Moses v. Chapman

10 Citing cases

  1. Bettis v. United States

    635 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1981)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that enlisted person's unauthorized use of military vehicle did not subject government to vicarious liability under the FTCA

    In Georgia, one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable. Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977), citing Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845(1), 149 S.E.2d 850 (1966); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Garmon, 139 Ga. App. 146, 227 S.E.2d 816 (1976). We cannot perceive how failure to insure compliance with the regulation requiring the Scout to be stored in the motor pool alone makes the injury here foreseeable.

  2. Brogdon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

    496 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 3 times

    And one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850) (1966). See also Cummings v. Grubb, 184 Ga. App. 872 ( 363 S.E.2d 167) (1987); Byrd v. Rivenbark, 183 Ga. App. 564 ( 359 S.E.2d 433) (1987); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827 ( 237 S.E.2d 450) (1977).

  3. Housing Authority v. Jefferson

    223 Ga. App. 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming denial of summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause and finding that the question of whether the lack of a smoke detector contributed to the plaintiff's injuries was for the jury

    " Negligence is predicated on what should have been anticipated; a tortfeasor is responsible for a consequence which is "probable, according to ordinary and usual experience . . . which human foresight can foresee." Jacobs v. Taylor, 190 Ga. App. 520, 526 ( 379 S.E.2d 563) (1989); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850) (1966). Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 ( 296 S.E.2d 693) (1982).

  4. Strickland v. Dekalb Hosp. Auth

    197 Ga. App. 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that summary judgment to defendant was appropriate when it was not foreseeable that appellant would leave hospital and shoot and kill his wife after being left unattended under the effects of various medications

    [Cits.] And one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850); accord Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 829 ( 237 S.E.2d 450). 3.

  5. Ramsey v. Mercer

    142 Ga. App. 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 20 times

    Not only was Ramsey familiar with weapons, but Code Ann. § 26-2908 makes it a criminal offense for anyone to intentionally and without legal justification point or aim a firearm at another "whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded." Insofar as Mercer is concerned, "`One is not bound to anticipate of foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable.' [Cit.] Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). Indeed, `unless and until there be facts or circumstances to indicate to the contrary, it will be presumed that every person obeys the mandates of the law.' Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 (5) ( 52 S.E.2d 465)." Wittke v. Horne's Enterprises, 118 Ga. App. 211, 218 ( 162 S.E.2d 898) (1968).

  6. Anderson v. Saffold

    134 Ga. App. 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 13 times

    Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga. App. 862 ( 162 S.E.2d 307); Benefield v. McDonough Const. Co., 106 Ga. App. 194 ( 126 S.E.2d 704). See e. g. Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677 ( 182 S.E.2d 164); Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850)." Ga. Power Co. v. Williams, 132 Ga. App. 874, supra.

  7. Ga. Power Co. v. Williams

    132 Ga. App. 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 9 times
    In Georgia Power Co. v. Williams, 132 Ga. App. 874, 209 S.E.2d 648 (1974), cert. denied (Ga.), two men were injured while attempting to raise a TV antenna near a house.

    Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga. App. 862 ( 162 S.E.2d 307); Benefield v. McDonough Const. Co., 106 Ga. App. 194 ( 126 S.E.2d 704). See e.g., Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677 ( 182 S.E.2d 164); Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850). The question of foreseeability in the utility line situation was dealt with in Georgia Power Co. v. Carden, 128 Ga. App. 347, supra, affirmed in Carden v. Georgia Power Co., 231 Ga. 456 ( 202 S.E.2d 55).

  8. Wittke v. Horne's Enterprises, Inc.

    118 Ga. App. 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 6 times

    Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald c. Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 716 ( 26 S.E.2d 545)." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). Indeed, "unless and until there be facts or circumstances to indicate to the contrary, it will be presumed that every person obeys the mandates of law."

  9. Bolden v. Barnes

    162 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 8 times
    In Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga. App. 862 (162 S.E.2d 307) Barnes' widow sued Bolden in a death action, alleging that Bolden's employee was negligent in blowing air into the gas line of Barnes' car while Barnes was removing the gas cap.

    Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald c. Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 716 ( 26 S.E.2d 545)." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). The evidence shows that the cause of decedent's death was his removal of the gas cap simultaneously with the application of compressed air to the fuel line by the defendant's employee which caused gasoline to spew out at the cap onto the decedent and into his eyes, causing him to retreat backwards into the kerosene heater and ignite.

  10. Howell v. Amerson

    156 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 8 times

    This defendant, having warned of the only defect about which he knew, fulfilled his duty. 3. That the husband may have suffered a fatal shock from his use of the drill a short while after borrowing it from defendant was not a foreseeable event in the light of defendant's action in changing the connection plug and making a personal test of the drill before lending it. Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). 4. It was error to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.