Opinion
Case No. 2:00-CV-855
August 16, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. #57, #60, #62, #69); Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Class (Doc. #63); and Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. #67). For the reasons that follow, the Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted; the Plaintiffs' motion is certify a class is denied as moot; and the Defendants' motion to strike is denied as moot.
I.
Plaintiff William R. Moss brings this action together with a purported class of Plaintiffs to remedy the alleged "dual system of education that denies [Plaintiffs] and Black children a thorough and efficient system of common schools, equity, equal educational opportunity, and equal protection of the laws." (Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 3). Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count I); intentional discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II); conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986 (Counts III and IV); and violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Count V). The remaining Defendants in this action are: the Columbus Education Association and its President, John Grossman; the Ohio Department of Education; the City of Columbus School District Board of Education and the individual board members; and various Columbus suburban school districts. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Specifically, the following school districts: Canal Winchester, Dublin, Franklin County, Gahanna-Jefferson, Groveport-Madison, Hamilton Local, Hilliard, Plain Local, Reynoldsburg, Southwestern, Westerville, and Worthington.
In its September 27, 2001 Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed many of the claims and Defendants initially presented in this case. The Court gave Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to specifically address the basis for certain claims in this case. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was filed on November 1, 2001. It is, however, nearly identical to the prior complaint. The complaint makes numerous references to the plight of black children in the Columbus school district and states, in conclusory fashion, that the same is attributable to the Defendants.
According to Plaintiffs, although the Columbus City School District has been desegregated pursuant to federal court order, many residents of Columbus have engaged in "white flight" by moving outside the city limits to the surrounding suburbs. Plaintiffs contend that the "Win-Win Agreement" currently in place has furthered such flight. The agreement was first executed between the Columbus Board of Education and the various suburban school districts in 1986 and was renewed in 1992. Plaintiffs claim that because of the agreement, black children in the City of Columbus school district are deprived of "a representative number of Black teachers, administrators, and staff. . . a full tax base from within the territorial boundaries of the City of Columbus, Ohio, and a curriculum that prepares youth, including black youth, to be productive members of society. . . ." (Id. at ¶ 38). Plaintiffs further contend that the Columbus Board of Education has "done nothing to address and remedy the racially discriminatory, hostile, and oppressive educational environment within the Columbus City School District." (Id. at ¶ 52).
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the "creation, promotion, maintenance, and operation of a dual system of education with persistent racial problems" violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 57). Count II alleges that the "creation, promotion, maintenance and operation of a dual system of education with persistent racial problems" violates the Thirteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. at ¶ 60). Count III alleges that the "creation, adoption, implementation, and repeated renewal and extension of an agreement known as the "Win/Win Agreement" was, and continues to be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as a conspiracy to interfere with, and otherwise deny [Plaintiffs'] civil rights and equal protection of the laws. . . ." (Id. at ¶ 63). Count IV alleges that the Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 "with knowledge of the wrongs conspired to be done as previously alleged and having power to prevent or aid in preventing commission of the same, neglected or refused to do so." (Id. at ¶ 66). Finally, Count V alleges that the Defendants, as "operators of federally assisted programs, "have violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by their "creation, promotion, maintenance, and operation of a dual system of education with persistent racial problems. . . ." (Id. at ¶ 69).
All Defendants seek dismissal of the claims presented. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and move for class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.
II.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). All well-pleaded allegations must be taken as true and be construed most favorably toward the non-movant. Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 637 (6th Cir. 1993). While a court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations, Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir. 1990), the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). Consequently, a complaint will not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless there is no law to support the claims made, the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or there is an insurmountable bar on the face of the complaint.
III.
A. Plaintiffs' Claims against Defendants John Grossman and the Columbus Education Association
In the prior Opinion and Order, this Court allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint with respect to their claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 against Defendants Columbus Education Association and its President, John Grossman. Plaintiffs alleged in their First Amendment Complaint that these Defendants entered into agreements that had the effect of promoting a dual system of education and that they acted in concert with other entities to limit the number of black teachers in the school district. (Opinion and Order, Sept. 27, 2001 at 8).
This Court expressed concern as to whether the claims were sufficiently pled and whether the claims are within the two year statute of limitations period. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to amend to "reassert the claims in a more specific manner with particular reference to the application, if any, of the continuing violations doctrine. . . ." (Id. at 11). Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint falls woefully short of this directive. The complaint is devoid of any allegations against Defendants CEA and Grossman. As a result, the Court concludes that dismissal of the claims is appropriate.
The Court also granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their Title VI claim against Defendants CEA and Grossman. Title VI provides that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The Court observed that a claim under Title VI requires that Plaintiffs allege intentional discrimination; the claim may not be proven by way of disparate impact. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001); D.J. Miller Associates, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Administrative Services, 115 F. Supp.2d 872 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts that would state a claim under this standard. In fact, the complaint contains no allegation as to how Defendants CEA and Grossman have violated Title VI. Moreover, Plaintiffs make no reference to Defendants CEA and Grossman at all. Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
B. Plaintiffs' Claim against Defendants State of Ohio and Ohio Department of Education
The only remaining claim against the Defendant State of Ohio and Ohio Department of Education is asserted under Title VI. As with Defendants CEA and Grossman, the Court afforded Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their Title VI claim against the State Defendants to articulate the facts which support the claim as well as to establish that the claim is within the limitations period.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to name the State of Ohio and the Department of Education as Defendants. Thus, these Defendants are entitled to be dismissed from the case.
C. Plaintiffs' Claims against Defendants Columbus City School District Board of Education and Individual Board Members
Plaintiffs assert claims under §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and Title VI against the Board of Education and the individual Board members. In its prior Opinion and Order, this Court noted that the original complaint made "only general, conclusory allegations [with respect to these claims] which contain few, if any, alleged circumstances occurring with the period provided by the statute of limitations." (Opinion and Order, Sept. 27, 2001 at 11). Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies. The allegations presented are identical to those previously assessed by the Court. Although Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to amend, the Second Amended Complaint falls woefully short of the satisfying the standards to state a claim against the Board of Education and individual Members Defendants. Plaintiffs' claims are therefore dismissed.
D. Plaintiffs' Claims against the Defendant Suburban School Districts
Plaintiffs appear to assert claims under the Thirteenth Amendment, §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, and Title VI against the various suburban school districts. In its earlier Opinion and Order, this Court noted that "[w]hile the basis for relief appears to be that the Win/Win Agreement, entered into in 1986, is allegedly unlawful, Plaintiffs fail to plead any connection with the various statutory and constitutional provisions. . . . Further, the few generalized factual allegations as to the Win/Win Agreement appear to raise issues barred by the applicable statute of limitations." (Opinion and Order, Sept. 27, 2001 at 25). The Court allowed Plaintiffs to amend their allegations but pointed out that Plaintiffs "must articulate the basis for each particular claim as to each Defendant, and must allege a basis for the continuing violations exception to the statute of limitations." (Id.).
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Court's directive. As with the first complaint, the Second Amended Complaint provides lengthy statements regarding the "dual system of education" and the negative impact of Win/Win Agreement. The Second Amended Complaint does not, however, articulate any basis upon which the suburban school districts could be held liable under the various theories advanced. Consequently, all claims against the suburban school districts are dismissed.
IV.
In light of the Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Class is denied as moot. Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify is similarly rendered moot.
V.
In light of the foregoing, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. #57, #60, #62, #69) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Class (Doc. #63) is DENIED as moot, the State of Ohio's Motion to Extend the time to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. #65) is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. #67) is DENIED as moot.
This action is hereby DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.