Murphy v. Bd. of Pension Trustees

26 Citing cases

  1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillaspie

    668 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995)   Cited 10 times
    Construing Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902(b), which defines underinsured motor vehicle as having liability coverage less than claimant's UM/UIM coverage

    According to the Court, that interpretation of § 3902(b) was based under Georgeopoulos upon accepted principles of statutory construction. Thomas, supra at 24 (citing Murphy v. Bd. of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krongold, Del.Supr., 318 A.2d 606, 609 (1974)). In Murphy, the Supreme Court held that a court is obligated, under settled rules of construction, to read a statute as a whole and to harmonize the parts by finding the legislative intention and giving effect to it.

  2. Division of Family Services v. Paddington

    822 A.2d 398 (Del. Fam. 2003)   Cited 1 times

    A fundamental rule of statutory construction when faced with an ambiguous statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent by looking to the statute as a whole and seeking to harmonize the provision in question within other parts or sections of the statute. See, Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1245-1246 (Del. 1985); Murphy v. Bd. of Pension Trs., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (Del. 1982); Hedrick v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 807 A.2d 584, 589 (Del.Super.Ct. 2002). Faced with two possible interpretations of a statute, one of which would lead to an unreasonable result, the Court should reject that interpretation in favor of the other construction which produces a reasonable result.

  3. Suburban Trust and Sav. v. University of Delaware

    910 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1995)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that a "material connection" was "clearly present here because defendant is incorporated in Delaware"

    In considering whether to apply section 1-102 as the Bank indicates, the Court is obligated, under settled principles of Delaware law, to read the Commercial Code as a whole and harmonize the parts thereof. Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, 442 A.2d 950, 951 (Del. 1982). Here, the two provisions differ in their applicability: Section 1-102 is general and applicable to an infinite number of potential commercial agreements under all of the Articles of the Code; section 9-318(1) is specifically geared toward a limited group of contracting parties, i.e., account debtors whose status has arisen pursuant to a sales agreement governed by section 9-206, who have agreed to waive certain defenses.

  4. Johnson v. Physicians Anesthesia Serv.

    621 F. Supp. 908 (D. Del. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    In Johnson, the court squarely addresses the issue of whether an administrator could properly bring an action under Delaware's revised Wrongful Death Statute.

    The Court's duty in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute itself. Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, 442 A.2d 950 (Del. 1982); Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982).There is a presumption that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable, absurd or unworkable result when enacting a statute, and if the object sought to be attained or general intent underlying statutory language can be ascertained from the statute as a whole, it will be given effect by the Court. Opinion of the Justices, 295 A.2d 718 (Del. 1972); E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Clark, 32 Del. Ch. 527, 88 A.2d 436 (1952).

  5. Brady v. White

    C.A. No. 04C-09-262-FSS (Del. Sep. 27, 2006)

    Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). See also Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, 442 A.2d 950, 951 (Del. 1982); A P Stores v. Hannigan, 367 A.2d 641, 643 (Del 1976).Id.

  6. Snell v. Engineered Systems Designs, Inc.

    669 A.2d 13 (Del. 1995)   Cited 25 times
    Finding that Delaware has a "strong judicial tradition" that supports the constitutionality of legislation

    Thus, we find that the statute will be violated only if there is proof that the use of "engineered" in defendant's trade name would lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant is holding itself out as engaging in the practice of engineering. See Daniels v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 1104, 1110 (1988) (allowing Court to read statute so as to conform to intent of legislature); Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982) (noting that it is the Court's duty to construe a statute to conform with legislative intent); C. v. C., Del.Supr., 320 A.2d 717, 722 (1974) (holding that the Court should adopt any reasonable construction of a statute to avoid absurd or unworkable results); X-Citement Video, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 472 (Court must "read the statute to eliminate . . . doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of [the legislature]"). See also Streett v. State, Del.Supr., 669 A.2d 9, 13, Berger, J. (1995). If the statute were construed to provide that any person's belief that ESD's use of "engineered" is misleading, no matter how irrational or unreasonable that belief may be, the statute could run afoul of the First Amendment.

  7. Valerius v. State

    574 A.2d 855 (Del. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    So read, the Act may only be construed as barring Valerius from seeking restoration of his driving privileges prior to expiration of his five-year period of revocation. See Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985); Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982). * * *

  8. Home Ins. Co. v. Maldonado

    515 A.2d 690 (Del. 1986)   Cited 31 times
    Recounting the Delaware Supreme Court's unwillingness to declare the first version of our state's uninsured motor vehicle law "absurd" even though the court considered the result of its clear statutory language — that an injured person was in a better position when harmed by an uninsured driver than by a driver carrying the statutory minimal level of insurance — "illogical and unfair" and "poor public policy"

    Thus, our duty in construing section 3902 is to find the legislative intention and give effect to it. Murphy v. Board of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982); Clark, supra. Given the legislative history of section 3902 and the enactment of the 1982 amendments in response to Hallowell, supra, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to equate the statutory provisions controlling uninsured motorist coverage, including subrogation limits, with the statutory provisions governing underinsured motorist coverage.

  9. Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus

    492 A.2d 1242 (Del. 1985)   Cited 187 times
    Rejecting a literal construction of the Coastal Zone Act, which was enacted to "protect the natural environment of [Delaware's] bay and coastal areas" by regulating bulk transfer facilities on the waterways, but would have produced the "irrational and absurd result of prohibiting only those facilities for the transfer of substances from vessel to an onshore facility or vice versa, regardless of the potential threat of pollution and industrialization to the Delaware Coast"

    Consequently, each part or section should be read in light of every other part or section to produce an harmonious whole. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975), Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 350 U.S. 270, 76 S.Ct. 349, 359, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956), Murphy v.Board of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982). To apply a statute the fundamental rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.

  10. Mary A. O. v. John J. O

    471 A.2d 993 (Del. 1983)   Cited 8 times

    Hence, this Court is obligated to read § 960 as a whole and to harmonize its parts. Murphy v. Bd. of Pension Trustees, Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 950, 951 (1982). Applying these settled rules of construction, we find § 960 plainly articulates two procedural requirements for taking an appeal to Superior Court: (1) filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the disposition below; and (2) giving a bond in the amount determined by the Family Court.