Opinion
5:04-CV-134-4 (DF).
October 13, 2004
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (tab 2). After holding a hearing on this motion and carefully considering the positions of each party, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss for the following reasons.
I. FACTS
On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff Mothershed (a/k/a William R. Richardson) filed a complaint in this Court seeking relief against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for alleged constitutional violations. In general terms, Plaintiff alleges that the IRS violated the United States Constitution by harassing and discriminating against him. Plaintiff maintains that the IRS has engaged in First Amendment violations by abridging his civil rights. The complaint further states that Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative remedies and prays for injunctive relief and monetary relief in the amount of $1,000,000. See Pl.'s Compl., tab 1.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts four arguments in support of its motion to dismiss: (1) the IRS is not a proper party; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (4) Plaintiff's suit is barred by the prohibition against injunctive relief contained in 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a). Each argument will be addressed in turn.
A. IRS as Improper Party
An agency of the United States government cannot be sued in its own name without express congressional authorization. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952). Plaintiff has cited no authority suggesting that Congress has authorized the IRS to be sued, in its own name, in federal court. The Court, likewise, has found nothing to support such a position. See Deleeuw v. I.R.S., 681 F. Supp. 402, 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (stating that "Congress has not authorized the Treasury Department or any of its divisions or bureaus to be sued."); see also Castleberry v. ATF, 530 F.2d 672, 673 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); see also 14 Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3655 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) ("a person attempting to sue a federal agency or officer must demonstrate that the claim being asserted is covered by a specific statutory authorization to sue the United States, or that in effect the proceeding is not against the United States."). Because Congress has not authorized suit against it, the IRS is not properly before the Court, and Plaintiff's motion must be DISMISSED.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a lawsuit if the allegations presented in the complaint "fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (West 2004). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to determine whether the plaintiff's complaint, or any part thereof, states a legally sufficient claim for relief. See 5A Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (2d ed. 1990 Supp. 2000). The legal sufficiency of a complaint is governed by Rule 8(a), which simply requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A court evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must focus its analysis on the face of the complaint, but it may also consider any attachments to the complaint, matters of public record, orders, and items appearing in the record. See Watson v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 n. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff'd mem., 84 F.3d 438 (11th Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that the IRS "has and continues to harass and discriminate against me by violating the constitution of the united states" and cites the Court to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7433 (Lexis 2002). No further facts are set forth to support this allegation. Section 7433, a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, provides that a taxpayer may bring suit against the United States "[i]f, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence disregards any provision of this title." 26 U.S.C.A. § 7433. Even under the liberally construed notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), Plaintiff has simply failed to identify any conduct or behavior by an employee or officer of the IRS that would entitle him to relief. Furthermore, an action under this section becomes time barred if not brought within two years after the date on which the right of action accrues. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7433(d)(3). The harassment Plaintiff complains of apparently happened "since 1988 before and after." Pl.'s Compl., tab 1. It is unclear from this description exactly when the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred. However, Plaintiff conceded at the hearing that more than two years have elapsed between the alleged harassment by the IRS and the time he commenced this suit in May 2004.
Hence, the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's complaint do not articulate a legally cognizable claim for relief under section 7433, and even if his allegations were sufficient, by his own admission, they would be barred by the applicable limitation period found in subsection (d)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint must be DISMISSED.
C. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Before one is entitled to an award of damages against the United States under § 7433, a court must determine whether "the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies available to such plaintiff within the Internal Revenue Service." 26 U.S.C.A. § 7433(d)(1). The IRS noted at the hearing that it could not locate a single internal record showing that Plaintiff had pursued any administrative remedies within the agency. Plaintiff did not challenge the IRS's position. Further, Plaintiff's complaint fails to demonstrate, other than by conclusory assertion, that his administrative remedies have been exhausted. In the absence of a showing that such remedies have been fully pursued, Plaintiff's claim cannot proceed and must be DISMISSED.
D. Propriety of Injunctive Relief
In addition to monetary relief, Plaintiff seeks an "[i]njunction against any further collections or harassment." Pl.'s Compl., tab 1. However, the tax code contains a general prohibition against suits for injunctive relief. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a) (Lexis 2002). Specifically, the anti-injunction statute provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a). While there are several exceptions to the general rule, none is applicable here. Consequently, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the IRS which would interfere with its collection of taxes, his complaint must be DISMISSED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.