Opinion
C. A. 22-1697-MGL-SVH
09-19-2022
Rose B. Moumouni, Plaintiff, v. Chester County School District, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this employment case, an employee alleges she was discriminated against, sexually harassed, and retaliated against, resulting in her termination. Her former employer moves for dismissal, arguing she failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies.
Rose B. Moumouni (“Plaintiff”) originally filed this suit on May 31, 2022, against her former employer Chester County School District (“Defendant”). Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. [See ECF No. 14].
As directed by the court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 7, 2022 [ECF No. 11], but thereafter also filed an additional complaint on July 11, 2022 [ECF No. 14]. The court considers the latter complaint the operative complaint in this case. It appears this complaint is substantively similar to the previous complaint filed, but with certain errors corrected.
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 30]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF No. 42], it is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendant's motion.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges in part that her supervisor began sexually harassing her on February 22, 2021, the harassment was ongoing, she informed the school's vice principal about the abuse on April 13, 2021, she was placed on administrative unpaid lead effective August 9, 2021, and she was terminated from her position effective August 31, 2021. [ECF No. 14]. Plaintiff further alleges that during September and October 2021, she engaged in ongoing discussions with various individuals and the school board, appealing her termination. See id.
Defendant represents, and has provided supporting documentation, that on November 22, 2021, it received a letter from the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) from the U.S. Department of Education stating that it had received a complaint from Plaintiff that Defendant “discriminated against her on the basis of sex and retaliated against her in her employment.” [ECF No. 30-2].The letter indicates that due to the nature of Plaintiff's complaint, the complaint was referred by the OCR to the Equal Employment Commission (“EEOC”). See id.
Although courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), a court may consider documents outside the pleadings without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment if those documents are “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” and their authenticity is unchallenged. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2015). “In the employment context, a court may consider an EEOC charge and other EEOC documentation [when considering a motion to dismiss] because such documents are integral to the complaint as Plaintiff necessarily relies on these documents to satisfy the time limit requirements of the statutory scheme.” Pierce v. Office Depot, Inc., C/A No. 0:13-3601-MGL, 2014 WL 6473630, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing Williams v. 1199 Seiu United Healthcare Workers East, C/A No. 12-72, 2012 WL 2923164 at * 1 n. 1 (D. Md. July 17, 2012)); see also Adams v. 3D Sys., Inc., C/A No. 019-00663-JMC-KDW, 2019 WL 8754875, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 0:19-00663-JMC, 2020 WL 1527056 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (same).
Presumably an EEOC investigation ensued, and both parties have submitted to the court the EEOC's determination to not proceed further with an investigation of Plaintiff's claims and to issue a notice of her right to sue (“RTS”) on February 26, 2022. [ECF No. 1-1 at 2, ECF No. 30-3 at 2].
Defendant represents, and has provided supporting documentation, that on March 1, 2022, it unsuccessfully inquired into the EEOC charge, but the only documentation provided in the EEOC's respondent portal was a reference to the RTS. [ECF No. 30-4]. On March 3, 2022, Defendant filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request concerning Plaintiff's EEOC charge. [ECF No. 30-5].
Defendant also represents, without supporting documentation, that on March 9, 2022, the EEOC denied its request due to the lack of a filed court complaint and that Defendant submitted an additional request for information concerning Plaintiff's EEOC charge and awaits response. [ECF No. 30-1 at 3, 7-8, see also ECF No. 30-6].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 (2019); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). The allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint. King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that a subsequent civil suit “may encompass only the ‘discrimination stated in the [EEOC] charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge'”) (citing Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976)); see also Smith, 202 F.3d at 247 (“A plaintiff's EEOC charge defines the scope of her subsequent right to institute a civil suit.”).
Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII because (1) she failed to allege in her operative complaint that she exhausted her administrative remedies and (2) she failed to allege in her operative complaint that the allegations found in that complaint were also asserted in her EEOC charge. [EFC No. 30-1 at 5-7]. Defendant argues that although not obligated to do so, it has been unable to independently verify the existence or the contents of Plaintiff's EEOC charge and that “[w]ithout the charge itself, at minimum, the Amended Complaint must assert that the claims in her Charge reflect the allegations contained in the pleading.” Id. at 6-7. Otherwise, “the District may be unfairly exposed to liability and defense costs to claims outside the scope of the EEOC claims. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff submitted with her original complaint the RTS. Although an amended complaint typically supersedes the original complaint rendering it void of any legal significance in the case, Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001), in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the court considers this document attached to Plaintiff's original complaint. Defendant has also submitted the RTS.
Defendant asks the court to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claim with prejudice. Id. at 8. Although Plaintiff filed a response, she does not substantively address Defendant's arguments or indicate the allegations she made in her EEOC charge. [See ECF No. 42].
Defendant does not address Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to Title IX, claims that are not subject to an exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement and no notice provisions.”).
Defendant does not cite to, nor is the court aware of, binding precedent requiring a Plaintiff to attach an EEOC charge to her complaint or otherwise describe the contents of the charge. Indeed, this court has held a plaintiff is not even required to attach a copy of her right to sue letter to a complaint, where she had alleged “she filed charges with the appropriate federal and state agencies, received a right to sue letter and timely filed this action.” Thomas v. Dillon Sch. Dist. Four, C/A No. 4:13-00990-RBH, 2013 WL 6193044, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2013); see also Ervin v. Ebenezer Senior Servs., LLC, C/A No. 0:15-917-JFA-PJG, 2015 WL 5037108, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2015) (holding exhaustion sufficiently alleged where the plaintiff informed the court she seeks relief under Title VII and that she pursued administrative exhaustion of the claim by presenting it to the EEOC and where plaintiff submitted her RTS letter); Torres v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, C/A No. 3:21-CV-00001, 2022 WL 848063, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2022) (collecting cases holding that a plaintiff is not required to “attach the EEOC charge or right to sue letter to the complaint, or to otherwise describe the contents of the charge” and noting where a plaintiff has plausibly alleged exhaustion, “[w]hether plaintiff did or did not exhaust her administrative remedies is an issue of fact that cannot be addressed when ruling on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).
Here, pro se Plaintiff attached a copy of her RTS to her original complaint, a copy Defendant has also submitted. Defendant has also submitted a letter it received from the U.S. Department of Education detailing that Plaintiff had filed a complaint, which was referred to the EEOC, that Defendant “discriminated against [Plaintiff] on the basis of sex and retaliated against her in her employment.” [ECF No. 30-2].To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need contain only sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. The reasonable inference from documentation submitted to the court by both parties is that Plaintiff filed charges regarding sex-based employment discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC-the same claims that are asserted in her operative complaint here, and received a RTS prior to filing her complaint with this court. The court is unaware of a requirement to do more in this context to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss.
This case stands in contrast to others in this district where the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint and accompanying documentation were devoid of any indication as to the nature of the allegations in the EEOC charge. See Parker v. G4S Secure Sols. USA Inc., C/A No. 8:16-2993-TMC-KFM, 2017 WL 1058463 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 8:16-2993-MGL-KFM, 2017 WL 1048358 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2017); Holmes v. ResCare Home Care, C/A No. 2:15-3286-RMG-BM, 2016 WL 11407790, at *9 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2016) (attaching only a right to sue letter from the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission, not the EEOC), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:15-3286-RMG, 2016 WL 901253 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2016). However, even in these cases, the defendants' motions to dismiss were not granted, but instead, plaintiffs were provided an opportunity to provide specific details of the factual allegations contained in the administrative charge or attach a copy of the charge. See Parker, 2017 WL 1058463, *3.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendant's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 30].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).