In Georgia, one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable. Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977), citing Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845(1), 149 S.E.2d 850 (1966); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Garmon, 139 Ga. App. 146, 227 S.E.2d 816 (1976). We cannot perceive how failure to insure compliance with the regulation requiring the Scout to be stored in the motor pool alone makes the injury here foreseeable.
And one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850) (1966). See also Cummings v. Grubb, 184 Ga. App. 872 ( 363 S.E.2d 167) (1987); Byrd v. Rivenbark, 183 Ga. App. 564 ( 359 S.E.2d 433) (1987); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827 ( 237 S.E.2d 450) (1977).
" Negligence is predicated on what should have been anticipated; a tortfeasor is responsible for a consequence which is "probable, according to ordinary and usual experience . . . which human foresight can foresee." Jacobs v. Taylor, 190 Ga. App. 520, 526 ( 379 S.E.2d 563) (1989); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850) (1966). Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 ( 296 S.E.2d 693) (1982).
[Cits.] And one is not bound to anticipate or foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850); accord Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 829 ( 237 S.E.2d 450). 3.
Not only was Ramsey familiar with weapons, but Code Ann. § 26-2908 makes it a criminal offense for anyone to intentionally and without legal justification point or aim a firearm at another "whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded." Insofar as Mercer is concerned, "`One is not bound to anticipate of foresee and provide against that which is unusual or that which is only remotely and slightly probable.' [Cit.] Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). Indeed, `unless and until there be facts or circumstances to indicate to the contrary, it will be presumed that every person obeys the mandates of the law.' Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 (5) ( 52 S.E.2d 465)." Wittke v. Horne's Enterprises, 118 Ga. App. 211, 218 ( 162 S.E.2d 898) (1968).
Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga. App. 862 ( 162 S.E.2d 307); Benefield v. McDonough Const. Co., 106 Ga. App. 194 ( 126 S.E.2d 704). See e. g. Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677 ( 182 S.E.2d 164); Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850)." Ga. Power Co. v. Williams, 132 Ga. App. 874, supra.
Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga. App. 862 ( 162 S.E.2d 307); Benefield v. McDonough Const. Co., 106 Ga. App. 194 ( 126 S.E.2d 704). See e.g., Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677 ( 182 S.E.2d 164); Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 ( 149 S.E.2d 850). The question of foreseeability in the utility line situation was dealt with in Georgia Power Co. v. Carden, 128 Ga. App. 347, supra, affirmed in Carden v. Georgia Power Co., 231 Ga. 456 ( 202 S.E.2d 55).
Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald c. Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 716 ( 26 S.E.2d 545)." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). Indeed, "unless and until there be facts or circumstances to indicate to the contrary, it will be presumed that every person obeys the mandates of law."
Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald c. Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 716 ( 26 S.E.2d 545)." Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). The evidence shows that the cause of decedent's death was his removal of the gas cap simultaneously with the application of compressed air to the fuel line by the defendant's employee which caused gasoline to spew out at the cap onto the decedent and into his eyes, causing him to retreat backwards into the kerosene heater and ignite.
This defendant, having warned of the only defect about which he knew, fulfilled his duty. 3. That the husband may have suffered a fatal shock from his use of the drill a short while after borrowing it from defendant was not a foreseeable event in the light of defendant's action in changing the connection plug and making a personal test of the drill before lending it. Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga. App. 312 ( 151 S.E.2d 157); Moses v. Chapman, 113 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 850). 4. It was error to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.