Opinion
3:20-cv-04954-LB
03-01-2024
YOLANDA MUNOZ, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Re: ECF No. 28
LAUREL BEELER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this Social Security appeal, the parties stipulated to, and the court approved, voluntary remand for further agency proceedings. On remand, the plaintiff received past-due disability benefits. The parties previously stipulated that the plaintiff be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $4,000.00 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The plaintiff's counsel now seeks fees of $36,000.00, which is within the 25-percent limit allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the representation agreement with his client. The court can decide this matter without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the motion.
Order - ECF No. 23. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
Notice of Benefits - ECF No. 28-3 at 3.
Order - ECF No. 27.
Mot. - ECF No. 28.
The court declines the plaintiff s counsel's request to apply a 3.27 multiplier. See id. at 4-5.
STATEMENT
The Commissioner withheld 25-percent of the retroactive benefits, or $38,644.75. The plaintiff has a fee agreement with her lawyer that provides for a 25-percent contingency fee of the past-due benefits owed “at any time following an unfavorable or partially favorable administrative law judge decision.” The plaintiff's attorney has already received $4,000.00 in attorneys' fees under the EAJA. He agreed to refund the EAJA fees.
Notice of Benefits - ECF No. 28-3 at 3.
Free Agreement - ECF No. 28-4 at 1.
Order - ECF No. 27 at 2.
Mot. - ECF No. 28-1 at 12.
The Commissioner filed a response to the plaintiff's motion stating that he “neither supports nor opposes Counsel's request for attorneys' fees.”
Resp. - ECF No. 30 at 2.
ANALYSIS
Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social security] claimant ..., the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” for the claimant's counsel, which can be no more than 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). a court may award such a fee even if the court's judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has rendered judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the 25-percent fee based upon any past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
In considering a motion for attorney's fees under § 406(b), the court must review counsel's request “as an independent check” to ensure that the contingency fee agreement “yield[s] reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” Id. at 808-09. To evaluate the reasonableness of a fee request under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808; see Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. This includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than 25 percent in fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). If an attorney “is responsible for delay ... a reduction [of fees] is in order so that the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (cleaned up); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151.
The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney's fees by any award of fees granted under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012).
The 25-percent contingency fee agreement is within § 406(b)(1)(A)'s ceiling, and the amount is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The court finds that a fee award of $36,000.00 is reasonable under § 406(b). The plaintiff's counsel must refund the plaintiff the EAJA fees, which results in a net (remaining) fee award of $32,000.00. The net fee award is to be paid by the plaintiff's past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy.
IT IS SO ORDERED.