Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:02CV00032.
January 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By order entered November 17, 2003, this court awarded attorneys fees in this social security case to plaintiff's attorney for his efforts in securing a reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and the establishment of plaintiff's entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Citing the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 122 S.Ct. 1817 (2002), the court implemented a contingent fee agreement established by the claimant and the attorney prior to the initiation of proceedings before the Commissioner of Social Security.
The Commissioner of Social Security has filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Stated succinctly, the Commissioner argues that this court erred in considering time spent by the attorney both in the administrative proceedings and in federal court in determining an appropriate and reasonable fee for services rendered. The Commissioner maintains that under the enabling statute, 42 U.S.C. § 406(g), the court is authorized to approve a fee only for services rendered before the court, and not for time and effort expended by the attorney at the administrative level.
The court concludes that the Commissioner's motion for relief from the order of November 17, 2003 is without merit. The court believes that the Commissioner has misread the court's order.
Under Gisbrecht, it is recognized that contingent fee agreements provide the primary measure for attorneys' fees in social security cases. In so ruling, however, Justice Ginsberg cautioned the district courts to carefully review the underlying attorneys' fee petition so as to ensure that the contingent fee is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. In assessing reasonableness, Justice Ginsberg pointed to the number of hours spent by the attorney in representing the claimant as one of the factors to be considered. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S.at 808, 122 S.Ct. at 1828.
In the instant case, the court did not intend to award any fee falling outside the boundaries of 42 U.S.C. § 406(g). Instead, the court merely considered all of the hours devoted by the attorney in the case, both at the administrative and court levels, in determining whether the contingent fee was reasonable. The court went on to point out that because the contingent fee established in the case exhausted the maximum possible fee permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 406(g) for services rendered in a social security case, plaintiff's attorney would not be allowed to file a petition for an additional fee with the Social Security Administration.
Inasmuch as the court limited its consideration of services rendered by plaintiff's attorney at the administrative level to the assessment of the reasonableness of the contingent fee agreement, the court concludes that the Commissioner's motion for relief from the order of November 17, 2003 must be denied. An appropriate order will be entered this day.
The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record.
ORDER
For reasons stated in a memorandum opinion filed this day, it is nowORDERED
that defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be, and hereby is, denied.
The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this Order to all counsel of record.