Murphy v. City of Chicago

Full title: PATRICK MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: May 26, 2004

No. 02 C 7261 (N.D. Ill. May. 26, 2004)

Opinion

No. 02 C 7261.

May 26, 2004

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES NORGLE, District Judge

One October 9, 2002, Plaintiff, Patrick Murphy ("Murphy"), filed a one-count complaint against Defendant, City of Chicago ("City"), alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, Murphy alleges that the City failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 1993, Murphy was hired by the City as a seasonally-employed cement mixer in the Department of Transportation. The duties of a cement mixer included the following: shoveling material into a cement mixer, operating a jackhammer, lifting and emptying heavy bags of cement into wheelbarrows, operating the levers to run a cement mixer, sweeping and cleaning streets, building forms, filling out paperwork, and forming and grading concrete. The ability to perform strenuous physical labor was an essential function of the cement mixer position.

In September 2000, Murphy was diagnosed as having cardiomyopathy, which is a heart disease that results in a weakening of the heart. One of his treating physicians described Murphy's cardiomyopathy as moderate. Murphy has not had any major complications resulting from his cardiomyopathy, his prognosis is good and his condition is stable. While his cardiomyopathy limits his ability to perform strenuous activities, he is able to lead a normal life.

Murphy informed the City of his cardiomyopathy and requested a three-month medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., which the City granted. Murphy requested subsequent leaves of absence, which the City also granted. In addition, Murphy submitted a request for a reasonable accommodation along with a physician's note indicating that he could only perform light-duty positions. The City responded to his request, stating that no light-duty positions existed for the cement mixer position.

From September 2000 to date, Murphy remains unable to perform strenuous physical labor and cannot perform the essential functions of the cement mixer position, with or without accommodation.

The City has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that Murphy is not a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the ADA. The motion is fully briefed and before the court. The court will address the limited issue of whether Murphy is a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the ADA.

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

A. Summary Judgment

A grant of summary judgment is permissible when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court views the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P.56(c); see also Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1995). The court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, and the substantive law, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. See Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)); 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2712, at 574-78 (2d ed. 1983)).

B. Americans with Disabilities Act

Under the substantive law, the ADA forbids employers to discriminate against any "qualified individual with a disability because of the disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Byrne v. Avon Products, Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether he is a "qualified individual" under the ADA. See E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2001); Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998).

III. ANALYSIS

Murphy admits that he cannot perform the essential functions of the employment position, either with or without reasonable accommodation. See Def.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Statement, ¶ 62 ("From September 2000 to date, Murphy could not perform the physically strenuous duties required of his job as a cement mixer, with or without an accommodation." (citing Murphy Dep. at 164; Dr. Shaik Dep. at 49-50)); Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) Response, ¶ 62 ("Admit."). Thus, Murphy is not a "qualified individual" as defined by the ADA. "An inability to do the job's essential tasks means that one is not `qualified'; it does not mean that the employer must excuse the inability." Byrne v. Avon Products, Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003). "The rather common-sense idea is that if one is not able to be at work, one cannot be a qualified individual." Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1999).

Despite this admission, Murphy argues that he is a "qualified individual" because he could perform a few of the duties of the cement mixer position, including: sweeping, filling out paperwork, hanging signs and any other non-strenuous activities. However, the issue is not whether Murphy can perform a few of the duties of the cement mixer position; rather, the issue is whether Murphy can perform the "essential duties" of the cement mixer position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that "a disabled employee will not be qualified for the position unless he can perform enough of these duties to enable a judgment that he can perform its essential duties" (emphasis in original)). As the Seventh Circuit has stated:

If it is reasonable for a farmer to require each of his farmhands to be able to drive a tractor, clean out the stables, bale the hay, and watch the sheep, a farmhand incapable of performing any of these tasks except the lightest one (watching the sheep) is not able to perform the essential duties of his position.

Miller, 107 F.3d at 485. The same logic applies to Murphy, who cannot shovel material into a cement mixer, operate a jackhammer, operate the levers to run a cement mixer, lift and empty heavy bags of cement into wheelbarrows, and the like. While Murphy is able to sweep, fill out paperwork and hang signs, these are not the essential duties of the cement mixer position.

Therefore, because Murphy cannot perform the essential functions of his employment position, either with or without reasonable accommodation, the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Based on this holding, the court need not address the City's alternative arguments in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.