Opinion
2:20-cv-01852-RMG-MGB
07-09-2021
Jerome Myers and Gloria Myers, Plaintiffs, v. Latoya Hobson; Bernice McClary, Personal Representative for Estate of Willie W.M. Myers; Caesar E. McKnight; Irvin Condon; Sandpiper Rehab & Nursing; Family Services, Inc., d/b/a Origin SC; Kyle T. Varner; Ittriss Jenkins; Betty Dorn; Active Day, Inc.; Walter R. Kaufmann; C. Mac Gibson; Joseph A. Broom; Kristi L. Harrington; Shelly K. All; and Dennis J. Christensen, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Siblings Jerome Myers (“J. Myers”) and Gloria Myers (“G. Myers”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, bring this civil action based on a series of probate disputes involving their late father, Henry Myers (“Mr. Myers”). Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the case and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without authorizing service of process.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the scope of this action is difficult to ascertain, as Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint encompasses over two hundred fifty pages of rambling, often incoherent, allegations and supplemental documents. (See Dkt. Nos. 6, 15, 15-1.) Based on the undersigned's review, however, this case appears to be the latest lawsuit in a fourteen-year probate dispute over Mr. Myers' guardianship, conservatorship, and, most recently, the administration of his estate. According to Plaintiffs, the dispute began in April 2007, when Willie W.M. Myers (“Mrs. Myers”), Mr. Myers' then-spouse, allegedly forged their father's signature on a durable power of attorney so that she could gain control of his finances. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 6-36.) According to Plaintiffs, Mrs. Myers' granddaughter, Latoya Hobson (“Hobson”), served as a witness to the document, and Mrs. Myers' attorney, Caesar E. McKnight (“McKnight”), served as the notary. (Id.) Although not entirely clear, it seems this event caused Plaintiffs to file a petition seeking a determination by the Charleston County Probate Court that their father required a guardian and conservator to manage his affairs. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 82.)
For purposes of this initial review, the Amended Complaint consists of Dkt. Nos. 6 and 15, in addition to any attachments thereto.
In an effort to better understand the context of Plaintiffs' extensive-often unintelligible-allegations, the undersigned carefully reviewed the records filed in Mr. Myers' various probate matters before the Charleston and Dorchester County Probate Courts, as well as those relevant state and federal actions involving the same. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those public records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
On November 8, 2007, Probate Judge Irvin G. Condon (“Judge Condon”) issued an order confirming that Mr. Myers was in fact incapacitated, such that he could no longer manage his property or financial affairs. (See Case No. 2007-GC-10-091 ; see also Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1-2.) More specifically, Judge Condon found that Mr. Myers did not have “sufficient understanding or capacity to make a will, to revoke his existing will or to make codicils to his existing will;” to “execute instruments;” or to “enter into contractual relationships.” (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1-4.) Judge Condon therefore appointed Mrs. Myers as Conservator of her husband's estate and Walter R. Kaufmann (“Kaufmann”) as his court-appointed Guardian. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1-8; see also Dkt. No. 6 at 37-81.) Mr. Myers was eventually placed in several assisted living facilities, the most recent being Sandpiper Rehab & Nursing (“Sandpiper”). (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 25-26.)
The undersigned was unable to locate this case in Charleston County's electronic probate records. Thus, any references thereto are based on documents and background provided in the instant action and/or in prior related lawsuits.
On January 22, 2009, the Charleston County Probate Court issued a consent order releasing Mrs. Myers as Conservator, and appointing Family Services, Inc. (“Family Services”) in her place. This same order authorized Mr. Myers to leave Sandpiper and return to his home, where Plaintiffs began serving as his primary caretakers. Shortly thereafter, Kaufmann informed the probate court that Plaintiffs were not cooperating with him, and that they had repeatedly tried to conceal information regarding their father's care from him. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 58.) What followed was a series of unsuccessful state and federal lawsuits through which Plaintiffs attempted to challenge their father's guardian and conservatorships and regain control over his affairs.
For reference, the undersigned obtained this information in the most recent estate action, Case No. 2016-ES-18-607, filed in the Dorchester County Probate Court. See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/ (search limited to “Dorchester Probate” records, entering Case No. “2016ES1800607” into the search bar upon selecting the appropriate county).
Indeed, on August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a federal action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina against Kaufmann; Kaufmann's associate, Joseph A. Broom (“Broom”); and the director of Active Day (Adult Day Care & Adult Day Programs), Betty Dorn (“Dorn”), seeking their father's “release and remov[al] from all court appointed Guardians, Guardians Ad Litem and Conservatorship (family service) by law section 62-5-306 and section 62-5-307.” (See Case No. 2:10-cv-02081-RMG-RSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiffs claimed that on June 17, 2010, Broom visited their father at Active Day pursuant to a letter that purported to give him authority to act as Mr. Myers' guardian in Kaufmann's stead. (Case No. 2081, Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Broom later drove Mr. Myers home and asked to see his living conditions, which Mr. Myers apparently allowed. Thus, the crux of Plaintiffs' federal action seemed to be that Broom, who was not Mr. Myers' court-appointed guardian, conducted an unauthorized visit, and that Dorn allowed Broom to drive their father home without consulting them.
The district court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' action for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction on October 25, 2010, finding that the “matters raised in the Complaint [fell] within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state probate court, ” and that Plaintiffs' demands to terminate the guardian and conservatorships ordered by said court were barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See Case No. 2081, Dkt. No. 17 at 2; see also Case No. 2081, Dkt. No. 12 at 14, describing Plaintiffs' lawsuit as a “purely probate matter.”) The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision on April 4, 2011. (See Case No. 2081, Dkt. Nos. 27, 31.)
On December 23, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a second federal action against McKnight, Mrs. Myers, and Hobson based on the allegedly fraudulent execution of Mr. Myers' power of attorney in April 2007. (See Case No. 2:10-cv-03259-RMG-RSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiffs also named their own attorneys-Dennis J. Christensen (“Christensen”) and Shelly K. All (“All”)-as defendants, claiming that they failed to adequately represent Plaintiffs in the underlying state probate proceedings. (Case No. 3259, Dkt. No. 1 at 5-8.) The district court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' action, once again finding that it lacked original federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims and reiterating that it could not entertain “a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state probate court.” (Case No. 3259, Dkt. No. 13.)
Notwithstanding the district court's dismissal of the aforementioned federal actions, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Charleston County Court of Commons Pleas on March 17, 2011, renewing the same allegations of fraud and forgery against McKnight, Hobson and Mrs. Myers. (See Case No. 2011-CP-10-2026.) The circuit court dismissed the action on November 6, 2012, finding that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims in South Carolina. See S.C. Code § 15-3-530 . The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision on June 1, 2016. (See App. Case No. 2013-371.)
See https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/publicindex/ (entering Case No. “2011CP1002026” into the search bar).
See https://ctrack.sccourts.org/public/caseSearch.do (entering Appellate Case No. “2013-000371” into the search bar).
On December 28, 2012, Plaintiffs filed yet another lawsuit in state court, this time against Kaufmann, Broom, and Dorn for negligence; kidnapping; stalking; “conspiracy against rights” under 18 U.S.C. § 241; violations of S.C. Code §§ 62-5-304, 62-5-308, and 62-1-106; and violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. (See Case 2012-CP-10-8423.) Plaintiffs claimed that Kaufmann violated their rights by failing to “keep up with the duties as a guardian” and permitting Broom to act as an appointed guardian without proper authorization from the probate court. Plaintiffs further alleged that Broom used the “illegal” appointment to force his way into Mr. Myers' home. On December 12, 2013, Circuit Court Judge Kristi Harrington (“Judge Harrington”) dismissed Plaintiffs' action, finding that they had failed to state a claim under South Carolina law because “[t]he Guardian acted pursuant to the powers granted by the Charleston County Probate Court and S.C. Code § 62-5-312.” (See Case No. 8423.) Plaintiffs appealed and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Harrington's decision on March 2, 2016. (See App. Case No. 2014-77.)
See https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/publicindex/ (entering Case No. “2012CP1008423” into the search bar).
See https://ctrack.sccourts.org/public/caseSearch.do (entering Appellate Case No. “2014-000077” into the search bar).
The focus of the probate dispute eventually shifted to matters of the estate following Mr. Myers' death in May 2013. Indeed, on June 20, 2013, Mrs. Myers filed a Rule to Show Cause against Plaintiffs, requesting that they be held in contempt of court for violating Judge Condon's previous orders regarding Mr. Myers' assets. (See Case No. 091.) More specifically, it appeared that Mr. Myers' three life insurance policies had been modified, such that Plaintiffs became the beneficiaries in place of Mrs. Myers, and that the modification occurred after Judge Condon's determination that Mr. Myers lacked the capacity to execute any such changes. Meanwhile, on July 1, 2013, Plaintiffs submitted an application for probate of their father's will and appointment as personal representatives of his estate. (See Case No. 2013-ES-10-973.)
For reference, the undersigned obtained this information in the most recent estate action, Case No. 2016-ES-18-607, filed in the Dorchester County Probate Court. See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/ (search limited to “Dorchester Probate” records, entering Case No. “2016ES1800607” into the search bar upon selecting the appropriate county).
See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/ (search limited to “Charleston Probate” records, entering Mr. Myers' first and last name into the search bar upon selecting the appropriate county).
After a hearing on the Rule to Show Cause, Judge Condon appointed a special administrator, Ittriss Jenkin (“Jenkins”), to investigate Mr. Myers' life insurance policies and whether the original beneficiary had been changed; he enjoined the parties from disposing of any property owned by Mr. Myers in the interim. At some point thereafter, Mr. Myers' probate dispute was transferred to the Georgetown County Probate Court and, later, to the Dorchester County Probate Court. (See Case No. 2016-ES-18-607.) After several continuances, a hearing on the Rule to Show Cause was finally held before the newly appointed Probate Judge Mary L. Blunt (“Judge Blunt”) on November 3, 2017. Jenkins confirmed that Mrs. Myers was the original beneficiary on Mr. Myers' three life insurance policies, and that she had been removed as the beneficiary on February 16, 2009, only several weeks after Mr. Myers returned home to live with Plaintiffs.
See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/ (search limited to “Dorchester Probate” records, entering Case No. “2016ES1800607” into the search bar upon selecting the appropriate county).
Accordingly, by order dated December 27, 2017, Judge Blunt found that Mrs. Myers was the proper beneficiary of Mr. Myers' life insurance policies, as she was the listed beneficiary at the time of Judge Condon's determination of incapacity. Judge Blunt then appointed Kyle T. Varner (“Varner”) as the new special administrator of Mr. Myers' estate and directed him to further investigate the changes to the life insurance policies and whether the new beneficiaries received any payments therefrom.
On June 27, 2019, Varner filed a Petition in Support of the Rule to Show Cause against Plaintiffs, confirming that the modifications to Mr. Myers' life insurance policies were not authorized by the probate court, and that G. Myers had in fact received proceeds from these policies, which should have been paid to the estate of Mrs. Myers. Varner also discovered that J. Myers had transferred the title to a vehicle-an asset of Mr. Myers' estate-to himself without any authorization. Thus, on July 20, 2020, Judge Blunt found Plaintiffs in contempt of court for violating the probate court's previous orders. She ordered that G. Myers issue payment to Mrs. Myers' estate for the life insurance proceeds she received within forty-five days, and that J. Myers produce his father's vehicle so that it could be sold at auction within that same time period.
Mrs. Myers died on April 13, 2016; accordingly, her daughter, Bernice McClary (“McClary”) was appointed as the personal representative of her estate. (See Case No. 607.)
It is against this backdrop that Plaintiffs now bring this federal action against a long list of Defendants for their respective roles in Mr. Myers' probate process. Shortly after filing their initial pleading on May 13, 2020 (Dkt. No. 1), Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint containing 152 pages of handwritten allegations for this Court's review. (Dkt. No. 6.) Upon reviewing their Amended Complaint, the undersigned issued a proper form order notifying Plaintiffs that their claims were subject to summary dismissal and giving them an opportunity to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing a second amended complaint with the Court. (Dkt. No. 12.) In response to the undersigned's instructions, Plaintiffs filed one hundred pages of supplemental documents, most of which are copies of filings from the initial guardianship/conservatorship action (Case No. 091), randomly interspersed with more handwritten allegations. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 15-1.) Although service has not been authorized, Plaintiffs have since filed two Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18) and a Motion for Service (Dkt. No. 19). Plaintiffs appear to seek monetary damages only.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that the plaintiff has standing, that federal jurisdiction exists, and that the case is not frivolous, even where the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020) (“It is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.”) (internal citations omitted); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (noting that the court must consider whether the complaint asserts a plainly meritless legal theory or alleges clearly unbelievable facts).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court must ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all civil actions). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As suggested above, the precise nature and limits of Plaintiffs' claims are difficult to ascertain due to the rambling and voluminous nature of their allegations-many of which are comprised of “buzzwords” and “legalistic gibberish.” Boston v. Stobbe, 586 F.Supp.2d 574, 581- 82 (D.S.C. 2008); Brantley v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 9:19-cv-0490-BHH, 2020 WL 1181309, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020); see also Hankins v. North Carolina, No. 7:18-cv-00061-D, 2018 WL 4576775, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 21, 2018) (noting that the court is not required to act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or parse through volumes of documents in search of viable claims) (referencing Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013)); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the undersigned has carefully combed through Plaintiffs' two-hundred-page Amended Complaint, as well as over a decade's worth of relevant judicial filings, in a serious effort to understand and consider their pro se claims. Based on this review, the undersigned liberally summarizes Plaintiffs' claims as follows:
• Fraud against Hobson, McKnight, and Mrs. Myers in relation to their execution of Mr. Myers' durable power of attorney and his conservatorship, among other things (Dkt. No. 6 at 5-36);
• Fraud and general judicial abuse against Judge Condon in relation to the incapacity determination and other rulings issued during the underlying probate proceedings (id. at 37-81);
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress and “civil rights” violations against Family Services and Sandpiper for their care of Mr. Myers and their handling of his funds from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (id. at 82-89);
• “Civil rights” violations against Special Administrators Jenkins and Varner for their roles in the administration of Mr. Myers' estate (id. at 90-98);
• Breach of contract, use of a fraudulent document, and kidnapping against Dorn and Active Day for allowing Broom to act as Mr. Myers' guardian and drive him home from the daycare facility without proper authorization (id. at 99-103);
• Negligence, fraud, evasion, unjust enrichment, and abuse of power against Kaufmann, Broom, and C.M. Gibson in relation to Mr. Myers' guardianship and the fees associated therewith, among other things (id. at 104-31; Dkt No. 15 at 1);
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress and general judicial abuse against Judge Harrington for her failure to accept certain exhibits in Case No. 8423 (Dkt. No. 6 at 132- 38); and
• Negligence, fraud, and “civil rights” violations against attorneys All and Christensen in relation to their representation of Plaintiffs in the underlying probate proceedings (id. at 139-51).
It appears C.M. Gibson was appointed as Mr. Myers' initial Guardian for a short period of time, although the specific details of this relationship are unclear.
In other words, this action ultimately boils down to Plaintiffs' cumulative frustrations with their father's probate process. For the reasons discussed below, however, these frustrations simply are not cognizable in federal court and Plaintiffs' action is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
I. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs fail to allege a basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint. There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his or her pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Rule 8(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction. . . .”
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Pursuant to this limited power, there are two primary bases for original federal jurisdiction: (1) “diversity of citizenship, ” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and (2) “federal question, ” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint appears to allege that both bases apply here. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 3, asserting diversity jurisdiction, and at 38, 83, 91, 100, 105, 133, 140, asserting federal question jurisdiction.)
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires that the plaintiff demonstrate complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). In the absence of diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy is irrelevant.
In attempting to invoke diversity jurisdiction here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Hobson is a citizen of Ohio, while Plaintiffs are citizens of South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) Plaintiffs' filings clearly show, however, that most of the remaining Defendants are also citizens of South Carolina. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2-3, 37, 82, 90, 99; 104-05, 132, 139.) Thus, as the undersigned explained in the previous proper form order, Plaintiffs have failed to plead complete diversity for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 2 n.2.) See, e.g., Atkins v. Andrews, No. 3:20-cv-3953-RBH-PJG, 2020 WL 8083697, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2020), adopted, 2021 WL 51401 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2021) (finding that parties were not completely diverse under § 1332 where information provided by South Carolina plaintiff suggested that defendants had South Carolina mailing addresses).
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To establish federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must assert a cause of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[T]he complaint must, however, contain allegations affirmatively and distinctly establishing federal grounds not in mere form, but in substance and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect.” Burgess v. Charlottesville Savings and Loan Assoc., 477 F.2d 40, 43 (4th Cir. 1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, the court “must look beyond the verbiage of a complaint to the substance of the plaintiff's grievance. . . . ” Id. Federal jurisdiction therefore requires “more than a simple allegation that jurisdiction exists or citation to a federal statute, and a mere allegation that a federal statute has been violated is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Brantley v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 9:19-cv-0490-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 8918793, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 1181309 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
Although Plaintiffs' allegations appear to be grounded in state law, the Amended Complaint contains several vague, isolated references to federal violations. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 6 at 91, asserting that Plaintiffs' “rights were violated” pursuant “Article III, Section 2, Article IV 2, ” and at 93, asserting that “defendant's conduct was oppressive and against [Plaintiffs'] civil rights.”) Beyond these general references, however, Plaintiffs offer no intelligible, substantive factual allegations that connect Defendants' conduct to federal law. And while the undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiffs that invoking federal question jurisdiction requires more than pleading unsupported, naked references to federal statutes and general “civil rights” violations (Dkt. No. 12 at 2-3), they have done exactly that. See, e.g., Rivers v. Goodstein, No. 2:18-cv-2032-RMG-MGB, 2018 WL 4658487, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4656239 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (explaining that the “mere recitation of inapplicable statutes in connection with patently frivolous claims” will not save pro se complaint from dismissal); Hamilton, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (finding no basis for federal question jurisdiction where complaint failed to allege sufficient facts in support of conclusory references to purported federal violations); Jones v. Cherry, No. 0:20-cv-3489-JFA-PJG, 2020 WL 7055562, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 7332876 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2020) (same). Therefore, the undersigned finds no basis for applying federal question jurisdiction in the instant case.
C. State Law Claims
If a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it shall also have supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). On the other hand, without original jurisdiction, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Id. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”). Given that Plaintiffs have failed to allege complete diversity of parties or a valid federal cause of action, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and, thus, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims.
II. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even if the Court could exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the undersigned finds that several of Plaintiffs' claims are still precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars a “party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” Am. Reliable Insurc. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see also Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional, it may be raised by the court sua sponte). This general rule “extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are ‘inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.'” See Boyd v. Simmons, No. 6:18-cv-576-BHH-JDA, 2018 WL 4999804, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4356579 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (referencing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)). An issue is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision “if in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
This doctrine derives from two United States Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Here, Plaintiffs ask that the Court award damages for certain Defendants' conduct during the course of their father's probate process. In order to grant this relief, however, the Court would necessarily have to conduct what amounts to an appellate review of specific issues already decided by a state court of competent jurisdiction, and override, or otherwise find invalid, determinations that shaped Mr. Myers' guardian and conservatorships. For example, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint once again challenges whether Judge Condon correctly determined that Mr. Myers lacked the capacity to handle his financial and personal affairs; whether Mrs. Myers fraudulently executed the durable power of attorney that triggered the probate proceedings; and whether Kaufmann violated his duties as Guardian. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 6 at 5-36, 99-131.) As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiffs, this is precisely the type of impermissible “appellate review” barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as the state probate and circuit courts already considered and ruled on these issues. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 3; see also Case Nos. -091, -2026, -8423, -973, -607.)
In fact, the federal district court also addressed many of these same issues in Case Nos. -2081 and -3259. It is well-settled that “district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits” and may dismiss such suits as frivolous. See Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 425 F.2d at 1296 (“The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.”) Thus, the undersigned notes that some of Plaintiffs' claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency within the federal court system.
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review judicial determinations rendered by state courts, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs' claims regarding the underlying probate and circuit court proceedings are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Allison, No. 2:12-cv-3375-CWH-BM, 2013 WL 706436, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 706416 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2013) (explaining that although complaint sought punitive damages for constitutional violations, plaintiff was in actuality asking the court to review probate court proceedings, such that ruling in his favor “would, necessarily, require this court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in the probate court”); Alford v. Mecklenburg Cty. Clerk of Superior Ct., No. 3:19-cv-156-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 2881556, at *5 (W.D. N.C. July 2, 2019) (finding plaintiff's action barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where complaint essentially asked the court to review state probate proceedings related to plaintiff's mother's estate); Donnelly v. Misiti, No. 8:19-cv-03291-BHH-JDA, 2019 WL 7938321, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 415898 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding that to the extent plaintiff sought to challenge the state probate court rulings, her remedy lied in the state appellate courts rather than the federal district court).
While the Amended Complaint appears to seek only monetary damages, the undersigned notes that Plaintiffs may have intended for some of their claims to ultimately redirect the administration of their father's estate. If that is the case here, any such claims are likewise barred by the “probate exception, ” which prohibits the exercise of federal jurisdiction over matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state probate court. More specifically, “the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate court.” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006); see also Beattie v. J.M. Tull Foundation, 941 F.Supp. 57, 58-59 (D.S.C. 1996) (explaining the probate exception divests federal court jurisdiction over “cases involving the probate of wills, disturbing the possession of an estate in the hands of a state probate court, or involving the conclusiveness of judgements of state courts in probate matters”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs are attempting to challenge the administration of their father's estate or void his original last will and testament, the probate exception likely precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Misiti, No. 8:19-cv-03291-BHH-JDA, 2019 WL 7938321, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 415898 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2020); Alford v. Mecklenburg Cty. Clerk of Superior Ct., No. 3:19-cv-156-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 2881556, at *5 (W.D. N.C. July 2, 2019).
III. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred Under the Younger Abstention Doctrine
In addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the undersigned finds that some of Plaintiffs' claims-particularly, those claims against Varner in relation to the administration of Mr. Myers' estate-may also trigger the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has since made clear, however, that the Younger abstention doctrine also applies “to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. VA., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (referencing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n, 457 U.S. at 432). In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiffs are clearly involved in the ongoing probate dispute before the Dorchester County Probate Court. (See Case No. 607.) Indeed, most recently, Varner filed a petition in Case No. 607 finding that Mr. Myers executed a valid last will and testament on or about March 14, 1997, in which he bequeathed “all personal property” to his wife. Varner also found, however, that on or about November 6, 2008, Mr. Myers executed another document that purported to bequeath his property to Plaintiffs; the petition therefore asks that the probate court find this subsequent document null and void on the grounds that Mr. Myers lacked the mental capacity to execute any testamentary documents and Plaintiffs exercised significant influence over him. It appears the petition is still pending.
Case No. “2016ES1800607” into the search bar upon selecting the appropriate county) (last visited July 7, 2021). See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/ (search limited to “Dorchester Probate” records, entering
The second criterion is also met, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that matters concerning the probate process implicate important state interests: “[T]he law of probate, trusts, and estates-allocating the personal property of citizens-remains an important interest of the states for Younger purposes.” Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Eveland v. Maryland, No. 1:16-cv-00762-CCB, 2016 WL 6780207, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2016), aff'd, 691 Fed.Appx. 111 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[r]esolution of state probate matters is a vital state interest”).
And finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiffs can address many of their claims in the pending proceedings before the probate court. Because this case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, the undersigned recommends that the Court abstain from considering Plaintiffs' claims regarding the administration of their father's estate and, relatedly, any determinations regarding his capacity to execute a last will and testament. Such claims are properly before the probate court and should be resolved by the same. See, e.g., Eveland, 2016 WL 6780207, at *2 (precluding review of challenged probate proceedings pursuant to Younger abstention doctrine); Caldwell, 2013 WL 706436, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2013) (same).
IV. Judges Condon and Harrington Are Entitled to Judicial Immunity
Notwithstanding this Court's lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims in the instant case, the undersigned notes that the Amended Complaint is also subject to dismissal with respect to Judges Condon and Harrington. It is well-settled that judges have absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Knight v. Episcopal Church of U.S., No. 2:10-cv-516-DCN-RSC, 2010 WL 2926156, at *5 (D.S.C. July 23, 2010) (noting that “judicial immunity applies to probate judges performing judicial acts”). Although Plaintiffs characterize the actions of these defendant-judges as unlawful, absolute immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, absolute judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 F. App'x. 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, Judges Condon and Harrington are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions while presiding over the underlying probate and circuit court disputes, and Plaintiffs' claims against them are subject to summary dismissal. See Knight, 2010 WL 2926156, at *4-5 (finding that Judge Condon was entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his rulings in a probate matter because such rulings constitute “normal judicial functions”); Addison v. Pearlman, No. 2:06-cv-3403-HFF-RSC, 2006 WL 3843616, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2006) (finding that judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity with respect to his judicial acts in probate court case involving plaintiff's estate).
V. Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and Service Are Likewise Subject to Summary Dismissal
As noted above, Plaintiffs recently filed two Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18) and a Motion for Service (Dkt. No. 19) on the grounds that Defendants have failed to respond to the allegations in the Amended Complaint. However, the undersigned has yet to authorize service of process on Defendants because this case is still in the initial review stage. See Local Civil Rule 72.03(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.) (permitting magistrate judges to conduct “all pretrial proceedings” involving litigation by individuals proceeding pro se). Thus, Plaintiffs' motions (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 19) are premature at this time and, in any case, moot in light of the undersigned's Report and Recommendation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice and without authorizing service of process. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court deny Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and Service (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 19) as moot.
Because Plaintiffs have already had an opportunity to amend their pleadings to correct the deficiencies discussed above, the undersigned also recommends that the Court dismiss this action without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint). “[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on the merits of the underlying claims.” See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Norton v. Columbus Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 736 Fed.Appx. 406, 407 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that a dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be issued without prejudice); Brown v. Sumter Cty., No. 1:20-cv-3076-MGL-SVH, 2020 WL 6384639, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2020) (noting that a dismissal based on the Younger abstention doctrine should be issued without prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).