Insofar as GSWP entered into contracts to sell treated lumber (the "lumber sales contracts"), those contracts are contracts for goods, governed by the UCC. See MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., No. CV 2013-48, 2014 WL 6461583, at *5 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2014). In contrast, the contracts to merely treat lumber (the "treatment service contracts") are better construed as service contracts, governed by the common law.

On November 18, 2014, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Great Southern Wood Preserving, Inc. ("GSWP"), Putnam Family Properties, Inc. and Putnam Lumber and Export Company (collectively, "Putnam"), and Whitecap Investment Corp. d/b/a Paradise Lumber ("Whitecap"), and against plaintiffs MRL Development, LLC and Michael Lucht (collectively, "MRL"). MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163055 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2014). J. [ECF 396]. On May 17, 2016, in a precedential opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.

It adds that it could not stipulate to a legal issue in any event. Dkt. No. 187 at 2 (citing, inter alia, Evans-Freke v. Evans-Freke, 2021 WL 6210673, at *19 (V.I. Dec. 30, 2021); MRL Dev. I LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 2014 WL 6461583, at *17 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2014)). The Court does not need to resolve the stipulation issue in order to address this stay factor, and concludes that CRC would be harmed if ordered to engage in discovery that may very well be futile, given the analysis in the R&R.

It adds it could not stipulate to a legal issue in any event. Dkt. No. 90 at 2 (citing, inter alia, Evans-Freke v. Evans-Freke, 2021 WL 6210673, at *19 (V.I. Dec. 30, 2021); MRL Dev. I LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 2014 WL 6461583, at *17 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2014)). The Court does not need to resolve the stipulation issue in order to address this stay factor, and concludes that CRC would be harmed if ordered to engage in discovery that may very well be futile,given the analysis in the R&R.

Lockheed only concerned an implied-warranty claim, and there is reason to conclude that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would find fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling applicable to express-warranty claims. First, RSA 382-A:2-725 expressly states that it does not "alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations," RSA 382-A:2-725(4), and other courts have interpreted that language to allow for application of fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling, see, e.g., JN Expl. & Prod. v. W. Gas Res., Inc., 153 F.3d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1998); MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., No. 2013-48, 2014 WL 6461583, at *8-9 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2014). Second, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has long found tolling appropriate in cases of fraudulent concealment, so that the wrongdoer does not receive "the advantage and benefit" of his fraudulent conduct.