Murray v. Banning

5 Citing cases

  1. Grobe v. Valley Garbage Service

    87 Wn. 2d 217 (Wash. 1976)   Cited 37 times

    — hardly an excessive speed — she would have traveled 10.3 of the 12 to 13 feet in 1 second, and considering plaintiff's entitlement to reaction time as later discussed, the collision could not have been avoided. See Murray v. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 6, 134 P.2d 715 (1943); Am.Jur.2d Desk Book, Doc. 176, at 456 (1962). [2] As stated in White v. Greyhound Corp., 46 Wn.2d 260, 264, 280 P.2d 670 (1955):

  2. Tobias v. Rainwater

    71 Wn. 2d 845 (Wash. 1967)   Cited 22 times
    In Tobias it is pointed out that excessive speed on the part of the favored driver is not in itself sufficient to justify the submission of the issue of deception to the jury.

    But the duty resting on the disfavored driver is mandatory, Hefner v. Pattee, 1 Wn.2d 607, 96 P.2d 583 (1939); Miller v. Asbury, 13 Wn.2d 533, 125 P.2d 652 (1942). [A] favored driver who has done nothing to confuse or deceive a disfavored driver is entitled to assume that the latter will yield the right of way. Breithaupt v. Martin, 153 Wn. 192, 279 P. 568; Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P.2d 791; Murray v. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 134 P.2d 715; Bleiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn.2d 368, 161 P.2d 145; Anderson v. Kurrell, 28 Wn.2d 227, 182 P.2d 1. The favored driver may rely upon this assumption until he becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, that the right of way will not be yielded. Stokoe v. Paulson, 168 Wn. 1, 10 P.2d 247; Ellestad v. Leonard, 18 Wn.2d 118, 138 P.2d 200. Massengale v. Svangren, 41 Wn.2d 758, 760, 252 P.2d 317 (1953). See, also, Ward v. Zeugner, 64 Wn.2d 570, 392 P.2d 811 (1964), and Archibald v. Gossard, 65 Wn.2d 486, 397 P.2d 851 (1965).

  3. Sebastian v. Rayment

    254 P.2d 456 (Wash. 1953)   Cited 3 times

    "Every driver has the right to assume that other users of the highway will obey the traffic laws and rules of the road. Accordingly, we have frequently held that a favored driver who has done nothing to confuse or deceive a disfavored driver is entitled to assume that the latter will yield the right of way. Breithaupt v. Martin, 153 Wn. 192, 279 P. 568; Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P.2d 791; Murray v. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 134 P.2d 715; Bleiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn.2d 368, 161 P.2d 145; Anderson v. Kurrell, 28 Wn.2d 227, 182 P.2d 1. The favored driver may rely upon this assumption until he becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, that the right of way will not be yielded. Stokoe v. Paulson, 168 Wn. 1, 10 P.2d 247; Ellestad v. Leonard, 18 Wn.2d 118, 138 P.2d 200. "Under the established facts of this case, the two vehicles were about equidistant from the intersection as they approached at a speed of approximately thirty miles an hour.

  4. Massengale v. Svangren

    252 P.2d 317 (Wash. 1953)   Cited 18 times

    [1] Every driver has the right to assume that other users of the highway will obey the traffic laws and rules of the road. Accordingly, we have frequently held that a favored driver who has done nothing to confuse or deceive a disfavored driver is entitled to assume that the latter will yield the right of way. Breithaupt v. Martin, 153 Wn. 192, 279 P. 568; Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P.2d 791; Murray v. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 134 P.2d 715; Bleiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn.2d 368, 161 P.2d 145; Anderson v. Kurrell, 28 Wn.2d 227, 182 P.2d 1. The favored driver may rely upon this assumption until he becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, that the right of way will not be yielded. Stokoe v. Paulson, 168 Wn. 1, 10 P.2d 247; Ellestad v. Leonard, 18 Wn.2d 118, 138 P.2d 200. Under the established facts of this case, the two vehicles were about equidistant from the intersection as they approached at a speed of approximately thirty miles an hour.

  5. Kaan v. Kuhn

    187 P.2d 138 (Wyo. 1947)   Cited 6 times
    In Kaan v. Kuhn, 64 Wy 158, 187 P.2d 138, the court said that it was "common knowledge that at least half a second after danger appears is required for the average motorist to transfer his foot from accelerator throttle to brake.

    " See also Murray vs. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 134 P.2d 715; Thomasson vs. Henwood, 235 Mo. App. 1211, 146 S.W.2d 88; Berton vs. Cochran, ___ Cal.App. ___, 185 P.2d 349. The outcome of the matter demonstrated that both cars were moving too rapidly for the drivers thereof to have that control over their vehicles demanded by the condition of the road. Plaintiff's daughter testified as to that condition: "ruts in the road all over, bad road".