The proper procedural mechanism for interposing the defense of transaction or compromise is the peremptory exception of res judicata. Rivett v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 508 So.2d 1356 (La. 1987); Murphy v. Hoffpauir, 540 So.2d 573 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, a motion for summary judgment can be granted based on a finding of res judicata when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
The denial of a motion for summary judgment is merely an interlocutory ruling that does not bar reconsideration of the same issues raised in the unsuccessful motion. See State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of Risk Management v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 2010–0689 (La.App.1st Cir.2/11/11), 56 So.3d 1236, footnote 7,writ denied,2011–0849 (La.6/3/11), 63 So.3d 1023;McIntyre v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff, 2002–0700 (La.App.1st Cir.3/28/03), 844 So.2d 304;Murphy v. Hoffpauir, 540 So.2d 573 (La.App. 3d Cir.1989), writ denied,544 So.2d 406 (La.1989). The denial of summary judgment did not produce any ruling on the issue of whether this matter belongs in workers' compensation or tort that would constitute law of the case and did not preclude Shady Lake from raising the issue again before the trial court.
The defense of compromise or transaction may be properly raised through the peremptory exception of res judicata. Murphy v. Hoffpauir, 540 So.2d 573 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), writ den., 544 So.2d 406 (La. 1989); Boudreaux v. Leblanc, 517 So.2d 911 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987), and cases cited therein. The check given to defendant by plaintiff stated on its face that it was in payment for a death benefit, that it was for the claim of Jackson, and that the insured was Norwood.
Where literate and intelligent persons execute a release that is clear and unambiguous, they may not later have that release nullified, absent fraud, duress or error. Failure to read a release is neither an acceptable defense nor a reasonable excuse. Murphy v. Hoffpauir, 540 So.2d 573 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1989), writ denied, 544 So.2d 406. A person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot avoid its obligations by contending that it was not explained or that he did not understand it. Smith v. Leger, 439 So.2d 1203 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983). Ms. Shepherd relies on Wise, supra, Moak v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So.2d 911 (1961) and Mooneyhan v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 290 So.2d 405 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1974), cases in which general releases were set aside because the circumstances indicated that the plaintiffs had not intended to fully settle their claims.