Opinion
23-cv-03939-EMC
04-11-2024
THOMSA NEAL MULLINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DOCKET NO. 61
EDWARD M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider that part of its order on Defendants' motions to dismiss in which it dismissed with prejudice (1) the LMRDA claim and (2) the state law wage claims. Having considered the parties' briefs, the Court finds the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is DENIED.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Claim for Violation of the LMRDA (Count 2)
The LMRDA claim is pled against the Union Defendants only. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the Union Defendants violated the LMRDA because Plaintiffs asked the Union Defendants for a copy of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) but the Union Defendants failed to provide a copy. As the Court noted in its order, Plaintiffs' specific concern was the failure to provide a copy of the Cost Model; according to Plaintiffs, the Cost Model was part of the CBA. See Docket No. 59 (Order at 24) (“Implicitly, the Union Defendants violated [the LMRDA] when they failed to provide a complete copy of the CBA to Plaintiffs - i.e., including the Cost Model.”); Compl. ¶ 56 (“LOA #29, Section 1, subsection (j), . . . clearly states that once the Cost Model is agreed to, it will be attached to the CBA as Exhibit A.”).
The Court dismissed the LMRDA claims for two reasons: (1) the Cost Model was not, in fact, part of the CBA, and (2) the LMRDA claim was time barred. The Court further found that amendment would be futile and thus dismissed with prejudice. See Docket No. 59 (Order at 2425).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court's rulings were manifestly unjust. The Court does not agree.
On (1), Plaintiffs essentially argue that the Cost Model was a part of the CBA because it was an agreement entered into by the parties and, under the Office of Labor Management Standards (“OLMS”) Interpretive Manual (to which the Court should afford deference), such an agreement becomes a part of the CBA. See Mot. at 8 (arguing that “the Cost Model was created through the collective bargaining process and it derives its scope and significance from the CBA, and its terms agreed to by the union following negotiation”). The relevant part of the Interpretive Manual provides as follows:
110.300 "AGREEMENT" INCLUDES CHANGES
The question as to what components comprise a collective bargaining agreement depends upon several factors in each individual case. In addition to the basic agreement, any subsequent agreement or amendment, oral or written, which modifies the basic agreement becomes a part of the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, all agreements which are incorporated by reference into the basic working agreement become a part of it.https://www.dol.gov/agencies/olms/compliance-assistance/interprative-manual/100-member-rights (last visited 4/10/2024); see also Compl. ¶ 124-25 (quoting from the above provision).
In its prior order, the Court explained why the Cost Model was not incorporated by reference into the CBA (including LOA #29 which was undisputedly part of the CBA). See Docket No. 59 (Order at 20-21). Plaintiffs' suggestion here that the Cost Model was a “subsequent agreement” that modified the CBA also lacks merit. That the Cost Model was to be agreed upon by economic experts from United and Teamsters does not establish that the Cost Model was a collectively-bargained agreement between United and the union. Finally, Plaintiffs' contention that the Court relied on representations made by the Union Defendants about the nature of the Cost Model (i.e., being proprietary and confidential) at the hearing is unsubstantiated.
Indeed, whether or not the Cost Model was proprietary and confidential would have no bearing on whether it was part of the CBA.
Because the Court does not find manifest injustice on (1), it need not address (2). In other words, futility on (1) is a sufficient basis for dismissal of the LMRDA claim with prejudice. However, on (2) as well, there is no manifest injustice. The LMRDA claim was time barred based on the face of the complaint. See Compl. ¶ 43 (alleging that “Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class began asking for the ‘Cost Model'” and that a response to these requests was given in 2018). Plaintiffs' counsel's equivocation at the hearing on the motion to dismiss does not establish otherwise, nor does it support a lack of futility. See Docket No. 60 (Tr. at 32) (“[T]he gist of paragraph 43 is that they have, as a group, been asking. These particular plaintiffs have never asked for this before until February and March of 2023, which we, you know, provided evidence for.”). This is especially true given that (as the Union Defendants note) the complaint also alleges that Plaintiffs were effectively told, in or about December 2022, that the Cost Model would not be given to them. See Compl. ¶ 50.
The complaint refers to December 2023, not 2022; however, that is obviously an error since the complaint itself was filed in August 2023.
B. State Law Wage Claims (Counts 6-10)
In their motion to reconsider, Plaintiffs suggest that the United Defendants only moved to dismiss Counts 6-8, and not Counts 9-10 as well. It is true that the United Defendants' motion to dismiss specifically referenced only Counts 6-8 (plus Count 5) on two pages. See Docket No. 35 (Mot. at 14, 16). However, it is clear that the United Defendants intended to encompass all state law wage claims, including Counts 9 and 10, since they asked for a dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. See Docket No. 35 (Mot. at 16). Furthermore, Counts 9 and 10 (claims for a violation of PAGA and California Business & Professions Code § 17200) are essentially claims derivative of the other state law wage claims (Counts 6-8).
The Court dismissed the state law wage claims asserted against the United Defendants on the basis that the claims were preempted by the RLA - specifically because the claims required interpretation of the CBA and LOA #29. See Docket No. 59 (Order at 38). This ruling was not manifestly unjust. Contrary to what Plaintiffs argue, the Court did apply the RLA preemption test as provided for in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc). See Docket No. 59 (Order at 36-38) (adopting the reasoning on the fraud claim for the state law wage claims). And it is clear that the state law wage claims required interpretation of the CBA and/or LOA #29 because additional wages would be owed only if Plaintiffs' interpretation of these agreements were adopted.
To the extent Plaintiffs cite authorities holding that a PAGA claim or a Labor Code claim was not preempted, those authorities are distinguishable as they did not require interpretation of a CBA. See Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 986 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that “resolution of their claims does not require interpretation of the CBAs” because “a court will simply need to examine the wage statements plaintiffs received from United to determine if the statements comply with the requirements of § 226[;] [a] court will not need to interpret the meaning of any terms of the CBAs to determine whether the wage statements include United's name and address or an itemized statement of the hours worked and the applicable hourly rates”); Medina v. United Airlines, Inc., No. B293677, 2021 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 5463, at *14 (Cal. Act. App. Aug. 24, 2021) (holding that PAGA claim was not preempted because, although “the factfinder may consider, refer to, or apply some of the CBA provisions, the determination of whether Medina and similar employees were provided their second meal breaks will turn on an interpretation of California law, not the CBA”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is denied. Consistent with the Court's prior order, see Docket No. 63 (order), Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint within two weeks.
This order disposes of Docket No. 61.
IT IS SO ORDERED.