"In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has the authority to correct errors of law and to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence." Mr. T v. Ms. T , 378 S.C. 127, 131–32, 662 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ct. App. 2008). However, the appellate court is "not required to ignore the fact that the [family] court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility."

In Mr. T v. Ms. T, the plaintiff filed a paternity action naming his ex-wife as a defendant and alleging that she committed fraud in leading him to believe he was the biological father of her children. 378 S.C. 127, 130–32, 662 S.E.2d 413, 415–16 (Ct.App.2008). The plaintiff also sought relief from the parties' prior decree of divorce, which had incorporated the parties' settlement agreement and had found that two children were born of the marriage.

In Mr. T v. Ms. T, the plaintiff filed a paternity action naming his ex-wife as a defendant and alleging that she committed fraud in leading him to believe he was the biological father of her children. 378 S.C. 127, 130-32, 662 S.E.2d 413, 415-16 (Ct. App. 2008). The plaintiff also sought relief from the parties' prior decree of divorce, which had incorporated the parties' settlement agreement and had found that two children were born of the marriage.

Cf., e.g.,Mr. T. v. Ms. T., 378 S.C. 127, 662 S.E.2d 413 (Ct.App.2008) (holding complicated decisions in family court proceedings cannot be made in a vacuum with an undeveloped record based on strict notions of finality).          Because this case comes before the Court in the posture of a party seeking summary judgment, the allegations in the complaint are deemed true for purposes of this analysis.

If Williams had been served, there are times when courts will not be collaterally estopped from modifying prior paternity determinations under Rule 60(b)(5). See Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 139-40, 662 S.E.2d 413, 419-20 (Ct. App. 2008) ("While this court acknowledges the policy consideration which thrives for finality of judgments, the equities of a case may be just as significant in overriding such finality[, which] especially rings true when the issue before the court is a determination of something so fundamental as the identity of a biological parent."); Ashburn, 420 S.C. at 415-16, 423-24, 803 S.E.2d at 470-71, 475 (applying Rule 60(b)(5) to grant relief from an order establishing child support and paternity even though paternity had previously been acknowledged).

When the movant alleges the judgment is void or that the nonmoving party engaged in fraud upon the court, the motion must "be made within a reasonable time ... after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." Rule 60(b), SCRCP (emphasis added); see alsoChewning v. Ford Motor Co. , 354 S.C. 72, 80, 579 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003) (noting "[t]here is no statute of limitations when a party seeks to set aside a judgment due to fraud upon the court"); Mr. T v. Ms. T , 378 S.C. 127, 134, 662 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The language of Rule 60 specifically excludes motions under Rule 60(b)(4) ... from the one[-]year limitation ... and indicates these motions must be brought within a reasonable time."); cf.Perry v. Heirs at Law of Gadsden , 357 S.C. 42, 48, 590 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding the circuit court did not err by finding a Rule 60(b) motion was untimely when the movant "failed to proffer an argument as to why [the appellate court] should find that a four-year delay [wa]s reasonable"). With respect to Wife's claim that she is entitled to equitable division of the parties’ property and military retirement benefits, we find the family court abused its discretion by finding she failed to file the Rule 60(b) motion within a reasonable time.

Although at oral argument Magruder's counsel opined the fraud alleged in this case was intrinsic, we need not reach this distinction because (1) fraud is Magruder's sole theory for seeking relief and (2) we see no fraud of either sort. Nonetheless, we are cognizant that Rule 60(b) provides for relief on grounds other than fraud. See Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 134-35, 662 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct. App. 2008) (observing Rule 60(b) not only lists grounds for relief other than fraud but also does not prevent courts from granting equitable relief from judgment when exceptional circumstances exist). While we heartily disagree with the State's characterization of Magruder's argument on appeal as "frivolous," Magruder failed to demonstrate attorney Harrison acted either recklessly or knowingly in making the inaccurate statements in the Affidavit.

Nonetheless, we are cognizant that Rule 60(b) provides for relief on grounds other than fraud. See Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 134-35, 662 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct. App. 2008) (observing Rule 60(b) not only lists grounds for relief other than fraud but also does not prevent courts from granting equitable relief from judgment when exceptional circumstances exist). While we heartily disagree with the State's characterization of Magruder's argument on appeal as "frivolous, " Magruder failed to demonstrate attorney Harrison acted either recklessly or knowingly in making the inaccurate statements in the Affidavit.

We agree with Wife that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is available only in cases of fraud upon the court or “rare, special, exceptional or unusual circumstances that may warrant equitable relief, including accident or mistake.” Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 135, 662 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct.App.2008) (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2868 (2d ed.1995)). Nevertheless, although Husband cannot obtain “relief” from the 1999 support order under Rule 60(b)(5), we hold he is entitled by statute to a supplemental order clarifying the terms of that order.

We agree with Wife that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is available only in cases of fraud upon the court or "rare, special, exceptional or unusual circumstances that may warrant equitable relief, including accident or mistake." Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 135, 662 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2868 (2d ed. 1995)). Nevertheless, although Husband cannot obtain "relief" from the 1999 support order under Rule 60(b)(5), we hold he is entitled by statute to a supplemental order clarifying the terms of that order.