Opinion
5:22-cv-01662-GW (SP)
12-08-2022
MASTRI MOSHE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PETITION FOR FAILURE TO STATE COGNIZABLE CLAIM
HONORABLE GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 2022, petitioner Mastri Moshe, a prisoner housed at the Federal Correctional Institution Victorville Medium I, filed a “Notice of Alert,” which was docketed as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). Petitioner contends a unit manager at the prison has denied him additional time for access to the law library so that petitioner might prepare a motion for compassionate release or sentence reduction. Petitioner states he seeks assistance from this Court and the Federal Public Defender's Office to acknowledge the problem, in gaining additional access to the law library, and in stopping abuses by the prison staff and racial inequity.
Although docketed as a habeas petition, the Notice of Alert petitioner filed is not a true habeas petition in that, among other things, it does not state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the Court finds it is not appropriate to construe the Petition as a civil rights complaint. The Petition is nothing more than a notice; it is not even clear that petitioner intended to commence a legal action. Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed.
II.
DISCUSSION
“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). With the instant Petition, petitioner asks for assistance in gaining additional access to the prison law library so that he might file a motion seeking earlier release, but he is not seeking release from custody with the Petition itself. The Petition is nothing more than a vague request for assistance with the conditions of petitioner's custody.
Because the fundamental nature of the instant Petition is at most a challenge to the conditions of petitioner's confinement rather than to the legality of his confinement, it is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. See, e .g., Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (civil rights action is proper method of challenging conditions of prison confinement); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition on basis that challenges to terms and conditions of confinement must be brought in civil rights complaint); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242; 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (discussing the relationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal habeas statutes); Muhammadv. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus [citation]; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 [civil rights] action.”).
Although petitioner has not presented a proper petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court has discretion to construe the Petition as a civil rights complaint. See Willwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (holding that district courts have discretion to construe a habeas petition attacking conditions of confinement as a civil rights complaint despite deliberate choice by petitioner to proceed on habeas), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). But if the Court were to construe the instant Petition as a civil rights complaint brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) - which allows a plaintiff to sue a federal officer for certain civil rights violations under color of federal law - that would have a number of consequences.
First, the Court is unable to treat the Petition as a civil rights complaint at this time, because petitioner has not paid the $350 filing fee required for such a complaint to be filed. Indeed, petitioner has not even paid the $5 filing fee required for a habeas petition, nor did petitioner file a request to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, despite the Court informing him on September 21, 2022 that he had thirty days to do so.
In addition, construing the instant habeas Petition as a civil rights complaint would require the Court to screen the petition/complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding in forma pauperis, and by prisoners seeking redress from government entities. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. Under these provisions, the Court may sua sponte dismiss, “at any time,” any prisoner civil rights action and all other in forma pauperis complaints which are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek damages from defendants who are immune. Id., see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Although the Court has not thoroughly screened the Petition as a civil rights complaint, the Court's cursory review reveals certain defects. In particular, petitioner appears not to have named a proper defendant for a civil rights action, since petitioner does not name a defendant or a respondent at all. In addition, the Petition does not assert facts sufficient to state a claim against any individual for any civil rights violation. Petitioner states he is seeking to stop racial inequity, but he does not allege any facts suggesting race has any role in the matters about which he complains. And the primary matter about which petitioner complains is not that he has been entirely denied access to the law library, but rather that he is not being given the extra time in the law library he wants. A complaint states a claim against a defendant when it “pleads enough factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Here, petitioner has not named a defendant, much less asserted facts from which the Court could infer any individual is liable for a constitutional violation.
For the foregoing reasons, it would be futile for the Court to construe the Petition as a civil rights complaint.
III.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered denying the Petition and dismissing this action without prejudice.
Presented by:
SHERI PYM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.