Opinion
Case No. 2:23-cv-02549-SB-BFM
2023-10-20
M.P.D.A. et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Defendants.
Omer Martin Quiroz, Quiroz Law Firm APC, Los Angeles, CA, Lisa J. Jackson, Lisa J. Jackson Law Offices, Pacific Palisades, CA, for Plaintiffs Shirley Alejandra Caceres Aldana, Mauricio Alexander Diaz Pinzon, A Minor, Karen Dayanna Caceres Aldana, Kevin Mauricio Diaz Aldana. Jason W. Schaff, Jeremy James Schroeder, Nicole Marie Low, Flesher Schaff and Schroeder Inc., Rocklin, CA, Harjeet E. Gidha, Schroeder Schaff and Low, Inc., Rocklin, CA, for Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company.
Omer Martin Quiroz, Quiroz Law Firm APC, Los Angeles, CA, Lisa J. Jackson, Lisa J. Jackson Law Offices, Pacific Palisades, CA, for Plaintiffs Shirley Alejandra Caceres Aldana, Mauricio Alexander Diaz Pinzon, A Minor, Karen Dayanna Caceres Aldana, Kevin Mauricio Diaz Aldana.
Jason W. Schaff, Jeremy James Schroeder, Nicole Marie Low, Flesher Schaff and Schroeder Inc., Rocklin, CA, Harjeet E. Gidha, Schroeder Schaff and Low, Inc.,
Rocklin, CA, for Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 25]
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., United States District Judge
In April 2022, Carmenza Alejandra Aldana Leon (Carmenza) attempted to climb between two connected train cars while the train was briefly stopped in a rail yard near a railroad crossing. While she was still between the cars, the train began moving again, killing her. Carmenza's surviving family members bring this wrongful death action against Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company, alleging that Defendant was negligent in not posting warnings to deter trespassers from entering the yard or crossing the tracks at that location. Defendant moves for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 25. The Court held a hearing on October 20, 2023, and both sides submitted on the Court's tentative opinion, which it now adopts. Because the tracks themselves and the presence of the train satisfied any duty Defendant had to warn trespassers of the danger inherent in crossing the tracks, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
I.
The railroad tracks where Carmenza was killed are part of a yard with multiple parallel tracks running east-west through Ontario, California. The parties produce both aerial and ground level views of the site. Joint Appendix of Evidence (JAE) I, Dkt. No. 25-2. To the east, the yard is bordered by San Antonio Avenue, which runs north-south. Id. There is a grade crossing (i.e. a street-level crossing) at the intersection, with movable crossing gates and flashing lights. Id. About a mile to the west, Mountain Avenue (another north-south street) crosses over the tracks by bridge. Id.; Joint Appendix of Facts (JAF) P4, Dkt. No. 25-4. As depicted in the photographs, the area around the tracks is open and flat, with ample visibility in both directions along the tracks. JAE I.
Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the JAF are to undisputed facts, to the undisputed portions of partially disputed facts, or to the portions of disputed facts that do not appear to be genuinely in dispute based on the stated dispute. See Dkt. No. 18 at 6 ("If a party disputes a fact in bad faith by offering evidence that does not contradict the proffered fact or by failing to provide a specific citation to the supporting evidence, the Court will deem the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.").
On the early morning of April 20, 2022, Carmenza and three family members—her daughter Shirley Caceras Aldana (Shirley), her brother, and her sister-in-law—walked to the north side of the San Antonio Avenue grade crossing, arriving at approximately 5:20 a.m. JAF P1. All four of them had arrived in the United States from Colombia within the last 15 days. JAF P10; JAE 3-J at 129 of 160. Shirley worked at a factory on the south side of the tracks and needed to be there by 6:00 a.m. JAF P2. Two freight trains blocked the family's path: an eastbound train moving quickly and a westbound train moving very slowly. JAF P3. A video taken on Carmenza's cell phone from near the crossing, which indicates that it was taken at 5:34 a.m., depicts the two trains moving in opposite directions, with the crossing gates down and the red lights flashing at the intersection. JAE 1 ¶¶ 6-7, 1-C, 1-D. After waiting a while, the family decided to walk west to the Mountain Avenue bridge to cross the tracks. JAF P4. They walked westward parallel to the tracks for about ten minutes before realizing the Mountain Avenue
bridge was farther than they had thought, so they turned around and began walking back toward the San Antonio Avenue grade crossing. JAF P5.
After about five minutes, they saw that the grade crossing was blocked by a train that was not moving. JAF P6. Although the JAF is not entirely clear, it appears to be undisputed that this stopped train was the westbound train that they had earlier observed moving very slowly. See, e.g., JAF D3; JAE 4 ¶ 7 (Shirley decl.) ("I saw that a parked train was still blocking that crossing and we would not be able to cross there. The same train had been creeping along at a 'snail-pace' and had made a previous stop[.]"). The family members decided to cross the tracks and pass through two freight cars on the stopped train to reach the factory on the south side. JAF P6. The three surviving family members state in their declarations that they "believed it was acceptable to cross there because there were no signs indicating otherwise" and that if there had been signs warning against trespassing, it would have prevented them from crossing the tracks. JAE 4 ¶¶ 11-12; JAE 5 ¶¶ 11-12; JAE 6 ¶¶ 11-12.
They crossed in the middle of the rail yard, approximately a third of the way from the San Antonio Avenue grade crossing to the Mountain Avenue bridge. JAE I. The family had never previously crossed there, and there were no signs warning trespassers not to cross the tracks. JAF P8, P10. Plaintiffs produce declarations from four nearby residents who state that for years they have seen people frequently entering the rail yard and crossing the tracks, especially when the San Antonio Avenue crossing is obstructed; that trains frequently block the crossing for a long time; and that they have seen "train employees" allow people to cross the tracks at locations other than the grade crossing. JAE 7-10. Three of them also state that they have witnessed people cross the tracks by jumping between stopped rail cars, although they do not state that this is a frequent occurrence or that they have ever seen railroad employees encounter people doing this. JAE 7-9. The admissibility of these declarations is addressed below.
The evidence states that there were no warning signs "at the subject location." JAF P8. It is unclear whether "the subject location" refers to the precise point in the middle of the rail yard where the family crossed the tracks or to the entire rail yard, including the two crossings.
Carmenza and her family members entered the rail yard and "proceeded to cross over the parked train" by climbing between two attached freight cars. JAF P13. Carmenza was the last of the four to pass through, and before she was clear, the train began moving without an audible warning. JAF P14. Carmenza fell from the train to the ground and was run over and killed. Id. Several of Carmenza's surviving family members filed this action in state court against Union Pacific Railroad Company and Scott Prendergast, who was incorrectly identified as the train conductor. Dkt. No. 1-1. Union Pacific removed based on diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1. In the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC), Carmenza's successors-in-interest (her children, Shirley Alejandra Caceres Aldana, Kevin Mauricio. Diaz Aldana, and MPDA, a minor; her mother, Karen Dayanna Caceres Aldana; and her husband, Mauricio Alexander Diaz Pinzon) allege a single cause of action for wrongful death against only Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiffs' sole theory of negligence is that Defendant did not post any warning signs to deter trespassers from entering the rail yard. Id. ¶ 20. Defendant now moves for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 25.
The parties debate the timing of these events. Relying on declarations interpreting recorded data from the train, Defendants assert that the train stopped at 5:34 a.m., was stopped for 3 minutes and 11 seconds, and began moving and struck Carmenza at approximately 5:38 a.m. JAF D5, D7, D9-D10. Plaintiff contends that the accident happened at around 5:50 or 6:00 a.m. JAF P13-P14. The train's recorded data on which Defendants rely purports to depict activity from 07:51 to 07:57, which is either entirely irrelevant or, if representing Central Time, would appear to support Plaintiffs' account of the timing. JAE F. Moreover, the Union Pacific Railroad Police Department's incident report states that the accident occurred at approximately 6:00 a.m. JAE J at 118, 129 of 160. Regardless, this fact dispute is immaterial. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the train was fully stopped for less than 4 minutes, and they concede that they saw it moving minutes before attempting to cross through it.
II.
Defendant raises several objections to the declarations of Armando Guido, Blanca Fuentes, Marcos Najera, and Maria Zaragoza—the four local residents who describe trespassing behavior they have observed at the rail yard over the years. Dkt. No. 25-3 at 2-3 (Joint Appendix of Objections); Dkt. No 27 at 1-3 (reply brief).
Defendant's principal objection is that the declarations should be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1) because the witnesses were not disclosed to Defendant before Defendant provided its portion of the joint summary judgment brief to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that they did not discover these witnesses until August 16, 2023, that they obtained the declarations on August 17 and 20, and that they provided them to Defendant on August 22, 2023. Defendant does not appear to dispute the accuracy of Plaintiffs' representation; it merely complains that Plaintiffs waited to start their investigation until after receiving Defendant's briefing. But fact discovery closed on August 25, 2023, so the declarations were obtained and disclosed within the discovery period. Plaintiffs, of course, have no obligation under Rule 26 to disclose witnesses of whom they are not yet aware. Even assuming that Plaintiffs waited to investigate until near the close of discovery (which the Court does not condone), Defendant cites no authority precluding them from relying on information they then obtained within the discovery period. And while Plaintiffs evidently did not provide supplemental disclosures after finding the challenged witnesses, any such failure is harmless because they produced the declarations, which include the witnesses' addresses, less than a week after discovering the witnesses. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ("If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." (emphasis added)). Thus, Defendants have not shown that the declarations should be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1).
Defendant also contends that the declarations do not satisfy Rule 901's authentication requirement because they are not independently certified translations. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) ("To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is."). Defendant relies on Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2005), which is plainly distinguishable: The court found that a purported translation from Arabic was properly excluded where the translator admitted that she neither spoke nor read Arabic and "that her so-called translation consisted of
what plaintiff told her to write." Here, each declarant signed copies of his or her declaration in both English and Spanish. Defendant does not suggest that the signed English declarations do not match the Spanish versions. The Court makes no assumptions about the language abilities of the declarants or any translator and considers only the English declarations signed by the declarants, which Defendant has not shown are inadmissible as a matter of law.
Finally, Defendant complains that the declarations are unreliable because they contain "almost verbatim the exact same language," and the declaration of Marcos Najera states that he has observed people entering the rail yard for 14 years even though he has only lived at his current address for 8 years. This objection goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and since the Court cannot weigh evidence on summary judgment, Defendant has not shown that the declarations should be excluded. Defendant's objections are OVERRULED.
III.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record, taken in the light most favorable to the opposing party, shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there are no disputed material facts. Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact ... the court may ... consider the fact undisputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Furthermore, "Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
IV.
A claim for wrongful death based on negligence requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant violated a legal duty owed to the decedent. Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 9 Cal. App. 4th 88, 105, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1992). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim for two related reasons: (1) Defendant owed no duty to install signs warning against trespass, and (2) the train tracks adequately warned Carmenza of the dangerous condition she encountered.
Defendant also argues that it had no duty to fence the tracks and that any claim by Plaintiffs about the amount of time the public crossing was blocked is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. Plaintiffs' claim, however, challenges only the absence of "No trespassing" signs.
Under California law, a property owner is statutorily liable "for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself." Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). In 1968, the Supreme Court of California rejected the historical distinction between the duties a landowner owed to trespassers, licensees, and invitees, and
held instead that § 1714 generally creates a uniform duty of care. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). The court noted, however, that a landowner will not be liable under § 1714 when public policy clearly supports an exception to liability. In determining whether such an exception exists, courts must consider the following factors:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.
Before Rowland, "it was generally settled throughout the country that railroads had no duty to fence access to their tracks in order to prevent injury to unauthorized entrants," but now the existence of a railroad's duty of care turns on application of the Rowland factors. Silva v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1027-29, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 668 (2000). "Although the determination of duty is primarily a question of law, its existence may frequently rest upon the foreseeability of the risk of harm. Foreseeability may be decided as a question of law only if, under the undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion." Id. at 1029, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 668 (citations omitted).
Since Rowland, courts have repeatedly held that railroads are entitled to summary judgment on premises liability claims asserting that they had a duty to warn about the dangers posed by trains. Some of these decisions have applied the Rowland factors and determined that no duty exists. For example, in Abboud v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 02-CV-4140, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32245 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2004), a train killed a pedestrian who stepped in front of a moving train on an open stretch of track where he should have been able to see and hear the train. Analyzing the Rowland factors first in the context of a duty to fence, the court found that foreseeability (the first and most important factor) weighed against imposition of a duty:
[W]hile it is clear that some degree of trespassing on railroad tracks is foreseeable, the court does not believe that accidents of the present type are reasonably foreseeable. According to the undisputed evidence, decedent should have been able to see and to hear the train approaching. It is not reasonably foreseeable that a[n] individual with a clear view of the tracks and the oncoming train would nevertheless step out in front of that train.
Id. at *14. The court then determined that the other factors reinforced this view, including that "decedent's death is more closely connected to his own unfortunate choices than it is to Union Pacific's behavior." Id. at *16. The court adopted essentially the same analysis for the plaintiff's failure to warn claim. Id. at *22-26 (concluding that railroad had no duty to warn because the court's assessment of the Rowland factors "is largely identical to the court's evaluation of the factors with respect to the duty to fence and ought to lead to the same conclusion"). The court also noted the long line of authorities holding that "the danger posed by railroads is a patent one, and the railroad tracks themselves serve as a warning that such a danger is a possibility." Id. at *24. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding in a memorandum opinion by Judges Fletcher, Kozinski,
and Fisher that "the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' negligence claims against Union Pacific Railroad Company are without merit under [Rowland]." Abboud v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 182 F. App'x 724 (9th Cir. 2006); see also id. ("Judge Kozinski would affirm for precisely the reasons set forth in the district court's entirely correct order.").
Other courts have found railroads entitled to summary judgment based on the absence of a duty to warn without analyzing the Rowland factors. These cases rely on the well-established general rule that "an owner or possessor of land owes no duty to warn of obvious dangers on the property." Christoff v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 134 Cal. App. 4th 118, 126, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 6 (2005) (citations omitted). Applying this general rule to railroads, courts have repeatedly held that "the presence of railroad tracks is a warning of an open and obvious danger." Id. (quoting Holmes v. S. Pac. Coast Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 161, 167, 31 P. 834 (1893) ("A railroad track upon which trains are constantly run is itself a warning to any person who has reached years of discretion, and who is possessed of ordinary intelligence, that it is not safe to walk upon it, or near enough to be struck by a passing train ....")). Thus, in Christoff, the court affirmed summary judgment for the railroad against a plaintiff who was injured by a passing train because "[a]ny reasonable person would know that standing within a few feet of a high speed freight train is dangerous." Id. at 127, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 6; accord Carter v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting summary judgment to railroad on failure to warn claim because "[t]he Court finds the reasoning of Christoff persuasive and reaches the same conclusion" where "[t]he danger to Mr. Carter of walking along railroad tracks where high-speed trains run on a regular basis ... was obvious").
This general rule has been repeatedly invoked by California appellate courts since Rowland, both within and outside the context of railroad cases. E.g., Kaney v. Custance, 74 Cal. App. 5th 201, 215, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 (2022) ("Foreseeability is a question of law, and it is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious. Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition. In that situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will perceive the obvious and take action to avoid the dangerous condition." (cleaned up)).
Similarly, in Cruz-Sanchez v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., Judge Fitzgerald granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad, agreeing with the argument that "railroad tracks, in and of themselves, sufficiently warn the public of the obvious danger of passing trains; no additional signage or other warning mechanisms are needed," which he found was "supported by both commonsense and more than a century's worth of California case law." 16-CV-6368-MWF, 2018 WL 6017034, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018). Judge Fitzgerald therefore determined that it was unnecessary to balance the Rowland factors and determine whether there was a duty to fence the tracks:
[B]ecause the Court has determined that Union Pacific has discharged its duty to Decedent/Plaintiff by warning of the hazard of passing trains (i.e., a warning in the form of the train tracks themselves) and that no recognized "necessity" or foreseeability exceptions apply, the Court need not engage with the Rowland factors to decide whether Union Pacific also had a duty to put up a fence.
Id. at *10.
Here, too, the Court finds as a matter of law that the obvious presence of
the railroad tracks and the multiple active trains Carmenza observed before crossing the tracks—including the train through which she attempted to pass—sufficiently warned Carmenza of the dangers inherent in her act, and Defendant had no duty to provide additional warnings by posting "No trespassing" signs. Though it may have been foreseeable that Carmenza would attempt to cross the railroad tracks where the path seemed clear of nearby trains (despite it being an obviously dangerous act), it was unforeseeable that she would climb between the cars of an active train she had recently observed moving. Plaintiffs attempt to frame Defendant's duty generally as a duty "to warn Decedent of the dangerous condition of the railroad tracks in the subject location." Dkt. No. 25-1 at 12. But Carmenza's act of climbing through an active train was far more dangerous—and far less foreseeable—than merely trespassing in the rail yard. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority suggesting that the Court must treat Carmenza's extremely risky conduct as indistinguishable from walking across or near open tracks in the rail yard for purposes of determining whether Defendant owed her a duty to warn her that her conduct was dangerous. To the contrary, courts have distinguished between the foreseeability of trespassing in general and the foreseeability of especially reckless conduct in the vicinity of railroad tracks. See Cruz-Sanchez, 2018 WL 6017034, at *9 ("Even assuming that trespassers on Union Pacific's right of way in the relevant area were foreseeable ..., it was not foreseeable that a trespasser would elect to walk directly on the train tracks for an extended period of time instead of safely to the side of the tracks."); Abboud, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32245, at *14 ("[W]hile it is clear that some degree of trespassing on railroad tracks is foreseeable, ... [i]t is not reasonably foreseeable that a[n] individual with a clear view of the tracks and the oncoming train would nevertheless step out in front of that train."); cf. Berry v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., H-22-CV-331, 2023 WL 3819372, at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2023) (granting summary judgment for railroad and holding that under Texas law, railroad did not owe decedent "a duty to warn of the obvious danger of crawling under a railcar unbeknownst to the train's operators or any other person at the rail yard").
While Plaintiffs produce evidence that railroad employees frequently encountered trespassers in the rail yard and allowed them to pass, they produce no evidence that Defendant or its employees were ever aware of trespassers climbing through the cars of an active train. The tracks themselves provide sufficient warning of danger; the presence of the train through which Carmenza climbed was an even more obvious sign of danger. It is undisputed that Carmenza saw the train moving shortly before she attempted to pass through it; indeed, she even recorded it moving on her cell phone less than half an hour beforehand. Moreover, the reason she chose to trespass and cross through the train yard was that the very train she climbed through was blocking the San Antonio crossing, which had its crossing gates down, making it foreseeable that the train was likely about to resume moving. On this record, Defendant had no duty to warn Carmenza of the open and obvious dangers of climbing between freight cars on an active train by posting "No trespassing" signs. In opposition, Plaintiffs rely essentially on a single district court decision, Ward v. California Dep't of Transportation/Caltrans, 04-CIV-0678, 2005 WL 8177158 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2005), which denied a railroad's motion for summary judgment against a plaintiff who was struck by a train while crossing a bridge. The facts of Ward (which apparently has not been cited by any other court) are readily distinguishable. That case involved a two-level bridge, with the upper level containing a road and a sidewalk for pedestrians, and the lower level containing two sets of tracks with a wire catwalk between them. The plaintiff had crossed the lower level eight to ten times in the two days before the accident, as well as several times on a previous visit to the area, and had never seen a train cross the bridge. Id. at *1, 5. There was also evidence that "Union Pacific employees made contact with an average of 430 persons per year approaching or on the lower level of the bridge," on which the court relied to distinguish other cases where the defendants were not "on notice that individuals frequently engaged in the precise conduct that caused the harm." Id. at *5. In concluding that the railroad owed a duty to warn, the court emphasized that "[t]he trespassing situation presented here is unique in that the trespassing occurred over a railroad bridge, rather than on an open span of track, Union Pacific knew that trespassers routinely crossed this precise section of tracks, and the bridge is located in the center of an urban area." Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
The surviving family members state in their declarations that there was no whistle or other audible notice before the train began moving, but the wrongful death claim in their FAC is based solely on the absence of "No trespassing" signs. This Court's ruling is limited to the claim and theory raised in the operative pleading.
Plaintiff's reliance on Ward is not persuasive here. Where a plaintiff has safely crossed a bridge at least a dozen times without ever seeing a train and was aware that other members of the public had similarly used the bridge to cross, an argument can be made that the danger of walking near the tracks may not be obvious. See id. at *5 ("While train tracks generally do present an open and obvious danger, Mr. Ward testified that he knew that the lower span of the bridge was used by members of the public, that he himself had crossed the lower span on multiple occasions without incident, that he had never seen a 'No Trespassing' sign, and had never actually seen a train cross the bridge. Under such circumstances, a person could discount the risk of using the walkway."). Here, in contrast, Carmenza saw multiple trains moving on the very tracks she crossed—including the train she attempted to climb through—just before she crossed the tracks. There is no evidence that Defendant was aware of anyone—much less hundreds of people each year—attempting to pass through freight cars on active trains. The danger inherent in such activity is so obvious that Defendant did not owe any duty to warn against it beyond the warning presented by the tracks and the train themselves. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
V.
Carmenza's death was tragic. But her actions were so obviously dangerous that Defendant had no legal duty to provide a further warning in the form of "No trespassing" signs. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company is DISMISSED on the merits with prejudice.
A final judgment will be entered separately.