stating that plaintiff should not return to work that week. (Defs.' Ex. 9). On February 4, 2002 and February 15, 2002, plaintiff was examined by a chiropractor, (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22), who faxed letters to Harmon on those dates stating that plaintiff was completely disabled and unable to work. (Defs.' Ex. 10). Neither note offered an estimated return-to-work date. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Harmon's Human Resources Department called her on February 22, 2002, to ask her to submit disability benefit claim forms. (Pl.'s Ex. H). On February 27, 2002, plaintiff submitted these "Notice and Proof of Claim for Disability Benefits" forms, on which she reported her date of return to work as "undetermined", despite the forms' request for a specific date. (Defs.' Ex. 10). Plaintiff asserts that Harmon never otherwise requested a return-to-work date. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 27).
Plaintiff asserts that a note signed by her chiropractor similar to those dated February 4 and February 15 was faxed to Harmon on March 7, 2002. (Id. ¶ 26). Defendants contend that plaintiff has no evidence that Harmon received this faxed letter. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 26). On March 15, 2002, Harmon notified plaintiff that her employment was terminated because it had received no contact from her since February 15, 2002 and because it had no other employee to perform plaintiff's work. (Defs.' Ex. 11).
Although plaintiff then provided Harmon with a copy of the March 7 letter, (Defs.' Ex. 10), the company did not change their decision to terminate her employment. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 40; Defs.' Ex. 5, ¶ 9). On April 24, 2002, plaintiff informed Harmon regarding the birth of her child and her readiness to return to work, and asked it to reconsider her termination. (Defs.' Ex. 12). Harmon claims that it extended an offer to plaintiff's male replacement on or before that date and hired him on May 6, 2002. (Avram Reply Decl., Ex. 3, ¶ 4). On May 7, 2002, Harmon notified plaintiff that her position had already been filled. (Defs.' Ex. 13).
Georgia-Pacific's Employee Medical Leave policy (the "policy") states that it will
grant an employee with a serious health condition a medical leave of absence, and pay an eligible employee with a serious health condition salary continuation or wage replacement benefits . . ., or portion thereof, for the period of leave up to a maximum of five months . . . in the 12-month period prior to the date the leave is to commence, referred to as the "rolling" 12-month period.
(Pl.'s Ex. E). Although the meaning of this phrase is less than clear, defendants do not dispute that the policy applies to plaintiff. According to the policy, the employee must submit medical certification substantiating the condition within fifteen (15) business days or absences will be subject to the location's attendance and discipline policies. (Id.). No further information regarding the specific location's attendance policy, or the company's discipline policies for failure to comply, has been provided.
On September 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), claiming sex and disability discrimination. (Defs.' Ex. 14). Since the EEOC was unable to conclude that any statutes had been violated, it dismissed the charges and issued a Right-to-Sue Letter on December 27, 2002. (Defs.' Ex. 15).
III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment should not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material "if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Holtz v. Rockefeller Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001). An issue of fact is genuine only if a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party based on that fact. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, after which the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a factual question that must be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). The trial court is required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. at 252;Cifarelli v. Vill. Of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Second Circuit has recognized that direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare, and must often be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Holtz, 258 F.3d at 69. Thus, granting summary judgment in such cases should be done with an extra measure of caution. However, if a discrimination case is void of genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment may be appropriate. Id. (citing Mc.Lee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001). ("It is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases.").
Plaintiff's Title VII and New York State Executive Law § 296 claims are analyzed together since the same standard of proof applies to both. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1997).
There is a three-step burden-shifting analysis applied to Title VII claims of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she satisfactorily performed the duties required by her position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) her position remained open and was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee. Quaratino v. Tiffany Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995); Sabatino v. Flik Intern. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);. Alternatively, to satisfy the fourth prong, plaintiff may show the circumstances surrounding the discharge give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Quaratino, 71 F.3d at 64. If a plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, it creates a presumption of the employer's unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant may rebut by producing evidence, which, if taken as true by a jury, would allow the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal.Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The burden thus shifted to the defendant is that of production, not persuasion; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993); it is enough merely that the evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, at 254.
If the employer proffers such evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive for termination, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case no longer applies. Weinstock, at 42. The burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who, to survive a motion for summary judgment, must offer evidence that suggests that the defendant's proffered reason is pretext for intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803. The plaintiff's evidence must be sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the dismissal was actually motivated by discrimination.Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997). However, the "plaintiff is not required to show that the employer's proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the `motivating' factors." Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1983) (legitimate reasons for dismissal were pretext for discrimination when employer declared them as the complete explanation for the dismissal, and there was a discriminatory motive that figured in the termination). To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff may rely on the evidence presented in the prima facie case, without more.Hicks, at 510. Unless the employer presents a dispositive, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, to which there is no genuine issue, and which no rational factfinder could reject, the conflict between the plaintiff's prima facie case and the defendant's nondiscriminatory reason presents a question of fact to be resolved at trial. Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203.
A. The Prima Facie Case
It is uncontested that plaintiff fulfilled three of the four prongs required to establish her prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination: she was a member of the protected class, she was discharged, and her position was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee. At issue is the second prong, whether she satisfactorily performed the duties required by her position.
Defendants contend that plaintiff did not, and could not have, satisfactorily performed her required duties, since she was not at work to perform them due to her car accident. Defendants are incorrect. It is true that an employee's excessive or unpredictable attendance problems have been accepted by the courts as evidence of an unsatisfactory job performance. See Dugan v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 760 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1985). However, plaintiff's six (6)-week absence prior to her termination was neither unpredictable, nor, according to Georgia-Pacific's own policy, excessive. Had plaintiff been employed by defendants for a year, her absence would have been protected by federal statute, under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Defendants argue that plaintiff could not satisfactorily perform her duties because she was absent from the workplace. To accept defendants' argument would mean that an employee who took a leave of absence pursuant to an employer's medical leave policy or the FMLA would automatically have to relinquish the right to bring a discrimination suit, because the absence from the workplace would preclude establishing satisfactory performance of job duties.
A medical leave of absence, if in accordance with company policy or federal statute, is not valid grounds for a claim of unsatisfactory job performance. The issue of whether plaintiff complied with Georgia Pacific's medical leave policy is a question of fact for jury determination. Although plaintiff contends that her doctor supplied Harmon with the requisite documentation, defendants claim plaintiff has no evidence that such documentation was ever received. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as this court must do, it is assumed that the notes from the plaintiff's doctor were timely faxed to Harmon. Plaintiff has therefore established her prima facie case: she was a member of a protected class, she satisfactorily performed the duties required by her position, she was discharged, and her position remained open and was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee.
B. The Nondiscriminatory Motive
Defendants assert three reasons for terminating plaintiff: (1) plaintiff was the only employee able to provide certain necessary services essential to the operation of the business; (2) defendants received no contact from plaintiff for four weeks prior to her termination; and (3) plaintiff was unable to return to work and unable to provide a return-to-work date.
At this stage, "the governing standard is simply whether the evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prohibited discrimination occurred." James v. New York Racing Ass'n., 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether "the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence," the summary judgment motion will be denied. Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Assuming that these bases for plaintiff's dismissal are true, plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to suggest that the defendants' proffered reasons are a pretext for intentional discrimination.
C. Pretext
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that defendants' decision to fire her for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons may be pretextual and that her imminent maternity leave, added to her medical leave, may have precipitated her termination. Plaintiff has raised issues of fact regarding defendants' assertion that plaintiff was the only employee that it had to perform necessary services for the company and that it could not function without plaintiff for the period of her absence.
With respect to defendants' claim that plaintiff failed to contact them for four (4) weeks, it is undisputed that plaintiff spoke to Harmon via telephone on February 22, 2002 and that she forwarded her disability forms to Harmon on February 27, 2002.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The parties are directed to appear in my courtroom at 1010 Federal Plaza, Central Islip, New York on April 14, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. for a settlement and/or scheduling conference with authority or persons with authority to resolve this action. Further, the parties are directed to engage in good faith settlement negotiations prior to the conference.
IT IS SO ORDERED.