Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0766-14T2
09-30-2015
THOMAS E. MYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARY MYNES, Defendant-Respondent.
Gregory A. Pasler argued the cause for appellant (Weinberger Law Group, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Pasler, on the brief). Deborah A. Rose argued the cause for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Messano and Maven. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FM-11-209-01. Gregory A. Pasler argued the cause for appellant (Weinberger Law Group, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Pasler, on the brief). Deborah A. Rose argued the cause for respondent. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Thomas E. Mynes and defendant Mary Mynes were married in 1987 and divorced in 2001. Two children were born of the marriage, a son, in 1989, and a daughter, R.M., in 1991. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement (PSA) incorporated in the judgment of divorce, plaintiff's
obligation to contribute towards support of each of the children shall continue . . . until said child has attained the age of [eighteen] or has graduated from high school, the latter being the controlling event. In the event that a child pursues a college education, then the issue of direct support shall be considered in conjunction with the contribution to be made towards the unsubsidized college education expenses.In July 2012, plaintiff moved pro se for an order declaring both children emancipated; he requested oral argument. Defendant filed no opposition.
Determining argument was "unnecessary," the Family Part judge entered an order declaring the parties' son emancipated. In a supplemental order dated August 28, 2013, the judge recalculated plaintiff's support obligations on behalf of R.M., having denied the request that she be declared emancipated.
Now represented by counsel, plaintiff filed another motion in July 2014 seeking a declaration that R.M. be declared emancipated effective January 2013, and crediting any overpayment of support against any arrearages. He requested oral argument if the motion was opposed.
Plaintiff certified that he was estranged from R.M. and was not aware if she was still in school as of January 2013. He acknowledged that R.M. attended Mercer County Community College (MCCC), at least until December 2012, but she had not been a full-time student. Plaintiff further certified that as of January 1, 2013, he was unaware if R.M. was still enrolled in school. In any event, plaintiff argued that had R.M. been a full-time student, she would have received an associate's degree by 2012, or, had she continued her education further, a bachelor's degree, no later than May 2014.
Defendant filed opposition, and a cross-motion seeking counsel fees; she, too, requested oral argument. Defendant certified that R.M. still attended MCCC, resided at home and was "completely dependent upon [defendant] for her major living expenses." Defendant further explained that R.M. had been diagnosed with cancer in Spring 2012, underwent successful treatment, but suffered psychological trauma as a result. Defendant asserted that "during all of her traumatic times, [R.M.] . . . continued to attend college," and plaintiff was fully aware of R.M.'s "academic and health status."
R.M. also filed a certification in which she stated that, despite knowing of the cancer diagnosis, plaintiff had distanced himself from her. She was financially dependent upon her mother and plaintiff's child support. She continued to be enrolled in MCCC throughout 2014 and anticipated starting the nursing "clinical program" in the fall. A transcript attached to the certification indicated that R.M. took a reduced class load in Fall 2012, which R.M. attributed to her illness. R.M. further acknowledged that she did not take "a full class load" in 2013 because she "was working in order to pay for school."
A letter from MCCC's director of nursing education explained that R.M. was enrolled in Fall 2014 classes, but taking only six credits. The director claimed that, because of other out-of-class requirements, R.M.'s schedule might nevertheless be considered "equivalent" to full-time. Plaintiff filed a reply certification, the contents of which we need not detail.
The judge did not entertain oral argument. She entered an order on August 29, 2014, denying plaintiff's motion without prejudice, and rejecting both parties' requests for counsel fees. In her written statement of reasons, the judge stated that oral argument was not needed "since there [was] no evidence beyond the motion papers themselves and the existing record necessary to a decision and any evidentiary deficiency as to any substantive issue cannot be cured at oral argument."
Recounting some of the parties' assertions in their respective certifications, the judge determined that "[R.M.'s] reduced course schedule . . . constitute[d] a medical hiatus" that warranted her remaining "unemancipated." The judge further wrote: "However[,] the Court recognizes that [R.M.] is [twenty-two] and the hiatus cannot create an open-ended burden for the [plaintiff]." Noting that R.M.'s anticipated graduation would be May 2016, and that defendant consented to R.M.'s emancipation at that time, the judge stated "regardless of graduation[,] [R.M.] shall be emancipated no later than May 2016."
In an amended order filed September 9, the judge essentially left unchanged her prior order and statement of reasons regarding emancipation. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff argues that the judge should have granted his request for oral argument, that a plenary hearing was necessary to resolve "disputed material issues," and that extending his child support obligations until May 2016, without compelling R.M.'s enrollment as a full-time student in the interim, was "clear error." Defendant counters by arguing there was no need for oral argument or for a plenary hearing because there were no disputed material facts, R.M. had not "left the sphere of influence of her custodial parent," and, hence, was not emancipated, and that the record clearly indicated R.M. was "enrolled in a full-time program of studies."
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We have said that "[n]o specific age equates to emancipation of a child[,]" and attainment of the age of eighteen is only prima facie "and not conclusive proof" of emancipation. Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90, 93 (App. Div. 2003) (citations omitted). The child's needs are determinative, and "enrollment in a full-time educational program" may compel continued support. Id. at 94. The fact that a child may "take a brief hiatus from educational pursuits," does not, in and of itself, demonstrate the child has "moved beyond the sphere of influence of her parents[,]" and hence has become emancipated. Keegan v. Keegan, 326 N.J. Super. 289, 295 (App. Div. 1999); see also Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2015) ("The presumption of emancipation may be overcome by evidence that a dependent relationship with the parents continues because of the needs of the child.").
Here, the judge determined that R.M.'s reduced class load was the result of a "medical hiatus," the temporary nature of which presumably compelled plaintiff's continued financial responsibilities. Plaintiff argues defendant produced no medical records or reports demonstrating R.M.'s reduced class load was the result of her medical treatment. More importantly, at argument before us, defense counsel acknowledged that defendant never asserted R.M.'s attendance at MCCC was interrupted by a medical hiatus. To the contrary, defendant asserted that R.M. was an active, full-time equivalent student, who remained financially dependent upon her mother and father.
Unfortunately, the judge did not address the broader issue of whether R.M. had moved beyond the sphere of parental influence, although that conclusion might be implicit from the order itself. Defendant certainly contends that because there was no material factual dispute regarding R.M.'s need for financial assistance, we should nonetheless affirm, regardless of the judge's expressed reasoning. See Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001) ("[A]ppeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."). We decline to do so on the record presented.
As we said in Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2010), a case cited by the judge as justifying the denial of both parties' request for oral argument, Rule 5:5-4 "has generally been interpreted to require oral argument 'when significant substantive issues are raised and argument is requested.'" Id. at 285 (quoting Mackowski v. Mackowski, 317 N.J. Super. 8, 14 (App.Div. 1998)). "The denial of oral argument when a motion has properly presented a substantive issue to the court for decision 'deprives litigants of an opportunity to present their case fully to a court.'" Ibid. (quoting Mackowski, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 14). We continued to recognize, however, that the judge is accorded the discretion to dispense with argument, "even in cases involving 'substantive' issues," based upon other factors, including the sufficiency of supporting facts in the record, or whether the motion itself is "deficient on its face." Id. at 285-86. We remain mindful of the significant number of motions faced by every judge assigned to the Family Part.
Here, the judge denied oral argument because the record was sufficient, i.e., "no evidence beyond the motion papers themselves and the existing record" was required. However, as noted, the judge misconstrued the essential argument made by defendant, concluding that R.M.'s education was interrupted by a medical hiatus, when none was asserted.
We therefore have no confidence in the conclusion that oral argument was unnecessary in order to provide plaintiff with a full and fair opportunity to present his request, and we choose not to consider the merits of plaintiff's contentions at this time, more than one year after the motion was made, see Keegan, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 296 (noting a declaration of emancipation must be based on the facts that then exist) (citing Sakovits v. Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 631 (Ch. Div. 1981)), and on this record. We also note that the judge did not consider what effect, if any, the PSA provisions had upon plaintiff's application.
We therefore reverse those provisions of the order that denied plaintiff's request to declare R.M. emancipated and to terminate plaintiff's child support. We hasten to add that we do not necessarily conclude that plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that discovery and a plenary hearing is required, see Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 217 (recognizing that although plenary hearing on an emancipation request may be typically required, it is only required when the submissions demonstrate a genuine and substantial factual dispute). Nor do we express any opinion on the ultimate merits of plaintiff's application.
Reversed and remanded. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION