As in constructive notice, however, a defendant who has actual notice of a condition is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to correct it. See Mercer v. City of New York, 670 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1996) (holding plaintiff failed to meet burden where no evidence of a reasonable time to correct or warn about existence of dangerous condition was presented);Aquino v. Kuczinski, Vila Assocs. P.C., 835 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (App.Div. 2007) ("[N]otice alone is not enough; the plaintiff must also show that defendant had a sufficient opportunity, within the exercise of reasonable care, to remedy the situation after receiving such notice" (quotation omitted)); Mullins v. Town of Clarkstown, 583 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (App.Div. 1992) (finding defendant's response to dangerous condition reasonable as a matter of law). In Mullins, plaintiff's car skidded on an icy road, causing it to skid off the road into a tree.

Decided September 15, 1992 Appeal from (3d Dept: 183 A.D.2d 1073) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

In opposing defendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of James Murphy, an experienced logger, who speculated as to the cause of decedent's death and opined that it was unreasonable for defendants to leave decedent, an inexperienced woodsman, alone to cut timber. We find the affidavit conclusory and, therefore, insufficient to raise questions of fact regarding defendants' alleged negligence ( see, Wessels v. Service Mdse., 187 A.D.2d 837; Mullins v. Town of Clarkstown, 183 A.D.2d 1073, 1075, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 757). Furthermore, we decline to address plaintiff's additional argument that defendants' liability may be premised upon decedent's alleged participation in an inherently dangerous activity.

In Mullins v Town of Clarkstown, 183 AD2d 1073, the court stated that "in examining plaintiffs claims against the County, we note that, in accordance with the provisions of Highway Law § 139, the County enacted a prior notice statute . . . which states that no civil action can be maintained against the County for damages sustained solely in consequence of the existence of snow and ice on any highway unless written notice specifying the exact spot was actually given to the County and there was a failure or neglect to remedy the situation within a reasonable time thereafter." In Mullins v Town of Clarkson, supra, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the County was negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of the presence of the ice patch by remaining at the scene, closing the highway, or setting up flares.