Opinion
2012-07-18
Veronica MUSANTE, appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents.
Friedman Khafif & Sanchez, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Emil J. Sanchez of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow, Suzanne K. Colt, and Deborah Brenner of counsel), for respondents.
Friedman Khafif & Sanchez, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Emil J. Sanchez of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow, Suzanne K. Colt, and Deborah Brenner of counsel), for respondents.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera, J.), entered June 20, 2011, which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability finding the defendants 50% at fault and the plaintiff 50% at fault in the happening of the incident, and upon an order of the same court dated June 10, 2011, granting the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, is in favor of the defendants and against her, dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
To determine that a jury verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, the court must conclude that there is “simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented” ( Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party ( see Hammond v. Diaz, 82 A.D.3d 839, 918 N.Y.S.2d 550;Dublis v. Bosco, 71 A.D.3d 817, 895 N.Y.S.2d 847).
Based on the evidence presented at the trial, there was no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly have led the jury to rationally conclude that the defendants created or had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition that caused the plaintiff to fall ( see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145). A general awareness that water might be tracked into a building when it rains is insufficient to impute to the defendants constructive notice of the particular dangerous condition ( see Piacquadio v. Recine Realty Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 967, 622 N.Y.S.2d 493, 646 N.E.2d 795;Orlov v. BFP 245 Park Co., LLC, 84 A.D.3d 764, 922 N.Y.S.2d 479;Perlongo v. Park City 3 & 4 Apts., Inc., 31 A.D.3d 409, 818 N.Y.S.2d 158;Dubensky v. 2900 Westchester Co., LLC, 27 A.D.3d 514, 813 N.Y.S.2d 117;Yearwood v. Cushman & Wakefield, 294 A.D.2d 568, 742 N.Y.S.2d 661;Negron v. St. Patrick's Nursing Home, 248 A.D.2d 687, 671 N.Y.S.2d 275). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment in their favor as a matter of law.