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Murphy v. JP Morgan Chase

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Apr 8, 2015
No. 2:15-cv-00725-KJM-GGH (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015)

Opinion

No. 2:15-cv-00725-KJM-GGH

04-08-2015

TONYA MURPHY and SAMUEL SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. JP MORGAN CHASE; VANZETTI PROPERTY; NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING LP, Defendants.


ORDER

On April 6, 2015, plaintiffs Tonya Murphy and Samuel Smith, appearing without counsel, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 10. Their motion also requests a temporary restraining order (TRO). See id. at 1, 8. The analysis applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions is "substantially identical." Stuhlbarg Int'l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the plaintiffs' motion does not meet the applicable standard, it is denied without prejudice.

Elsewhere plaintiffs refer to Ms. Murphy as Tonya Smith-Murphy. Compare, e.g., First Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 9 with Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1, ECF No. 10.

First, the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California impose certain requirements on litigants who seek TROs:

No hearing on a temporary restraining order will normally be set unless the following documents are provided to the Court and, unless impossible under the circumstances, to the affected parties or their counsel:



(1) a complaint;



(2) a motion for temporary restraining order;



(3) a brief on all relevant legal issues presented by the motion;



(4) an affidavit in support of the existence of an irreparable injury;



(5) an affidavit detailing the notice or efforts to effect notice to the affected parties or counsel or showing good cause why notice should not be given, . . . ;



(6) a proposed temporary restraining order with a provision for a bond . . . ;



(7) a proposed order with blanks for fixing the time and date for hearing a motion for preliminary injunction, the date for the filing of responsive papers, the amount of the bond, if any, and the date and hour of issuance . . . ; and



(8) in all instances in which a temporary restraining order is requested ex parte, the proposed order shall further notify the affected party of the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on two (2) days' notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow.

E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(c). The plaintiffs' motion omits several of these documents. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as those represented by a lawyer. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 183(a). Nevertheless, by long tradition, federal courts may afford unrepresented litigants leniency in their filings. Cf., e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1974); Forte v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 11-00318, 2014 WL 4745923, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014). The court therefore considers the merits of plaintiffs' motion, but cautions that any future motions must comply with the Local Rules.

A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing "that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm "just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer." Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, a court applies the factors that guide the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief, see Stuhlbarg, 240 F.3d at 839 n.7: whether the moving party (1) "is likely to succeed on the merits," (2) "likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief," (3) "the balance of equities tips in [its] favor," and (4) "an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Here, the plaintiffs argue the defendants' liability stems from the wrongful foreclosure sale of real property located at 929 Bess Place in Stockton, California. See Mot. 2-3, 5-6. They have attached documents to show a trustee's sale is complete and the purchasers intend to take possession of the property. Id. Exs. 3, 5. They allege the defendants have "attempt[ed] to take property that is not legal[ly] theirs," and they seek to halt other lawsuits. Id. at 8.

The court admits its difficulty understanding the plaintiffs' legal arguments. The plaintiffs' motion and supporting documents do not clearly describe their claims or show their likely success. The motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice. This order resolves ECF No. 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: April 8, 2015.

/s/_________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


Summaries of

Murphy v. JP Morgan Chase

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Apr 8, 2015
No. 2:15-cv-00725-KJM-GGH (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015)
Case details for

Murphy v. JP Morgan Chase

Case Details

Full title:TONYA MURPHY and SAMUEL SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. JP MORGAN CHASE; VANZETTI…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Apr 8, 2015

Citations

No. 2:15-cv-00725-KJM-GGH (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015)