Opinion
CIVIL 1:24-cv-01080-SOH-BAB
01-30-2025
SHARDA LE'JARDUN MULLINS PLAINTIFF v. ASST. JAIL ADMIN MICKY STERNISHA; CHIEF OF POLICE JERRY MANESS; and JAIL ADMIN GEAN SEIGER DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BARRY A. BRYANT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Sharda Le'Jardun Mullins, currently an inmate of the Columbia County Detention Center, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and at least some of Plaintiff's claims require dismissal, the Court enters its findings as a Report and Recommendation, and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. Based on this review, for the reasons outlined below, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on November 5, 2024 in the Eastern District of Arkansas. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). The Eastern District Court transferred the case to this Court on November 6, 2024. (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff failed to submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”) or pay his filing fee so the Court ordered Plaintiff to either file an IFP Application or pay his filing fee. (ECF No. 6). The Court also ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. (ECF No.). Plaintiff filed his IFP Application on November 14, 2024 and his Amended Complaint on November 21, 2024. (ECF Nos. 8, 9). Plaintiff then filed another IFP Application on November 21, 2024. (ECF No. 10). The Court granted Plaintiff's IFP Motion on December 11, 2024. (ECF No. 12).
Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he is incarcerated in the Columbia County Detention Center (“CCDC”) on a parole violation during the times in issue here. (ECF No. 9, p. 2). Plaintiff names three Defendants in his Amended Complaint: Jail Administrator Gean Seiger, Assistant Jail Administrator Micky Sternisha, and Chief of Police Jerry Maness. (ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff labels three claims in his Amended Complaint but alleges multiple claims within some of his numbered claims. In his Claim One he alleges, on October 28, 2024, Defendants Sternisha, Maness, and Seiger denied him the Arkansas Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) Hotline number, threatened his life “physically, sexually, and mentally,” used excessive force, and denied him mental health care. (ECF No. 9, p. 4). Specifically, Plaintiff states:
I was and still being threaten, sexually harassed by staff, medical neglected, neglected to see or talk to [a] counselor, [discriminated] against, improperly treated, and retaliated on here at Columbia County Jail.
M. Sternisha followed me into the pod and snatched my blanket out of my hand, and told me that she will keep me in the corner as long as she wants. I tried to move off away from her twice and she throw her hands up to block me. G. Seiger didn't do anything but
watched. Jerry Maness refused to allow me contact to PREA Hotline and still as of Nov. 12, 2024 have been denied the right to call. And Jerry Maness threatened my life if I press PREA issue. Threatened, sexually harassed, medical and mental health neglected, [discriminated] against, improperly treated, and retaliated on.(ECF No. 9, p. 5) (errors in original). For his official capacity assertion in Claim Three, Plaintiff states: “Holding me as .. hostage against the wall. Being denied PREA contact. Snatching my blanket out of my hand. Being threaten[ed] if I press PREA issue.” Id.
In his Claim Two, Plaintiff states Defendant Maness violated his constitutional rights on October 29, 2024 through his conditions of confinement and not giving him the right phone number to the Arkansas PREA hotline. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
I was called to Jerry Maness office and given a Military Rape Hotline And still haven't been given access to the right PREA number.
Jerry Maness threaten me if I press the PREA issue.
Mentally reliving sexual [assaults], denied PREA contact, and denied Mental Health assistance And threaten[ed] with my freedom and my life if I pressed PREA issue And being scared.(ECF No. 9, p. 6) (errors in original). For his official capacity claim in Claim Two Plaintiff states: “My freedom and life being threaten[ed].” Id. at 7.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff claims Jerry Maness violated his constitutional rights on October 31, 2024 by denying him the contact number for the PREA hotline and for threating Plaintiff's life and freedom. Specifically, Plaintiff states:
Scared, threaten with my life and freedom.
Jerry Maness called me into his office and told me if I called PREA he would put charges on me and make my life a living hell. And I would never be freed.
Scared and in fear for my life and freedom.(ECF No. 9, p. 8) (errors in original). Plaintiff does not make an official capacity claim in Claim Three. Id.
For relief Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No. 9, p. 9).
He also seeks injunctive relief to ensure inmates have the right to file a proper PREA report at the CCDC. Id.
Finally, attached to his Amended Complaint Plaintiff has additional explanation of the actions he complains. The Court finds this attachment helpful in determining what actions Plaintiff alleges violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff states:
On 10-28-2024 Ms. M. Sternisha Followed me . . . back into the pod after a pod search. She then followed me to my rack and snatched my blanket out of my hand, and told me that she can keep me in the corner against the wall as long as she wants. I then tried to move off and away from her twice and she throw her hands up to block me. As I put my back against the wall she steady approached me closer and closer until another inmate picked her up over his sho[u]lder and carried her out the pod. I have tried over and over to call prea hotline on her and have been denied. Mr. Jerry Maness has called me into his office twice since. Once given me a military rape hotline, and second giving me ADC Prea Hotline, but Jerry Maness threatened my freedom and life the second time calling me into his office. I have yet been able to contact Prea Hotline it being Nov. 7, 2024. I fear for my life at this jail. I am being threaten[ed], sexually harassed, medical neglected, [discriminated] against, improperly treated, and retaliated here at Columbia County Jail. It's not right and now being sexually harassed and threaten[ed] by officers, I'm in more fear being here. My motion for Restraining Order was denied, by Columbia County Sheriffs' Office that isn't right. Now being multiple law suits they are trying to retaliate against me ‘as well having my life threaten[ed]. Also I'm being still not allowed to file a proper PREA report and that is my rights. The officers Keep giving me the wrong Arkansas PREA Hotline number. Also Ms. Gean Seiger failed to do anything as Ms. M. Sternisha had me heamed against the wall.(ECF No. 9, pp. 12-13) (errors in original).
II. APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to vindicate a cognizable right. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F.Supp. 458, 464 (E.D. N.C. 1987). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff makes multiple factual allegations and claims within each of his numbered claims. Therefore, the Court will address each of Plaintiff's claims by subject matter rather than claim number herein. The Court will address: (1) Plaintiff's denial of mental health and discrimination claims; (2) Plaintiff's excessive force claim; (3) Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim related to the PREA; (4) Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Defendant Maness; and (5) Plaintiff's official capacity claims.
A. Denial of Mental Health, Discrimination, and Conditions of Confinement
First, while Plaintiff list denial of mental health, discrimination, and conditions of confinement in his list of claims in his Amended Complaint, he completely fails to allege any facts related to any of these claims.
Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court will consider well plead factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). However, while the Court will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Prison officials have a duty to provide mental and medical health care to Plaintiff under the Eighth Amendment. See Salam v. Delaney, 2015 WL 5693133, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 28, 2015). However, in order to state a claim for violation of this duty, Plaintiff must allege he suffered an objectively serious mental health care need, and the defendants actually knew of but were deliberately indifferent to that need. Id. at 8. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts related to his mental health care needs or purported denial of mental health care. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to any denial of mental health care claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Furthermore, while Plaintiff does enjoy protections under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from discrimination, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to state a claim under such Clause. The Court cannot determine from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, what type of discrimination he alleges, who purportedly discriminated against him, or how he was discriminated against. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of discrimination upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Lastly, because Plaintiff was incarcerated on a parole violation his conditions-of-confinement claim is considered under the Eighth Amendment. See Peterson v. Heinen, 89 F.4th 628 (2023) (holding a probationer held on an unadjudicated probation violation is subject to the Eighth Amendment because his detention is “part and parcel of the state's successful criminal conviction and ensuing punishment.”). This means Plaintiff must prove the conditions challenged were objectively, sufficiently serious, meaning they amounted to the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, and he must also prove the Defendants had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, meaning they acted or failed to act despite their actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm. See Baker v. Delo, 38 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff, however, failed to allege any complained of conditions, any risk of serious harm, and any culpable state of mind for the Defendants. Accordingly, he has failed to state a conditions-of-confinement claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
B. Excessive Force
Here, while Plaintiff alleges an excessive force claim against Defendant Sternisha, he fails to allege she used any force against him. Instead, Plaintiff alleges she “snatched” a blanket from him, cornered him against the wall, and spoke to him in a way that made him feel uncomfortable. (ECF No. 9, p. 12). The facts alleged against Defendant Sternisha do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. It is well established that “[v]erbal threats do not constitute a constitutional violation.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the use of offensive language does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmate's claims of general harassment and of verbal harassment were not actionable under Section 1983); O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (verbal threats and abuse by jail official did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation).
Furthermore, Defendant Seiger cannot be held liable simply because she is the jail administrator of the CCDC. As jail administrator, Defendant Seiger is only liable for her own conduct and cannot be held accountable for the misbehavior of her agents under a theory of respondeat superior or supervisor liability. Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir.2010). However, a supervisor may be found liable under Section 1983 if she is aware of “a substantial risk of serious harm” even if he is not aware that the harm has actually occurred. Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 552 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 842). To establish supervisor liability, the plaintiff must show a failure to train or supervise caused his injury. Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir.2011). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]he supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye [to it].” Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir.1995). “The question whether the official knew of the risk is subject to demonstration, like any other question of fact, by inference from circumstantial evidence.” Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir.1998). Therefore, if the plaintiff presents evidence of “very obvious and blatant circumstances” showing the supervisor knew of the risk of harm to him, then the fact finder may infer that the supervisor “must have known” of the risk. Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Seiger did not intervene when Defendant Sternisha cornered him in his pod. As the Court has already found, Defendant Sternisha's actions did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, accordingly, there can be no violation for Defendant Seiger failing to intervene.
C. Sexual Harassment
Thirdly, to the extent Plaintiff's claims regarding the purported sexual harassment by staff is an attempt to make a substantive claim under the PREA, it fails because there is no private cause of action under the PREA. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights or rights created under federal law. Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 939 (8th Cir. 2000). The PREA authorized the federal government to give grants to prisons and detention facilities that implement procedures designed to reduce the number of prison rapes. 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309. While there appears to be no Eighth Circuit decision on point, other courts have made clear that the PREA does not create a private cause of action. Johnson v. Garrison, 859 Fed.Appx. 863, 864 (10th Cir. 2021); Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 Fed.Appx. 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2017); Krieg v. Steele, 599 Fed.Appx. 213, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2015); Wilmoth v. Sharp, No. 6:15-cv-06057, 2018 WL 1092031, *3 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 2018). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible constitutional claims based on the PREA.
Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to allege any facts related to his sexual harassment claim. Accordingly, just as with his denial of mental health, discrimination, and conditions-of-confinement claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted related to his sexual harassment claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
D. Retaliation
However, Plaintiff's claims that Defendant Maness intimidated him and prevented his access to file a grievance or claim pursuant to the PREA is sufficiently stated at this juncture. Plaintiff specifically claims Defendant Maness threatened his life and freedom if he pursued his PREA claim. (ECF No. 9, p. 8). Inmates retain a First Amendment right to access the courts and to petition the government for redress of grievances. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-33 (1977). Inmates are entitled to “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Id. at 825. Furthermore, inmates have a constitutionally protected right to file grievances. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures). Moreover, inmates may not be retaliated against for exercising their First Amendment rights to file grievances. Id. Finally, verbal death threats by a prisoner officer could be found to chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from participating in the prison grievance procedure. See Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 992-3 (8th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated a claim, at this juncture, for retaliation against Defendant Maness.
E. Official Capacity
Finally, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff against all Defendants must fail as a matter of law. Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff's rights, and the only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Here, that means Plaintiff needed to allege a policy, procedure, or custom of Columbia County caused his alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff has failed to do so here as he has not alleged any facts regarding the policy, procedures, or customs of Columbia County.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended that:
(1) All of Plaintiff's claims except his retaliation claim against Defendant Maness be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);
(2) Defendants Sternisha and Seiger be dismissed without prejudice from this matter; and
(3) Plaintiff's claim of retaliation, against Defendant Maness, in his individual capacity only, shall proceed. A separate Order for service of process will issue.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.