Opinion
8:22-cv-02009-RBH-JDA
04-28-2023
Yahya Muquit, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Director SCDC; South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for temporary and permanent injunction and cross motions for summary judgment. [Docs. 21; 25; 31.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro so, filed this action in April 2022 in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the South Carolina Religious Freedom Act (“SCRFA”), and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”). [Doc. 1-1 at 12-26.] Defendants removed the action to this Court on June 24, 2022, based on federal-question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1.] On September 1, 2022, the Clerk entered Plaintiff's motion for temporary and permanent injunction. [Doc. 21.] Defendants filed a response in opposition on September 14, 2022. [Doc. 28.] On September 12, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 25.] The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 26.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on October 17, 2022, and Defendants filed a reply on October 24, 2022. [Docs. 30; 32.] On October 19, 2022, the Clerk entered Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 31.] Defendants filed a response in opposition on November 2, 2022, and Plaintiff's reply was entered on December 22, 2022. [Docs. 34; 36.] The motions are ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on either April 12, 2022, or April 26, 2022. [Doc. 1-1 at 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 26 (motions to proceed in forma pauperis, Summons, and Complaint signed on April 12, 2022, and April 26, 2022).]
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's verified Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 12-26.]
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). [Doc. 1-1 at 12.] He alleges that he “[s]incerely [p]ractices and [e]xercises the IFA [r]eligion from the Yoruba Nation of West Africa.” [Id. at 17 ¶ 1.] Plaintiff requested that SCDC recognize him as a practitioner of the IFA religion and allow him to start a “YORUBA/IFA Indigen[]ous African” study group. [Id. at 17 ¶¶ 3-4.] He alleges that most of his communications requesting to be recognized as a practitioner of IFA and to be allowed religious materials were ignored. [Id. at 18 ¶ 6.]
Plaintiff alleges that Michael Brown, SCDC's head chaplain, held a fiduciary duty to approve Plaintiff's requests but failed to accommodate his religious rights and violated the SCRFA and RLUIPA. [Id. at 18-19 ¶¶ 8-12.] Plaintiff asserts that, after constantly requesting items, he was allowed to obtain a prayer mat, a fila head covering, and one prayer necklace, but he was denied all other essential items and materials needed to practice his religion. [Id. at 19 ¶¶ 15-16.] He contends that allowing some but not all of the items essential for him to practice the IFA religion places a great burden on his ability to practice and exercise his religion. [Id. at 20 ¶ 17.] Plaintiff asserts that SCDC must allow all of the items unless it has a justified indication for denying the items and that the justified indication must follow SCRFA and RLUIPA. [Id. at 20 ¶ 22.]
Plaintiff alleges that the essential materials and items needed to practice IFA are: (1) a photo of Orisha, the deities and forces of nature recognized by the IFA religion; (2) a set of 16 cowrie shells; (3) strand(s) of white consecrated beads; (4) Elegua heads to place upon an altar; (5) obi, which are kola nuts used for divination; (6) opon IFA, which is a divine tray; (7) eni, which is a straw mat used to set up shrines; (8) ilekes, which are beads of different colors to mark the level of commitment; (9) iyere osun, which is divination powder; (10) herbs to be used for healing and spiritual baths; and (11) candles to be used on altars and shrines during services. [Doc. 1-1 at 14, 20 ¶ 21.]
Plaintiff has also requested to keep uncut hair based on his religious beliefs but asserts that SCDC denied his request even though they allow other male inmates to keep uncut hair. [Id. at 21 ¶ 23.] He alleges that his equal protection rights under the Constitution are violated because SCDC will not allow him to keep uncut hair but allows others to keep uncut hair. [Id. at 21 ¶¶ 24-27.] He further alleges that the denial of his request to conduct a “YORUBA/IFA Indig[e]n[]ous African” study group when other religions are allowed to conduct study groups violates his equal protection rights. [Id. at 22 ¶¶ 29-31.]
Plaintiff claims that Larry Epps, Susan Duffy, and Charles Williams, the chaplain, associate warden, and warden at Perry Correctional Institution, violated SCRFA, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause. [Id. at 22-23 ¶¶ 32-34.] He further alleges that Defendant Bryan P. Stirling, SCDC's director, violated SCRFA, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause by allowing SCDC to place a substantial burden on Plaintiff's exercise of religion and by personally denying Plaintiff the items he needs to practice his religion. [Id. at 23 ¶¶ 35-37.] Finally, Plaintiff asserts a negligence and/or gross negligence claim under the SCTCA based on the actions of Stirling, Williams, Duffy, Epps, and Brown. [Id. at 23-24 ¶¶ 38-42, 25 ¶¶ 45-46.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks an Order requiring “SCDC to provide/approve/allow each item and accommodation necessary in exercise and practice of the IFA-religion”; an Order requiring “SCDC to provide/approve/allow each item and accommodation necessary to obtain study-group(s) for the IFA-religion, and relev[a]nt studies”; a declaratory judgment that SCDC violated Plaintiff's civil rights, RLUIPA, and SCRFA; compensatory damages; and punitive damages. [Id. at 26.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Requirements for Injunctive Relief
The substantive standards for granting a request for a temporary restraining order and entering a preliminary injunction are the same. See Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying preliminary injunction standard to a request for temporary restraining order). Additionally, “[t]he standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). Accordingly, the undersigned addresses Plaintiff's motion for temporary and permanent injunction by referring to the standard for a preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
The current standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be ‘satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action. [Doc. 25-1 at 7-11.] Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies would bar Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court first addresses this issue and recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims on the basis of non-exhaustion and that Plaintiff's state-law claims be remanded to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to Federal Claims
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017). The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The exhaustion requirement applies even if the relief sought in the civil action is not available in the administrative proceedings. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Moreover, the exhaustion requirement applies whether the action was filed in federal court or was filed in state court and later removed to federal court. Blakely v. Ozmint, No. 4:04-22942-MBS, 2006 WL 2850545, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2006).
Exhaustion is defined by each prison's grievance procedure, not the PLRA; a prisoner must comply with his prison's grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules ....” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). An inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of an inmate's complaint because the inmate failed to proceed beyond the first step in the administrative grievance process); but see Jones, 549 U.S. at 219-24 (rejecting “total exhaustion rule” and holding that when presented with a complaint containing exhausted and unexhausted claims, courts should “proceed[ ] with the good and leave[ ] the bad”). Courts within the District of South Carolina have found an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies when he completes all steps of a prison's grievance procedure, and that § 1997e(a) does not require inmates to further appeal to South Carolina's Administrative Law Court. See, e.g., Ayre v. Currie, No. 05-3410, 2007 WL 3232177, at *7 n.5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007); Charles v. Ozmint, No. 05-2187, 2006 WL 1341267, at *4 n.3 (D.S.C. May 15, 2006).
To survive a motion for summary judgment asserting he failed to exhaust, an inmate is required to produce evidence in response to the motion that refutes the claim that he failed to exhaust. See Hill v. Haynes, 380 Fed.Appx. 268, 270 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that “to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial”); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (stating that once the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue).
Pursuant to the SCDC Inmate Grievance System, an inmate seeking to complain of prison conditions generally is required to attempt to resolve the grievance informally by submitting a Request to Staff Member (“RTSM”) form to the appropriate supervisor or staff member within eight days of the incident. SCDC Policy GA-01.12 ¶ 13.2; see Brooks v. Sgt. Davenport, No. 9:15-CV-3195-PMD-BM, 2016 WL 5425071, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2016) (finding it appropriate to take judicial notice of the grievance procedure), aff'd as modified, 721 Fed.Appx. 267 (4th Cir. 2018). If the issue remains unresolved after informal resolution is attempted, the inmate may file a Step 1 grievance within eight days of receiving a response to the RTSM. SCDC Policy GA-01.12 ¶ 13.2; [see Doc. 25-2 at 6 ¶ 25.] “A copy of the RTSM must be attached to the Step 1 grievance form.” SCDC Policy GA-01.12 ¶ 13.2. If the inmate has failed to provide necessary information . . . he will be given five (5) calendar days to re-file a properly filled out grievance.” Id. ¶ 13.3. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the response he receives to the Step 1 grievance, he may appeal with a Step 2 grievance. Id. ¶ 13.7; [see Doc. 25-2 at 6 ¶ 25.]
The policy can be found online by visiting SCDC's website for polices and procedures at http://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/policy.html and selecting the link for GA-01.12.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies because, although he has filed two Step 2 grievances regarding his religion, “neither involves matters complained of in Plaintiff's Complaint” and they “involve requests that are either moot or that were not ripe at the time of Plaintiff's Complaint.” [Doc. 25-1 at 8; see Doc. 25-2 at 6 ¶ 24.] Defendants have also submitted the relevant grievances that Plaintiff filed. [Docs. 25-6; 25-7.]
The record establishes that Plaintiff filed Step 1 Grievance Number PCI-0308-21 (the “21 Grievance”) in May 2021, complaining that he was not allowed to have a religious obsidian Oshun amethyst pendant necklace that the chaplain had previously approved. [Doc. 25-6 at 2.] The warden denied the 21 Grievance on June 3, 2021, informing Plaintiff that his necklace was not approved because his religion was not a recognized faith group within SCDC at that time but that the chaplain had submitted information to headquarters for approval to recognize the religion. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff then filed a Step 2 grievance for the 21 Grievance, “demand[ing] the right to obtain [his] religious necklace and pendant and stone set with the right to purchase a travel alt[a]r kit to honor and worship while any decision is being made about recognizing [his] religion.” [Id. at 4.] This Step 2 grievance was denied on June 23, 2021. [Id.] However, the warden subsequently approved two necklaces for Plaintiff [Doc. 25-2 at 6 ¶ 26], and Plaintiff acknowledges that he was allowed to obtain a prayer mat, head covering, and prayer necklace [Doc. 1-1 at 19 ¶ 15; see Doc. 36-2 at 1]. Thus, in this action, he does not seek the items sought through the 21 Grievance and instead maintains that those items are “not adequate and efficient to practice []or[] exercise IFA.” [Doc. 1-1 at 19 ¶ 16.]
Plaintiff filed Step 1 Grievance Number PCI-0147-22 (the “22 Grievance”) in March 2022, complaining that he was not allowed to have a religious book, a prayer mat, or ilekes in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). [Doc. 25-7 at 2.] The warden denied the 22 Grievance on April 8, 2022. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff filed a Step 2 grievance for the 22 Grievance, stating that he “was allowed to order these items on the yard what[']s the difference of . . . worshiping in RHU.” [Id. at 4.] This Step 2 grievance was denied on May 9, 2022. [Id.] As previously noted, Plaintiff filed this action in April 2022. Thus, at the time he filed this action, he was awaiting a decision on this Step 2 grievance. However, exhaustion must occur before a lawsuit is filed; it cannot happen during the pendency of the litigation. Germain v. Shearin, 653 Fed.Appx. 231, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[e]xhaustion has not occurred and dismissal is warranted when an institution's appeal process necessarily must continue after the filing of the complaint”); Cabbagestalk v. Ozmint, No. 9:06-3005-MBS, 2007 WL 2822927, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2007) (explaining that administrative remedies must be exhausted on the date of filing, and that “[i]f exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing, dismissal is mandatory”). Accordingly, any claims regarding Plaintiff's inability to obtain his religious materials while in RHU were not exhausted when Plaintiff filed this action.
See supra note 1 regarding the filing date for this case. Even if the Court used May 2, 2022, the date the Complaint was stamped as filed by the state court [Doc. 1-1 at 12], this case would still have been filed before a decision on the Step 2 grievance was issued.
Moreover, in neither the 21 Grievance nor the 22 Grievance-the only Step 2 grievances filed by Plaintiff related to the IFA religion-did Plaintiff reference any of the other essential materials and items the Complaint alleges are needed to practice IFA, request a study group for the IFA religion, or ask to keep uncut hair. Although Plaintiff asserts that he filed Step 1 and Step 2 grievances and a brief with the Administrative Law Court [Doc. 31-1 at 2; see also Doc. 30 at 25], a review of the documents Plaintiff has provided the Court shows a Step 1 and Step 2 grievance for the 21 Grievance and 22 Grievance the Court has already addressed [Doc. 30-1 at 36-37, 40-42] and
The record contains the forms from one other grievance that Plaintiff pursued through a Step 2 grievance; however, that grievance is related to obtaining copies of legal forms. [Doc. 25-9.]
Administrative Law Court filings related to the 21 Grievance [Id. at 39, 45-46]. As stated, these grievances do not establish that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the allegations complained of in the Complaint before he filed this action. Additionally, Plaintiff's assertion that he “wrote General Counsel and Bryan P. Stirling within a two year span petitioning Defendants [and] requesting these materials to practice the rituals of [his] religion” [Doc. 36 at 6] does not establish that he exhausted administrative remedies in compliance with SCDC's grievance procedure, see Brown v. May, No. 0:18-3347-TMC-PJG, 2019 WL 3225621, at *4 (D.S.C. June 27, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted as modified by 2019 WL 3219378 (D.S.C. July 17, 2019) (“[T]his correspondence to SCDC General Counsel does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because general correspondence will not substitute for SCDC's formal grievance process.”). Because exhaustion is mandatory and Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether he exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the allegations in the Complaint, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims based on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied for the same reason.
The majority of the documents Plaintiff has provided to the Court are informal inmate kiosk requests and RTSM forms [Docs. 30-1 at 1-7, 13, 38, 47-48; 36-2 at 4-5] and information Plaintiff provided to SCDC personnel regarding the IFA religion [Doc. 30-1 at 10-11, 14-35]. However, these documents are not formal grievances required to exhaust administrative remedies under SCDC's grievance procedure. Plaintiff has also provided certified mail receipts and removal filings [Id. at 49-51; Doc. 30-4] and argues that these documents establish Defendants' default [Doc. 30 at 26]. However, this Court has already found that Defendants timely responded to Plaintiff's Complaint and denied Plaintiff's request for an entry of default. [Doc. 18 at 3.]
State-Law Claims
Plaintiff's state-law claims could be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state-law claims along with federal claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, the Supreme Court has warned that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.... [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
A civil action for Plaintiff's state-law claims could be cognizable in this Court under the diversity statute, if that statute's requirements are satisfied. However, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction in this case because Plaintiff and Defendants apparently are all citizens of the State of South Carolina [Doc. 1-1 at 12-13], which defeats the required complete diversity of parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In the instant case, remand of the state-law claims is appropriate in light of the Shanaghan factors. The case originated in state court and, thus, Plaintiff would not have to file a new action. Indeed, Plaintiff sought to remand the case to state court after it was removed. [Doc. 10.] Moreover, the remaining claims present state-law questions. Additionally, “courts overwhelmingly remand state law claims where the federal claims have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Sutherland v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 0:19-2106-JFA-MGB, 2019 WL 9359728, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing cases), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 1672533 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2020). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims in this case and that those claims be remanded to state court.
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary and Permanent Injunction
In his motion for temporary and permanent injunction, Plaintiff seeks a
temporary restraining order prohibiting [Defendants] from assaulting, sexually assaulting[,] and raping [ P]laintiff and all further attacks[;] to not hide but properly investigate; respond to all grievances in a timely manner[;] allow [ P]laintiff to go to
the law library more than one hour one day in a week . . . so [he] can have access to the courts[,] make copies[,] and obtain legal supplies.[Doc. 21 at 1.] He further asks that, after a trial on the merits, he be granted “a permanent injunction prohibiting [Defendants] from further assault, sexually assaulting[,] and rape[,] harassment[,] and retaliation for practicing his religion” and that he be transferred permanently from Perry Correctional Institution. [Id. at 2.] Finally, Plaintiff seeks protection against anticipated future injury under the doctrine of quia timet. [Id.]
Plaintiff indicates that he is “temporar[i]ly on transfer while the Q2 dorm/unit HVAC is being fixed.” [Doc. 21 at 2.]
The allegations in Plaintiff's motion are unrelated to this action, and he has therefore failed to show that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Winter. “[A] party moving for a [temporary] injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed in the manner in which the movant contends he was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint. Thus, a temporary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm that was not caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action. Here, because Plaintiff's claims in this case are about being denied religious items, study groups, and the ability to keep uncut hair, which he alleges are essential to practice his religion, and Plaintiff's motion for temporary and permanent injunction has nothing to do with these claims and instead seeks injunctive relief related to alleged assaults and sexual assaults, harassment and retaliation, responses to grievances, access to the law library, and transfer to a different prison, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motion be denied.
Additionally, any request for permanent injunctive relief is more appropriately considered with the ultimate determination of the merits of Plaintiff's claims. See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 396 (1981) (“Where . . . a federal district court has granted a permanent injunction, the parties will already have had their trial on the merits.”).
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's motion for temporary and permanent injunction [Doc. 21] be DENIED; Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 31] be DENIED; and Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 25] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA and denied with respect to Plaintiff's state-law claims under the SCRFA and SCTCA and that the action be REMANDED to the state court to address Plaintiff's state-law claims.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.