Murray v. Cab Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Baker Getty Fin. Serv., Inc.

    93 B.R. 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)   Cited 7 times

    However, the Court notes that Ohio law allows the use of agency by estoppel to establish a master/servant relationship both in the absence of an actual employment relationship and in order to determine whether such a relationship exists at all. Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 299, 126 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1955); Murray v. Hills Cab Co., 119 Ohio App. 211, 215, 198 N.E.2d 466, 469 (1963); Luken v. Buckeye Parking Corp., 77 Ohio App. 451, 68 N.E.2d 217 (1945). The relevant inquiry is whether the employer took any actions from which a third party could reasonably conclude that Cordek was an employee of BGS. Blackwell v. UAW, 9 Ohio App.3d 179, 181, 458 N.E.2d 1272, 1275 (1983).

  2. Szymczak v. Midwest Premium Finance Co.

    19 Ohio App. 3d 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 16 times

    "* * * [W]here a person, by acts or conduct, has caused or permitted another to appear to be his agent, he will be estopped to deny the agency with respect to third persons who deal with the apparent agent in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence. See Combs v. Kobacker Stores Inc. (1953), 65 Ohio Law Abs. 326; Murray v. Hills Cab Co. (1963), 119 Ohio App. 211 [27 O.O.2d 62]; and Rubbo v. The Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178 [20 O.O. 233]." Agosto v. Leisure World Travel, Inc. (1973), 36 Ohio App.2d 213, 216-217 [65 O.O. 339].

  3. Agosto v. Leisure World

    36 Ohio App. 2d 213 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 16 times

    Thus, where a person, by acts or conduct, has caused or permitted another to appear to be his agent, he will be estopped to deny the agency with respect to third persons who deal with the apparent agent in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence. See Combs v. Kobacker Stores Inc. (1953), 65 Ohio Law Abs. 326; Murray v. Hills Cab Co. (1963), 119 Ohio App. 211; and Rubbo v. The Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178. This principle is particularly applicable where one by license permits another to use his business or trade name. Obviously, the value of the use of the business or trade name is founded upon the reliance of the public upon the business or trade name, and the advertising promoting the product or service bearing the trade name.

  4. Faltysek v. Kloepfer

    279 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)   Cited 6 times
    In Faltysek v. Kloepfer (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 8, 279 N.E.2d 105, this court held that the Illinois statute "manifest[s] a legislative intent that as to a motor vehicle used in transporting passengers for hire, the owner shall insure himself and any person who operates the vehicle with his express or implied permission against any injury negligently caused a member of the public."

    This the appellant should not be allowed to do. From appellant's testimony as an adverse witness, it was proved that he was the licensed owner of the taxicab which injured the appellee; and that the vehicle was being driven by Bingham with appellant's consent. Under these circumstances, appellant is estopped from denying that Bingham was his agent. (See Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co. (1933), 62 App.D.C. 201, 65 F.2d 834; Murray v. Hills Cab Co. (1963), 119 Ohio App. 211, 198 N.E.2d 466; Anno. 8 A.L.R.3d 818, 828-830 (1966).) Therefore, the findings and conclusion of the trial judge were correct. The judgment is affirmed.