Opinion
No. 05-19-01180-CR
08-03-2020
ROBERT LEE MURRAY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 219-83205-2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Reichek
Opinion by Justice Myers
A jury convicted appellant Robert Lee Murray, Jr. of aggravated robbery and the trial court assessed punishment at 75 years in prison. In two issues, appellant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence, and he argues the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt for the offense of aggravated robbery. We affirm.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The complainant in this case, Muhammad Karimov, worked with his father at a trucking company, but he also had a part-time business "on the side" buying and selling cellphones. In May of 2018, about a week before the robbery, he saw an advertisement on the website OfferUp, which Karimov described as a place where you could buy and sell things, about some iPhones for sale. Karimov responded to the offer. He and the seller, later identified as Victoria Boone, exchanged text messages, and Karimov agreed to buy five iPhones for $5,600. Karimov testified that Victoria initially wanted him to come to her location to do the exchange, which he found a little suspicious. They eventually agreed to meet at a McDonald's in Plano. Video from security cameras mounted inside and outside of the McDonald's captured the events that followed.
At trial, the State introduced and published to the jury nineteen separate security camera video clips from the McDonald's where the robbery occurred, and these clips were designated as States' exhibit 4. As initially filed in the appellate record, however, these nineteen clips had been merged into one continuous video feed. On February 26, 2020, the State sent a letter to the court reporter asking that the record be supplemented with State's exhibit 4 in the format that it was admitted at trial, and the State filed that same letter with this Court on February 27, 2020. On March 9, 2020, the court reporter filed the requested supplemental exhibit with this Court. In its brief, the State says the supplemental exhibit is consistent with its description of the exhibit at trial as "various clips of the surveillance video," and the State's presentation to the jury of separate video clips.
Karimov testified that he arrived at the McDonald's at 5:12 p.m. on May 25, 2018, and that he brought his cousin, Ahmadjon, to the meeting because they were "[u]nsure of what could happen." Karimov was wearing a yellow t-shirt and his cousin was wearing a blue and white striped t-shirt and a cap, but Karimov texted Victoria that he was wearing the striped t-shirt. This was another safety precaution, according to Karimov. Karimov's cousin suggested he tell Victoria that he was wearing the striped t-shirt so Victoria would approach Ahmadjon. His cousin was sitting at a separate table and Karimov could, as his cousin suggested, "sit aside and just watch us."
Karimov testified that, as shown in the security camera video, he saw a gold-colored Tahoe take a left turn and drive around the side of the building where the McDonald's was located, and he thought it was probably Victoria. On the security camera video, this vehicle can be seen backed into a parking space in the McDonald's parking lot, only a short distance from the restaurant. Karimov testified that, as shown again on the security camera video, Victoria got out of the Tahoe, walked toward the McDonald's while holding a baby in her arms, entered the McDonald's, and walked up to Karimov's cousin—still holding the baby. Karimov, who overheard the conversation, testified that Victoria told his cousin she did not want to bring all the phones inside because of her baby, and she asked him to follow her to her car. Karimov then walked over to his cousin's table and (as shown on the security camera video) sat down next to his cousin.
Karimov testified that his cousin told Victoria to bring the phones into the restaurant one at a time. Victoria did not want to do this, mentioning that she could hardly rob them because she was holding a baby. Victoria turned around and walked out the McDonald's. Karimov recalled that, before leaving the restaurant, his cousin turned to him and said he did not want to go through with the deal because it looked "shady," and Karimov said he, too, was nervous because the situation was "not feeling right." The security camera video shows Victoria leaving the McDonald's, walking back to the Tahoe, and opening the driver's side door. Karimov turned to his cousin and said, "Let's go." On the security camera video, the two of them can be seen leaving the restaurant. At that point, according to Karimov's testimony, they were going to leave without buying the phones.
Karimov testified that, as they were walking to his black SUV, parked "caddy-corner" from the Tahoe, Karimov looked across the parking lot and saw an older woman sitting in the driver's seat of the Tahoe. Victoria, who was sitting in the passenger seat, rolled down the Tahoe's front passenger-side window and called over to them, waving a box. Karimov then suggested to his cousin that they go ahead with the transaction. With Ahmadjon's agreement, he drove over and parked his SUV next to the Tahoe. The security camera video shows Karimov's black SUV driving over to the Tahoe and pulling into the space next to it. Karimov then got out of the driver's side of the SUV, reached towards the Tahoe, and stood next to it.
Karimov testified that the woman in the driver's seat, later identified as Linda Boone, Victoria's mother, asked for his car keys so he could not rob her "and take off." After Karimov handed over his car keys, he noticed the back seat of the Tahoe was missing and two men were "laying down" in the back. Karimov started getting nervous but he could not leave without his keys.
The security camera footage shows two people standing between the Tahoe and the SUV—Karimov and Victoria, according to Karimov's testimony. Karimov testified that Victoria handed him a box and that, as he removed the box's plastic wrapping, Victoria returned to the passenger side of the car. Karimov testified that he opened the box, only to find it was empty. As Karimov said to Victoria that the box was empty, an African America male got out of the back seat-area of the Tahoe, pointed a silver and black handgun at Karimov's face, and demanded Karimov give him all of his "shit" or he would shoot him. Karimov recalled he was "[t]errified" and "scared" during this moment, which he called the "worst moment of my life." The gunman then pointed the gun at Karimov's cousin, who was still sitting in the SUV. As shown in the security camera footage, Karimov took off running, followed by his cousin. Karimov testified that, as he ran away, he looked back but no else one got out of the Tahoe apart from the person who pointed the gun at him.
The gunman's identity is not discernable in the video.
The security camera footage shows the gunman using his left hand to open the rear driver's side door of Karimov's SUV. Karimov testified that the gunman took twenty-five to thirty new cellphones from the backseat of his SUV that he had bought earlier that day. According to Karimov, the gunman also reached into the front seat and took a pink wallet that belonged to Karimov's wife and four cellphones that belonged to him, his wife, and his cousin.
After the Tahoe drove away, the security camera video shows Karimov and his cousin running back to Karimov's SUV, and Karimov talking to someone on his cellphone. Karimov testified that he called 911, and that while he was speaking to the 911 operator, he searched Facebook using Victoria's cellphone number to see if he could identify her. He found a profile showing a picture of Victoria Boone and her baby, a picture of the driver of the Tahoe, and a picture of Victoria with an African American male. Karimov showed the Facebook pictures to the responding police officer, and Karimov told the officer that the man on Victoria's Facebook page was the gunman. However, the man Karimov identified was not the man on trial, a fact Karimov acknowledged during his testimony.
Plano Police Detective Jonathan Hay reviewed the social media information and gathered additional evidence. He also conducted surveillance on Victoria Boone's apartment at the 4100 block of South Cockrell Road and determined that Jesse Houston was a known associate of Boone's. He eventually identified three plausible suspects: Victoria Boone, Linda Boone, and Jesse Houston.
On May 31, 2018, six days after the offense, Victoria Boone, Linda Boone, and Jesse Houston were arrested. When Victoria was arrested, she was carrying a pink wallet that Karimov identified as belonging to his wife. Hay obtained a warrant to extract the contents of their cellphones and he interviewed each of them. Following these interviews, appellant Robert Murray became a suspect in the aggravated robbery.
Detective Hay also testified regarding text messages exchanged between Jesse Houston and Victoria Boone on May 25, 2018, the day of the robbery. That morning, Victoria (identified in the text messages as "Boston") asked Houston (identified as "Big Daddy Jesso") if he thought a person they identified as "Robert" was going to "jugg" in the daytime. "Jugg," according to the detective's testimony, referred to a property offense, either a theft or a robbery. Houston replied that "[h]e will," and he asked how the "play" was going to "go do[wn]." Houston and Victoria then exchanged a series of text messages about the planning of the robbery and pre-surveillance of the target and the location. Detective Hay testified that these text messages showed Houston and Victoria cooperating with one another and planning the robbery, and the text messages identified "Robert" as the person who would commit the robbery. After further investigation, Hay identified "Robert" as appellant, Robert Lee Murray, Jr., and obtained his cellphone number.
Review of appellant's cellphone records showed that, on May 19, 2018, six days before the robbery, the phone number associated with appellant, and identified on Houston's phone as "Rob," sent Houston a text message saying, "My new [b]itch[,] li[tt]l[e] bro! All we need is a [c]ouple [of] targets and it's over with!" Included with that text message was a picture of a silver over black semiautomatic handgun, and this was consistent, Hay testified, with Karimov's description that the gunman had wielded a silver and black handgun. Houston replied that that was "sweet," and he was "on it nw," meaning (according to Hay's testimony) "no worries." Using metadata embedded in the photo, Detective Hay determined that the picture of the silver and black handgun was taken on the same day appellant's phone sent the text message about needing "a [c]ouple [of] targets," and the GPS coordinates indicated the picture was taken in the same building where appellant's residence was located. This led Hay to conclude appellant produced the photo of the gun that was sent to Houston.
Four days later, on May 23, 2018, appellant texted Houston asking him if he could find some 9-millimeter bullets. Houston replied that his brother had "a full pack for sale." Appellant responded, "See will he front them to you until we hit the target," to which Houston texted, "Yea[h,] he['ll] probably give you[,] like[,] 12 of them." On May 25th, the day of the robbery, appellant's phone sent a text message to Houston's phone with the name, address, and zip code of appellant's apartment complex—located at the 700 block of North Joe Wilson Road, Cedar Hill, Texas 75104. Houston replied that he was on his way, and appellant texted, "Alght." At about 1:11 p.m., Houston texted that he was "[p]ulling [i]n n[o]w."
Detective Hay obtained a warrant for appellant's arrest for aggravated robbery and, after arresting appellant, interviewed him at the jail on June 21, 2018. This interview was recorded and a redacted version of it was published to the jury. During the interview, appellant gave his cellphone number, and this matched the phone number Hay had previously obtained. Appellant initially said he did not know why he was arrested, and that he did not remember the last time he had been in Plano. Asked if he was friends with "a guy named Jesse," appellant stated that he knew a "Jesse" who was friends with his brother, Marcus. Appellant denied knowing anyone named Victoria or Linda. Shown photos of Victoria Boone, Linda Boone, and Jesse Houston, appellant said that "Jesse" was the only one he had met.
Confronted with evidence showing his involvement in the aggravated robbery (e.g., text messages and metadata), appellant at first said he was paid to go with a group of people to Plano to sell some cellphones at a McDonald's. Later, however, appellant admitted it had been a robbery. When Detective Hay asked appellant about who approached him "to go do the lick" (street slang for a theft or a robbery, according to Hay's testimony), appellant said it was Jesse. According to appellant, Jesse told him it was a "cellphone lick." The plan was for them to pretend they were selling cellphones to some individuals and take their money or their phones. But appellant claimed it was Jesse that got out of the Tahoe, "reached in the dude's car," and grabbed the cellphones, after which they drove off. Appellant said he did not have a gun or own one, and he did not get out of the Tahoe. When Detective Hay confronted appellant with evidence he had sent Jesse a picture of a silver over black handgun, appellant claimed someone else sent him that picture and he merely forwarded it to Jesse.
Detective Hay used extraction software to copy the contents of appellant's cellphone, which was seized after appellant's interview, and Hay testified about three pictures found on the phone. Two of these pictures, taken on May 22, 2018, three days before the aggravated robbery, appear to show appellant holding a silver over black handgun. Hay testified that, in both pictures, the gun appears to be the same one photographed and sent by appellant to Jesse Houston prior to the robbery. In the third picture, taken on May 30th, appellant appears to be holding a handgun like the one in the previous two pictures. Detective Hay testified that Karimov's description of the weapon the gunman used was consistent with the gun shown in these pictures, and the photos contradicted appellant's claim that he did not have a gun.
Detective Hay also testified about some text messages exchanged between appellant's phone and the phone of his brother, Marcus, after the robbery but before appellant's police interview. A text message sent from appellant's phone to Marcus's phone on June 4, 2018, for example, says that "I got rid of it," but "our [c]ousin [K]ory has some heat." "Heat," according to Hay, "can be another term used for a firearm or a handgun." Another text message sent six minutes later says in part that "I [can] text [K]ory and see what he['s] got over there," and that "I felt the need to get rid of the other one, being that it was used in that situation." According to Hay, these messages showed appellant had disposed of the firearm used in the aggravated robbery.
The last witness called by the State was Melissa Nay, a criminalist with the Plano Police Department who conducted fingerprint comparisons in this case. Nay collected appellant's known prints and compared them with four latent prints that had been lifted by another criminalist, Heather Anderson, from the exterior door handle of the rear driver's side door of Karimov's SUV shortly after the offense. Nay testified that two of the latent prints were from the left thumb and left ring finger of appellant's left hand. One latent print was not of a high enough quality to do a comparison. The remaining print was not identified, but appellant, Jesse Houston, and Victoria Boone were excluded. Nay testified that her results had been verified by another criminalist, "R. Wilson."
The jury ultimately convicted appellant of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment. Following the presentation of punishment evidence, the trial court sentenced appellant to 75 years in prison.
The indictment included an enhancement paragraph alleging a prior aggravated robbery conviction, and appellant pleaded true to the enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. According to appellant, the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from his cellphone because Detective Hay conducted a warrantless search of appellant's phone without consent. Appellant points out that Hay did not get a search warrant before extracting the contents of appellant's phone, and he did not obtain the search warrant until after he had used the extraction software to make a copy of the contents of appellant's phone.
During the pretrial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Hay testified that, following appellant's June 21, 2018 interview, appellant's phone was seized and remained in police custody. Detective Hay intended to get a search warrant, but he was flying out of the country the following morning to go on vacation, so he used software to extract the contents of appellant's phone to preserve the evidence prior to obtaining a warrant. Hay testified that the data was extracted and saved, and that the data could not be seen unless the file system was accessed and an individual file clicked, opened, and viewed. Hay testified that he did not "search the evidence or the phone." When he returned from vacation, Hay obtained the warrant to search appellant's phone on July 3, 2018. The search warrant affidavit, according to Hay's testimony, was based on evidence gathered up to the point of appellant's arrest and statement—it was not based on the phone's contents. After obtaining the warrant, Detective Hay testified that he reviewed the previously extracted data and conducted an additional extraction of the contents of the phone using different software.
During his testimony at the suppression hearing, Detective Hay explained that there were risks associated with failing to preserve the evidence as soon as possible, including the possibility that if someone turned off the phone or the battery drained, the phone would automatically lock. If the passcode was not known, the data on the phone might be lost. Another possibility is that someone could remotely "wipe" the phone, "even though [the police] have safeguards, et cetera, to prevent that."
After listening to Detective Hay's testimony, the trial court denied appellant's suppression motion. The court did not make any findings of fact, and neither party requested them.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and uphold the ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of the law applicable to the case. Id.
The Texas exclusionary rule provides that no unlawfully obtained evidence shall be admitted in evidence against the accused. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the federal independent source doctrine applies under article 38.23(a) because it is consistent with the notion that evidence that fits within this doctrine was not "obtained" illegally, as the statute requires as a predicate to exclusion. See Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 68-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). "At its core, the independent source doctrine provides that evidence derived from or obtained from a lawful source, separate and apart from any illegal conduct by law enforcement, is not subject to exclusion." See Wehrenberg, 416 S.W.3d at 465 (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). In other words, "notwithstanding a prior instance of unlawful police conduct, evidence actually discovered and obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant is not subject to suppression, so long as the police would have sought the warrant regardless of any observations made during the illegal [conduct]." Id. at 465-66. "Thus, in determining whether challenged evidence is admissible under the independent source doctrine, the central question is 'whether the evidence at issue was obtained by independent legal means.'" Id. at 465 (quoting United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Appellant argues Detective Hay's actions were "inappropriate, unreasonable, lazy, and illegal," and that Hay could have prepared the search warrant prior to arresting appellant; could have stayed later that day to obtain the warrant; could have asked another detective to obtain the warrant; or he could have waited until he returned from vacation to extract the data from the phone. But regardless of whether Hay could have obtained a search warrant prior to extracting the phone's contents, his testimony shows he obtained that search warrant based on probable cause that was independent of the cellphone's contents, and that he did not review the data from the extraction until after he obtained the warrant. We conclude the search warrant in this case was valid because it was supported by probable cause independent of the cellphone's data extraction. See Lopez v. State, 512 S.W.3d 416, 423 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.) (assuming without deciding that officer's initial search without a search warrant of an iPod was illegal, the photographic evidence of naked children found on the iPod was admissible under independent source doctrine; warrant was later obtained based solely on statements from defendant's manager and supervisor, and not on anything acquired during the officer's initial search). We overrule appellant's first issue.
Appellant did not challenge the basis of probable cause in the search warrant at the suppression hearing, nor does he do so on appeal.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a factfinder could have found the essential elements of the charged offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The factfinder must resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). We presume the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also defer to the factfinder's evaluation of the credibility and weight of the evidence. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
As charged in this case, a person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, the person intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(2). A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and the State proves an aggravating factor. Sweed v. State, 351 S.W.3d 63, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In this case, the aggravating factor was the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(17)(A); 29.03(a)(2). The court's charge instructed the jury on the law of parties, and it authorized appellant's conviction as a party or as a primary actor.
Appellant argues there are "multiple issues" with the evidence presented by the State that raise reasonable doubt—i.e., the evidence on fingerprint analysis and identification, the security camera footage, and what appellant claims is a "[l]ack of corroborating evidence." Beginning with the fingerprint evidence, appellant argues that Melissa Nay could not identify how many "points of comparison" there were between appellant's thumbprint and the latent print. But Nay explained that points of comparison are no longer required by the International Association for Identification, of which she is a member, and that they look instead to "the overall print, not just the points of minutia." The jury was the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and it was free to believe or disbelieve all or part of Nay's testimony. See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Lancon v State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Appellant also complains that Nay never explained the methodology she used to compare the prints and verify that the prints from the SUV matched the prints from appellant. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, however, we consider the evidence admitted at trial—what was not in evidence is irrelevant to our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). And to the extent appellant is challenging the scientific reliability of Nay's conclusions, this claim was not developed at trial.
Appellant next attacks the McDonald's security camera video (State's exhibit 4), suggesting part of it may be missing. Appellant complains that at approximately 17:26:38, a second male is seen with Karimov beside Boone's vehicle, and "the surveillance video jumps from 17:26:16 to 17:26:38." This is a twenty-two second lapse during the time when the offense occurred, and after the person exited Boone's vehicle. Appellant asks: "What happened during those twenty-two seconds? This is the only period of time during the surveillance video that skips. It begs the question whether this surveillance video has been tampered with or altered."
Appellant's argument is based on State's exhibit 4 as it was originally filed in the appellate record, with the video clips merged into one video feed—an issue later resolved when the supplemental exhibit 4 was filed. That merged video feed shows a time lapse from 17:26:17 to 17:26:38, at the eleven-minute mark according to the media player. However, the State never argued, either at trial or on appeal, that the security camera video offered a continuous and uninterrupted point of view. There are different camera angles that show what happened, and the State explained at trial that it would be playing "various clips of the surveillance video." This is all the record shows. Indeed, review of the separate video clips in the supplemental exhibit 4 shows that video clip 15 ends at time stamp 17:26:17, and video clip 16 begins at time stamp 17:26:38. A similar issue is found at the one minute, fifteen-second mark into State's exhibit 4 as originally filed. The merged video feed skips from 17:10:46 to 17:11:12, a difference of twenty-six seconds, but review of the video clips shows that video clip number 3 ends at 17:10:46, and video clip 4 begins at 17:11:12. Thus, the record offers no support for appellant's assertion that the twenty-two second lapse "is the only period of time during the surveillance video that skips," nor for his insinuation that the security camera video may have been "tampered with or altered."
Furthermore, because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we are not permitted to use a "divide and conquer" strategy for evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Instead, we consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Id. "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Viewed in its proper context, the security camera video corroborates Karimov's testimony about what happened. Regarding appellant's suggestion that there may have been a second person outside the vehicle during that twenty-two second lapse, Karimov testified that only one person got out of the vehicle, and that was person who pointed the gun at him. The jury, as the trier of fact, was responsible for deciding whether to believe or disbelieve Karimov's testimony, and for resolving any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. See Bradley v. State, 35 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd).
We reach a similar conclusion regarding appellant's contention that there is a "[l]ack of corroborating evidence." Appellant points to the fact that there were three alleged co-defendants, and the State did not call any of them to testify against appellant. But appellant raised this issue at trial, arguing to the jury that Victoria Boone was the "mastermind" behind the robbery. As defense counsel stated during his closing argument: "But what do we know about the plan from those texts? We know that Victoria Boone, who you haven't gotten to meet because she's not here in this courtroom today, Victoria Boone started the whole thing." Based on its verdict, the jury was not persuaded by appellant's argument, and it presumably found the testimony of the State's witnesses to be credible. After reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and giving due deference to the jury's weight and credibility determinations, we conclude that, on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746. We overrule appellant's second issue.
Appellant also argues "this was not a reasonable jury," pointing to the fact that it deliberated for thirty minutes before returning a verdict. But there is nothing in the record to suggest the jurors did not follow the court's instructions or properly discharge their duties. Moreover, "[n]o statute, rule, or case law requires a jury to spend a certain amount of time deliberating before returning a verdict." See Torres v. State, 424 S.W.3d 245, 261 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2014, pet. ref'd) (jury deliberating for ten minutes before returning guilty verdict, by itself, did not show jury misconduct warranting new trial on charge for aggravated sexual assault of a child).
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
191180F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 219-83205-2019.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. Justices Partida-Kipness and Reichek participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 3rd day of August, 2020.